Raising the blocking percentage, they say, acted as a boomerang effect. If the intention was to make it difficult for the Arab parties to enter the Knesset, they would in fact unite on a joint list and answer the unprecedented rally of the Arab public.

But this process has another impact, which not many refer to: from ideological voting to small parties, the Arab public has shifted to a sectoral and pragmatic voting pattern, quite similar to that which characterizes the ultra-Orthodox parties.

This is a radical change, which can have tremendous effects on the political behavior of Arab Knesset members. They also know that the impressive achievement of the Common List does not necessarily signal the ideological adherence of the public to the list's positions, but its strong desire to integrate into political life despite the ideological chasm between the Arab minority and the Jewish-Zionist majority.

It's not in the sky. Representatives of the ultra-Orthodox parties, as they know, have for decades resisted being part of the government and settled on other positions in the coalition. Only after the Supreme Court ruling did the Deputy Minister of Health have to accept a ministerial appointment. This proves one thing: There is a theoretical possibility of integrating one or another of the Arab Knesset members into the coalition lot - and not necessarily as an integral part of the government. Whatever may seem puzzling or unthinkable, one can even imagine that a significant step in this direction will be made right now, and specifically with the Likud.

Fact: NIS 15 billion investment plan in infrastructure in Arab communities launched in Netanyahu's government, with partners Naftali Bennett (interested in annexation) and Avigdor Lieberman (who offered land swaps). In the election campaign, Netanyahu repeatedly repeated his intention to continue investing resources, most notably to amend or amend the Kamenitz Law, which allows the state to enforce house demolition orders. Correcting the law in collaboration with the Common List can be the basis for a pragmatic connection, despite its ideological remoteness.

Both parties should show responsibility. Ayman Odeh can prove that he does not wait until the day when a clear majority is achieved by the ideological left in Israel to make his party, as a sectoral party, an active partner in the decision-making process. Too bad it would be to waste the electoral achievement.

Netanyahu can seize the opportunity to establish the stability of his next government through some kind of cooperation with the joint, and in this way also signal his desire to build trust and prove to every Arab child in Israel that he is also his prime minister. Both of them will be signed in this way to a modest start to the healing process of one of the major tensions in Israeli society - without betraying their ideology. I wouldn't be surprised if she waited for a call.