About two weeks ago, Chief of Staff Kochavi warned the home front about the possibility of a war in the north: "The home front will be damaged ... We will need national strength. It is certainly a force multiplier for us. "It is undoubted that it is important to explain the various threats to the home front while it is alive. A vigilante will be mobilized effectively in times of emergency, provide public support, and will be attentive to life-saving guidelines, especially in the era of the success of the Iron Dome system in certain complacency jobs. A massive and prolonged attack on the home front is expected in the future, and the public should be aware that Iron Dome does not provide hermetic protection and fails to provide effective response against short-range rockets and mortar shells.

However, beyond preparation on the level of consciousness, there are indications of deficiencies in the physical preparation of the home front for a military confrontation. About two years ago, the Home Front Command's General to the Knesset Home Affairs Committee described a basic problem: While the South has good capacity to deal with emergencies, many residents of the North do not have sheltered spaces in homes and low public shelter service. The general also acknowledged that evacuating settlements during wartime would be difficult to impossible.

The State Comptroller's report released last March revealed a lack of means needed for rescue and rescue, imposing surplus missions on emergency rescue and rescue battalions that would also help evacuate populations, gaps in rescue and rescue capabilities from high-rise buildings, and deficiencies in the operational readiness of the rescue and rescue forces. The plan to close the protection gaps in northern communities already approved by the Cabinet in July 2018 has been delayed for many months, and in the past year, the only resilience center in the north that has operated in the past decade has been closed.

In addition, the question of the division of powers of home care during an emergency between the National Emergency Authority (Rahal) and the Home Front Command. The issue has been in dispute since the establishment of Rahal as part of the lessons of the Second Lebanon War. Just last week, the Defense Ministry began implementing the Mizrahi Commission's recommendation that the Home Front Authority's powers be transferred to the Home Front Command and that Rahal be left as an advisory body only, but there is a concern about the consequences of the heavy responsibility already imposed on the Home Front Command.

Public confidence in the political and military function is an important component of national resilience, and it provides the maneuvering space and breathability needed by decision-makers during wartime. But in order to preserve and raise public confidence, mobilizing rhetoric is not enough, and thought, resources and efforts must be invested in improving emergency preparedness. The phrase "national resilience" is not a slogan in which the public is supposed to report to the flag undisputedly. All of its constituents - the consciousness and the physical - must be constructed as routine.