Although the Covid-19 crisis is, above all, a health crisis, it does not leave aside the current geopolitical rivalries, which have persisted and even been more vigorous for several weeks. The commercial rivalry between China and the United States, which has dragged on for more than two years, and which has been joined by a technological rivalry (especially in the case of Huawei's 5G network), remains palpable. The so-called "phase 1" preliminary trade agreement, signed three months ago and intended to calm the next, more ambitious trade negotiations, is beginning to take effect now, with a delay due in part to the crisis, and not marks the end of disputes between Beijing and Washington.
But the tensions are also political and, increasingly, ideological. "The results of the prevention and control work have once again demonstrated the remarkable advantages of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese-characteristic socialist system," President Xi Jinping told more than 170,000 party cadres gathered by videoconference at the end. February, almost two months after the epidemic began in Wuhan, although the situation remained critical in the Chinese territory, and it had already become a pandemic, killing thousands of people in Europe, and soon beyond.
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This surprising boldness falls in line with the appeal to the "four trusts in itself" made by the Chinese president since 2016: then, he called on the entire party to trust their own "way", their own "theories", their own "culture" and its own "system"; that is, according to official terminology, "the advanced and superior character of Chinese socialism" with respect to other political systems.
It is precisely this alleged superiority that the Chinese authorities intend to project today through the extensive international communication campaign launched since the beginning of the crisis, in which they praise the construction of field hospitals, boast of the capacity for medical innovation and technology company, they cite various foreign personalities who have approved of its management of the crisis and urge other countries to follow Chinese methods. On Twitter, Chinese official communications do not hesitate to highlight the alleged flaws of other political systems or to defend conspiracy theories, such as the one hinting that the virus would come from abroad.
At the same time, the propaganda campaign stages the material and logistical aid sent to various countries, doing its utmost to present China as a saving power of the world. Although the hasty parallels between political systems and their ability to manage the Covid-19 crisis remain blurred as the pandemic progresses around the world and it is observed that factors other than politicians influence the management of a health crisis From this dimension (previous experiences with similar crises, structuring and level of the health system, level of economic development, etc.), the Chinese Communist Party will continue to affirm that its model of government is superior to others.
The propaganda campaign stages the material and logistical aid sent to various countries, doing its utmost to present China as a saving power of the world
This position is not new: since 2013, Xi Jinping's China aspires to promote its government model beyond its borders. The country is trying to position itself as a reference power, as a "solution" for the world. It already does this through, for example, training programs, which the authorities increasingly offer to senior officials and professionals in developing countries. Although many of these programs are technical in nature, they also include a political and ideological dimension, which explicitly pushes recipients to draw inspiration from the Chinese model when making decisions and developing economic, social or political reforms.
The coronavirus crisis can contribute to polarizing globalization, with the restructuring of supply chains and the emergence of less interdependent commercial “poles”, but also to polarize modes of government and even ways of life (economic and political governance , city administration, individual data management, etc.). Because some technological tools and methods used by China in the Covid-19 crisis could last and be used for other uses after the crisis, helped by the international promotion efforts of Chinese technology companies and the central government - already observable - . For example, various aspects of the social credit system have been tested in recent months, as well as the use of robots and drones and the extensive collection and use of individual data by public authorities. It is possible that, when the crisis ends, the use of these instruments and methods will not only intensify in the Chinese territory —to face other crises, not only sanitary— but will be exported to other countries.
Although this polarization is, at the moment, hypothetical, the Chinese leaders are already thinking about it when promoting the "new silk routes", officially conceived and presented as a new and alternative form of globalization. Chinese diplomacy now reinforces the promotion of the new silk routes, presented as a new solution to health problems, but also to logistics, technology, and other challenges related - more or less directly - to the Covid crisis -19. Under this general objective that a priori may appear consensual, the activism of Chinese diplomacy has accelerated these weeks in several international organizations - from the WHO to the G20 - and will probably extend to other organizations in the coming months (WTO, BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, etc.).
Chinese diplomacy aims not only to promote its national governance system, but also to accelerate the restructuring of global governance. The world has already entered a period of tough political and ideological competition, which is accelerating with the Covid-19 crisis, and which is not only the result of Sino-American tensions. Since 2013 —that is, long before trade tensions with Washington appeared—, Xi Jinping has constantly asked the country to prepare for a long period of "cooperation and conflict" between two different political systems: "socialism" and " capitalism". Whatever the labels, China will try to present itself to the world as the country that has best managed to manage the crisis, especially when compared to the United States.
Alice Ekman is a specialist researcher in China and an analyst responsible for Asia at the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). She is the author of Rouge vif: l'idéal communiste chinois , which has just been published by Editions de l'Observatoire.
Translation by María Luisa Rodríguez Tapia
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