Again and again the public in Israel is required, and from time to time the courts are also required to deal with the pearls that fall from the members of the joint list, and especially from the BLD members. Again and again, we hear stuttering and evasive explanations that what has been said or written has not been understood or taken out of context. In those who oppose any use of violence, these explanations have often been put to the test, and in many cases the judges have been attentive, examining them with a narrow legal perspective, and ruling them out until the next case.

However, it should be understood that this is not a stumbling block or a mouthpiece, but a sequence of statements expressing commitment to the Palestinian narrative. We hear echoes of this narrative, by the way, over and over again from senior officials of the Palestinian Authority, headed by Abu Mazen. After all, Abu Mazen also tends to stutter or disappear whenever he is required to condemn terrorist acts or explain why the authority calls terrorists killed "martyrs," glorifies them and continues to pay their families salaries.

What, then, is this Palestinian narrative, which the members of the joint list often adhere to, in keeping with Israeli ears? Recall some of his claims. First, "Jews are not a people but have a religious belief, and therefore are not entitled to self-determination and their own homeland." Hence the stubborn refusal to recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people. Second, "Israel belongs to the Palestinians, the same Arabs who lived there before the Jews returned to their country." These Arabs, who later adopted a Palestinian identity, are thus landowners, and those who left it in 1948 have the right to return to their lands.

Third, "The Israeli presence in the Land of Israel, and certainly in the territories of Judea and Samaria, is an occupation." The occupation can and must be resisted with the utmost force, even using violence not only against soldiers but also against civilians, who are nothing but "colonialist" settlers who came to settle on Palestinian land.

The constraints on the Palestinian Authority have led Abu Mazen to conclude that, from a tactical point of view, the use of terror is not worthwhile or even harmful. But this is not a moral negation and the basis of the use of violence, and in any case we will never perceive Abbas condemning acts of terrorism against Israeli soldiers in Judea and Samaria, which both the Palestinian public and Abbas believe is a legitimate act. That is why he calls the terrorists "martyrs" and pays salaries to their families.

The members of the common list for the most part hold this narrative, which underlies their statements and actions. Hence, if Knesset members call Samir Kuntar "Shahid", it is not a one-off stumble or a mouth-or-mouth issue. However, there is no denying that the adoption of the Palestinian narrative by the members of the joint list opens an abyss between them and those who follow them, and the public in Israel. The Arab public in Israel supports the joint list not necessarily because it adopts its eyes with its eyes closed, but because it is the only political force that represents it and purports to handle its affairs. This is a testament to the failure of the Zionist parties to mobilize alongside them and integrate the Arabs into Israel.

The integration of Israeli Arabs into life systems in the country, as citizens of equal rights and obligations, is the way to bridge the abyss and to push the Palestinian narrative from the discourse of Israeli Arabs to the margins.