Crisis management: why are the French more defiant of their government than their neighbors?

Bruno Cautrès is a CNRS and CEVIPOF researcher. His research focuses mainly on the analysis of political behavior and attitudes.

FIGAROVOX.- The latest barometer produced by OpinionWay for CEVIPOF and the economics department of Sciences Po reveals a strong distrust of the French with regard to government and its crisis management. How do you interpret it?

Bruno CAUTRÈS.- We cannot, of course, summarize this situation in one dimension. On the eve of the epidemic crisis and containment, the popularity of the executive was not very high anyway. The executive therefore approached this crisis in an already difficult position. In addition, there were many hesitations and some communication errors, until the communication was taken over by the Prime Minister during his first press conference with experts. The initiation of this sequence was therefore not good at the start.

The question of masks, in particular the way in which public opinion has experienced government communication, is the most telling example: basically, the French have largely overcome the hesitations and paradoxical injunctions of the executive on this question. Each of us can experience it: by doing our shopping, we can see that the French put on masks and have gone by themselves to wear the mask. Finally, it is true that confidence in elected officials and the world of politics is quite low in France. The political distrust is still there, three years after the election of Emmanuel Macron, but we must not forget that it also existed before him.

We note that the Germans and the British however have a much stronger confidence in their Head of State. Why? Have there been any errors in crisis management that have been particularly criticized in France?

The prevailing feeling in public opinion in France is that mistakes have been made in the management of the crisis. There is some doubt about the information given on the masks in particular. This does not mean that the French do not recognize the efforts made: they are in favor of the economic support measures for the crisis. But they are in doubt and distrust on the health management of the government. It is a diffuse feeling, which undoubtedly was nourished by the contradictory injunctions of the beginning (for example, the call to go to work with the farmers while firmly calling to stay at home), of the hesitations that the public perceives on the question of masks. We saw during the Great National Debate that one remark came up a lot: why a certain number of problems (schools, hospitals, poverty for example) are never resolved when we pay a lot of taxes? The paradox is that Emmanuel Macron intended to be the one who was going to answer this question and resolve it. And for the moment, three years after his election, he has trouble convincing that this is the case.

The study shows that the French are asking for a stronger, more efficient and more protectionist state. Is public opinion becoming more and more Eurosceptic?

The word "eurosceptic" is a catch-all word, not very well defined if it is not accompanied by more content. Specialists in the analysis of public opinion vis-à-vis Europe usually distinguish between “soft euroscepticism” and “hard euroscepticism”. The aim is to differentiate the questioning of the modalities and choices of EU public policies (soft version) from the questioning of the very principle of European integration (hard version). We have seen that Brexit marks a questioning of membership of the EU in principle, a question of national sovereignty that is not negotiable for part of the British.

In France, the majority of public opinion is not in a rejection of Europe on the principle; for the majority of the French, we are in the European Union and there will be no turning back; on the other hand, for many French people, the how and the why of this integration of France into the EU has become much more difficult to see. Europe for what, with whom, within what limits? Forms of contestation, in substance, European choices had emerged, especially in 2005 and this politicization of European issues was good news for the democratic construction of Europe because opinions need ideological guidelines to better appropriate Europe. Our data show that today the question of borders and the protection of national space is coming back to the fore. The health crisis will leave us a world where the question of sanitary control of space will occupy a central role. The articulation between national sovereignty and European level will play a major role here. In the background, the question of popular consent for more European integration still arises.

Should we expect a political crisis once the health crisis is "contained"? Can Emmanuel Macron get out of it by means of a "government of harmony"?

No one can know what will come out of this crisis politically. The "government of concord" has already been experienced after wars. We are not in a classic war, with destroyed cities, millions of deaths, but we are still in a very serious crisis which takes its toll. This crisis will leave traumatic traces for many French people. The politician must be there!

But at the same time, the model of government of "concord" poses real problems that it would be really serious not to manage: the first, not the least, is that of popular legitimacy on which this government of "concord" would rest. " When and how can the sovereign people decide on this formula and its outlines? ” We cannot, in a democracy, reorient fundamentally the choices of public policies and the most essential decisions without the ballot boxes being expressed. Furthermore, in a country where political parties are invested with very low confidence and where the image of politicians is calamitous, the government of "harmony" could quickly pass for an above-ground government. This question cannot be settled by referendum although there is the possibility of a "legislative referendum" (relating to reforms affecting economic, social or environmental policy and the public services which contribute to it). In fact, only legislative elections can establish popular legitimacy and indicate which parliamentary majority and which coalition can implement things. Furthermore, such a project, a fairly clear break with the result of the 2017 elections, would involve an executive very, very supported by opinion, which is not the case at the moment anyway.

What did you think of the press conference of Edouard Philippe and Olivier Véran yesterday? Does it go in the direction of a communication capable of responding to the growing anxiety of the population?

The model for this communication is beginning to be gradually established. Of course some may find the exercise too long. One can also criticize the choice of having taken so long to come on the subject of "deconfinement", masks and tests. Everyone expected more specific things. However, I find three strong points at this press conference: the seriousness with the presentation of figures and graphs, the presence of an expert epidemiologist; the educational effort even if the exercise may have seemed a bit arid; the lack of emphasis and the sobriety of the oratorical style adopted.

It seems to me that today we need the word of the State more, in the almost Gaullian sense that we give to this term in France, than an overhanging word on "the world after", a concept which means almost nothing. If transparency in the data, recognition of difficulties and of what is not known are fundamental points to maintain, efficiency in implementation will be even more important. Because many of us can legitimately wonder how our country could have been taken aback in this way on several points in this crisis where the responsiveness and dedication of the caregivers were more than admirable.