No surprise in the results of Iran's legislative elections last Friday. Conservatives and ultraconservatives have taken over Parliament, where their candidates have won 221 of the 290 seats. The alliance of reformists and centrists has barely achieved 19. The turn is not so much the result of popular will as of the shameless pre-election manipulation that eliminated the latter from most constituencies. Even so, it has also weighed popular disenchantment with the economic situation. Both factors refer to the relations of the Islamic Republic with the United States, whose enmity remains pending.
The discouragement has been evidenced in the low participation. Only 43% of potential voters bothered to go to the polls, the lowest percentage since the 1979 revolution, and that the voting schedule was extended five hours. This is a blow to the authorities that have always exhibited high attendance as proof of legitimacy and whose supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Jamenei, said on the eve of the elections that it was "a religious duty." Few have believed their subsequent excuse that fear of the coronavirus encouraged by the foreign press drove voters away. On the contrary, many Iranians suspect that those responsible have played with the announcement of the outbreak to justify disinterest.
The contrast cannot be greater with the mobilization that led to the re-election as president of the Hasan Rohani centrist, with the support of the reformists. Almost two thirds of the voters voted, in what was lived as a plebiscite on the nuclear agreement that his Government had signed with the great powers. The Iranians wanted their country to open up to the world and relate to the West. In the outgoing Parliament, elected in 2016 with a participation of 62%, the reformists-centrists added 121 seats compared to 83 of the mainists (as the conservative factions call themselves); The rest were independent.
The decision of the president of the United States, Donald Trump, to unilaterally abandon that pact was a slam of the door. On the one hand, it gave wings to the most ultras of the Islamic Republic, who never welcomed the reduction of its nuclear program. On the other, the embargo on oil exports and the closure to Iran of the international financial system that the Washington sanctions entail have sunk the economy, and discouraged the Iranians who relied on the reformists to make a change from within; protests over the rise in gasoline last November were repressed with forcefulness.
In any case, there was no alternative on Friday. After the disqualification of the majority of the moderate and reformist candidates, including 90 of the outgoing deputies, the conservatives lacked rivals in 230 seats. But even in capital Tehran, the constituency that elects more representatives and one of the few in which a complete list of moderate-reformist alliances was presented, the mainists have conquered the 30 positions in liza. A similar result has occurred in the provinces of Yazd and Tabriz, traditionally reformist fiefdoms.
That turnaround is both the result of abstention (promoted by some reformists and dissent abroad), and of disenchantment with the inability of reformism to realize its promises of change. Set against the ropes by the ultras, Rohani, as in his day President Mohamed Jatami, has swallowed the toad and has chosen to defend the system. "Regardless of the outcome and the political inclinations of the elected, we appreciate the participation of the Iranians," the president declared two days after the elections, in a gesture of acceptance of the conservative victory.
The new Parliament further weakens Rohani who is in the final stretch of his second and last term. Most of the new deputies opposed the nuclear agreement, which was their big bet. Although Parliament has no real powers over foreign and security policy, the predictable tightening of the speech predicts new tensions with the West and paves the way for the triumph of a conservative candidate in the presidential elections next year.
In addition, the Guardians of the Revolution ( Pasdaran ) have been reinforced, with whom many of the elected deputies are aligned. The Pasdaran constitute the most powerful branch of the Iranian Armed Forces and, increasingly, an important economic and political actor, something Rohani also failed to curb.
All of this suggests a worsening of relations with the United States. However, some observers are convinced that "without oil revenues, the regime cannot endure four more years." They argue that while the leaders have so far ruled out talking to Washington while not lifting the sanctions, the deterioration of the economy and the consequent social unrest will bring them to the table. What is not clear is how much more the situation has to be aggravated to take that step.
Factions rather than parties
In Iran there are 82 registered political parties at national level and 34 provincial. But that wordsearch has little relevance in the elections. Candidates are presented individually and although they are grouped into lists, voters have to select them (and write their names) one at a time. It is common for some to appear on several lists. Hence, despite the membership of a faction (reformist, centrist, conservative or ultra) more than militancy in a party that neither presents an electoral program nor then imposes voting discipline on its members, it is also difficult to gauge the orientation of those who they present as "independent" and then join the bench that interests them.
In the newly elected Parliament, there are 38 independents (including 5 representatives of religious minorities), in addition to 221 conservatives and 19 reformists. The rest of the seats will be chosen in the second round on April 17, having not obtained the minimum of 20% of votes required by law.