One year and four months after completing his term, Gadi Eisenkott misses doing: "I was a military secretary of Sharon and Barak, influence is through leadership." Prisoner Deal: "Shalit Model Should Not Be Repeated"

For a year and three months, Gadi Eisenkot has been out of the army, and it is difficult to say that he was able to disengage. While he avoids getting involved, he is very involved and makes sure to stay up to date. What happens in Israel and around the world engages him, and often upsets him. Eisenkot was also left on my citizens when he was, careful and moderate in his speech, but his determination and opinion were still there.

The IDF's 21st chief of staff has so far refrained from being interviewed extensively, not to appear to be interfering with the work of his replacement, nor because he wanted to get caught up in the turbulent election campaigns, though his name has been embedded as a potential candidate for a number of positions and parties.

Now, for the first time, he's talking about everything. On Iran and Hezbollah, on Gaza and Judea, on the failure of Khan Yunis and his successes, and on his plans for the future, with a particularly thick wink to politics.

Eisenkott (60) is one of the most prominent commanders of what is known as the "Lebanese Generation" IDF. Ehud Barak's government, in a decision to withdraw from Lebanon and at the time of the actual withdrawal, exactly 20 years ago, Looking back, he is convinced that this was the right decision.

"When I entered Lebanon in '82, as commander of the 51st Battalion, the goal was to keep the PLO away, to stop the Katyusha shooting on the north, to prevent the penetration of communities. His goal was to get the IDF out of Lebanon and return Lebanon to Lebanese. Therefore, the goals set for the outbreak of the First Lebanon War were no longer relevant. "

Had to retreat as early as the late 1980s?

"Yes, but that is wisdom after the fact. The long stay in Lebanon was a strategic error, which cost the State of Israel a heavy price. In real time, what interests us, the commanders, is to fight for operations and to take proactive and offensive activity. I saw it differently only when I moved from the Golani Brigade For the post of prime minister's military secretary.

"I completely identified with the goal that Ehud Barak then set out: to remove the IDF from Lebanon, preferably in an agreement with security arrangements, and if there is no choice, then unilaterally. Could it have gone out in a different way - more respectful, more professional, while projecting strength and power? The answer is yes. "

Where was the breaking point in public trust in the righteousness of staying in Lebanon?

"In 97. Helicopter disaster, the fire in Seleucid, the cruise disaster - these three events have calmed down Israeli society. The IDF needs broad national consensus to fulfill its tasks effectively, and in '97 it lost that consent."

When Eisenkott first entered Lebanon, as a young officer, the activity lasted three days, and he commanded her alone. "I would go, young deputy, make an ambush with 12 people. Slowly, with all the events and encounters, we started to add weights. "

These weights paralyzed the IDF: The Red Line (the northern border of the Security Strip) was rarely crossed, the IDF avoided entering the villages, and the troops entrenched themselves in posts and became a convenient target for Hezbollah. "The lesson is that even if you act in a very creative and sophisticated way, guerrillas can't be defended," he said.

"Every year there ended with the IDF winning a lot of battles, but losing the campaign. Hezbollah did have many more fatalities, but they had a simple goal - to get the IDF out of Lebanon, and to this strategic goal they succeeded in reaching a sequence of tactical operations. "

You say the decision to withdraw was true. When we left Hezbollah, there was a small organization that a division and a half were dealing with. Today he is a monster that engages the entire country.

"Today we understand that it's not just Hezbollah. There is something much bigger about it. The idea that Iran is promoting is a campaign whose historical analogy is Salah-Din's campaign against the Crusaders. They want to build an operation that will strike the State of Israel the way Saladin struck the Crusaders. Which is far greater than the conflict with Hezbollah, and its logic is to bring about the destruction of the State of Israel. "

By this logic, it was right to stay in Lebanon and leave them small.

"But we paid a big strategic price there, which hurt the broad national agreement and created fissures in Israeli society. I am not one who thinks that the withdrawal has motivated the abductions and the Second Lebanon War, but I do think it has led the Palestinians to realize that the road to achieving Israel is violence and not negotiations." .

So what did we do about it? Instead of 25 deaths a year in Lebanon, we paid more than 1,000 deaths in the second intifada.

"We may have been paying this price regardless. I mention that Barak's original intention was to withdraw from an agreement with the Syrians and the Lebanese.

"In the second intifada, Israeli society faced a huge challenge, and I, as the head of the UN, saw a company that stands firm, contrary to what they said about it. And I saw determined and creative soldiers, who come into the refugee camps every night and hurt those who needed and chased them, and ultimately defeated terror. It's the same army. "

Erez Gerstein, your close friend and who you replaced as the Golani Brigade Commander, claimed that "four mothers" impaired the soldiers' ability to fight.

"I talked about it with him a lot, including two or three days before he was killed. He was very busy with him. He spoke as a tactical commander trying to stabilize the troop spirit, encourage combat spirit, and prevent atmosphere of mischief and questions such as why we are doing it and why "But there is a difference between tactical commanders, who need to get on their feet and fight me, and a strategic level, which needs to be made more broadly."

Izenkut resented that "during the time the IDF was in Lebanon, the soldiers became 'boys' and 'our children'. That is, more expensive for Israeli society than the civilians they were supposed to protect. This phenomenon continues to this day. These 19-18 year olds are young guys, but they're not kids. They are soldiers.

"In the years of Lebanon, there was a crying about the funerals of fallen soldiers. When I was a Golan commander, I told my soldiers, 'You can cry, you can shed a tear. It's OK. But stand proud, don't weep and don't fall for each other. ' The intention was to tell them we were fighting, we were protecting civilians. There are difficult moments, but stand upright. You are men, not children.

"My son served as a fighter in Magellan. He is my boy, but he is also a man who will master his actions, and in the military he should be willing to risk doing tasks. I think if we treat them as children, it would be devastating for the military. popular".

So you think Gilad Shalit and Alor Azaria are not the "children of us all".

"When I talked about it, I did not mean Elor Azaria, but all the soldiers. Gilad Shalit was a soldier, who was in a Chariot 3 with M-16 on it, and he had to fight. That's what we expect and demand from our soldiers."

"The retreat was seen as an escape"

When did you realize that withdrawal was really going to happen?

"In the beginning of '99, I began the post of prime minister's military secretary. In the first week there was a discussion about the withdrawal from Lebanon. There was a whole discourse, at which end Mofaz's chief of staff remained in conversation with Ehud Barak. Barak told him that if there was no withdrawal in the arrangement, he should also prepare for a unilateral withdrawal. At the end of March 2000, after the failure of the Clinton-Assad summit in Geneva, I realized that the fur had fallen. "

Contrary to what many officers now claim, as if they supported the real-time withdrawal - Izancott, who was in all discussions as a military representative at the political level and as a representative of the political echelon of the army, says the opposition of the senior IDF officer to unilateral withdrawal was absolute. Obviously against. everyone's".

The retreat itself is scheduled to take place in late July. In mid-May, the IDF cleared two posts and handed them over to the SLA, but the SLA failed to meet the task. The IDF realized that they were getting into a spin and were afraid of losing control of the area.

"On May 22, I arrived with Barak for the inauguration of Mitzpeh in the north, and at the end we went to a discussion with the chief of staff and the IDF leadership at a nearby military post. Meanwhile, Lebanese marches began, and we realized that the clocks had accelerated significantly.

"The IDF recommended immediate withdrawal. Barak wanted to wait to make some more moves in the international arena, to reach agreements. A long four-hour discussion ensued, and then Lightning took a break to think about it, and when he returned, he asked the people if they were ready to retire that night. "

The retreat itself took place only after two nights, on May 24. She was seen as a frightened escape, with quite a bit of equipment left behind, and a mess with the absorption of SLA members and their families in Israel.

"The business was just running too fast for us," says Eisenkott. "The SLA realized that we were leaving immediately, and wanted to go to the gates. 6,000 people arrived and formed a cork that looked very bad. It was the result of an unplanned event, which we had two months before.

"The basic lesson is that unilateral steps in our area are not advisable, certainly setbacks. Although we went out without casualties and most equipment came out, we paid a price for how this withdrawal came to be, and we learned that images in the Middle East are something that should not be taken lightly. "I hope this will be fixed in recent years, with the decision to strike the neighborhood bully."

Iranians.

"Yes. This is a decision approved by the Cabinet in early 2017. Since I see it being said and said all kinds of things, then I will say that this decision that the Cabinet made, in my push and recommendation, is a major decision. The Israeli public may not see it, but it also affects it. In Gaza and everywhere else.

"The Iranians, the Quds Force, have been severely beaten for the past four years. What they have been able to do to us is disproportionate to the blows they have kidnapped from us."

"Two gray swans"

For Eisenkot Lebanon is first of all the friends who were killed. Erez Gerstein, who was killed in '99 by a Hezbollah charge; Amir Meital, who was a battalion commander at the same time and was killed in Operation Blue and Brown in '88; Uriel Peretz, who was a Golani officer at the time when Eisenkot commanded the brigade, and was killed in '98 during an operational operation.

Lebanon for him is also Ronen Gorno, Shahar Cohen and Shaul Hilvitch, fighters in Golani's anti-aircraft company, who were killed in October '91 from a side attack on Izankot's side, when he was a Golani commander. "It was an operation of the Golani Patrol with 8200, which were to go into the Gaza Strip, locate and attack the Hezbollah. I took power from the planets and drove toward them, and when we reached the village of Arama, Molly came up to us in connection with Giorno, who was Deputy Commander "T, saying, 'Let me bypass you, this is a village I know well.'

"I stepped aside and let him pass. He bypassed me with the IDF, drove another 10 meters - and then flew into the air with a huge blast. I felt the wave of fire in my face many years later.

"I ran to them, I took them out. The first report was that I was killed, because I was supposed to be the first officer in the convoy. "

Erez Gerstein's death had a decisive influence on Izencott and his contemporaries. Gerstein was the symbol of the fighting in Lebanon - the brave, defiant, invincible warrior - and his death made it clear to many that this fighting was futile. "Erez was a soulmate of mine. We knew when he was an AG officer and a KGB, and we lived in the same room and tent for a year. It's hard to say that I make a difference between death and death, but his death was a severe blow, also because of what he represented - powerful, Power, excellent function, and suddenly he was killed too. It was a very hard blow. "

Eisenkot has been accompanying Hezbollah since the organization began operating in southern Lebanon. "I remember the first time I came across the name, as a battalion commander replacing the paratroop battalion commanded by Benny Gantz. We killed several terrorists in the firing of tank shells. When we arrived, we found polished terrorists with some green ribbon on the forehead. I remember in the investigation someone said they belonged to some Kikuni organization called Hezbollah. "

He believes that Hezbollah is at one of the worst lows in its history today. It also has to do with the price they paid in the civil war in Syria (about 2,000 killed and more than 10,000 wounded), Iran's economic difficulties, which significantly reduced aid it provides to Hezbollah ($ 1 billion a year to $ 600 million), and especially to the blow it suffered from Israel - stopping the tunnel project. The attacks the organization dug into Israeli territory.

"When talking about 'Black Swan' usually means the Yom Kippur War, but in recent years Israeli intelligence has had two very gray swans that have slipped under the radar and should be a warning signal to future generations. We think we have excellent intelligence, but under this intelligence grew A Syrian reactor that was almost warm, and Hezbollah built with Iran an offensive plan to conquer the Galilee, which we discovered a decade ago.

"The tunnel project started even before the Second Lebanon War, and was greatly accelerated. There was always talk that they might be digging tunnels, but we understood it as a fact five years ago. Knowing that they had an offensive plan with tunnels 60 and 80 meters deep accompanied me from day one As chief of staff (Izencott served from February 2015 to January 2019; JL), and also greatly influenced decision-making in other areas. "

Is that the highlight of your term?

"Unequivocally. Because it ended two days before I finished the job, and it didn't have any public relations, so it went over to Israeli society. But there is a formative event here, which I think is the greatest security success of the last decade. The State of Israel is balanced. "

Are you sure they would use it?

"Undoubtedly. They were preparing it for a future campaign or in case of need. We were going to bring 6,000-5,000 Radwan fighters, their elite force, into our territory. When I came out of the tunnel at seed, at 84 feet, I looked at a seed from behind, and I had a cold sweat in my back. A fog night in 2021, when during an exchange of fire between us and them, they attack us in the rear with 6,000 people. "

And yet, despite this success, we are wary of a confrontation with Hezbollah. Deterrence works on both sides.

"Deterrence is an elusive concept. The US is a tremendous power, and North Korea and Iran still quarrel with it. We have Hezbollah, which is part of a whole Shiite axis. "

"We didn't want to be in front"

You mentioned the Cabinet decision of 2017 to attack the Iranians. Where was she born from?

"By 2016, Iran was busy rescuing the Assad regime. Once it realized that it was in control, it moved on. We know that part of Qassem Suleimani's vision was to build a line of intelligence at the Golan Heights. He rebuilt them. Then they rebuilt them, and after I finished they were destroyed. again.

"He also had plans to build air bases in Syria, and that was unsuccessful. He also had the intention of bringing 100,000 thousand Shiite youths from Pakistan and Afghanistan. That didn't happen either."

Israel considered eliminating Suleimani?

"Ultimately, the best thing happened to Israel, when the Americans eliminated it. Suleimani had three main goals: preserving the Ayatollah rule and Iran as a strong and progressive state; achieving regional hegemony in the Middle East; and obtaining nuclear weapons, as a diploma of government preservation." , Whose main implications are still ahead of us. "

Outgoing Defense Minister Bennett said this week that Iranians are beginning to withdraw from Syria.

"A target of getting them out of there should be set, but those who think it will attack several times and it will happen, make a bitter mistake. The actions taken today, which continued today, prevented the Iranian intention of being based in Syria and opening a front against Israel, blocking Hizbollah's intensification, especially in the missile precision project.

"We decided years ago to launch a campaign against their exact ability, and today they have no such ability. They are in a completely different place than they would like."

Hezbollah still has 150,000 missiles and rockets, and the ability to bring Israel to Israel is hit hard.

"In the 21st century, the national security balance changed dramatically in our favor. In 2000, they spoke of us as cobwebs and started the intifada. Today Israel enjoys six years of quiet, normalcy and flourishing. We realized that the clashes with the weak players in the neighborhood weakened us, so the decision to go for the strong player in the neighborhood It was not a whim, but a desire to radiate power in the Middle East. "

Eisenkott says that during his time, the IDF was able to remove strategic threats without being drawn into the war. Opposite the tunnels that Hamas excavated from Gaza; And in the face of the few terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria in 2015, which could have developed into a third intifada, but that didn't happen because we acted correctly.

"The Israeli public is not aware that in 2015 we also fought against ISIS. We did more than 1,000 actions, missions, assaults, operations, including events that surpass any imagination - without even a word in the media. We did not tell about it because it was sensitive We didn't want to be in front.

"Factually, ISIS was strong on our borders. But no Israeli was scraped by ISIS. It was a tremendous operation that greatly engaged the military during my time. I think we made an important contribution to ISIS victory, but that's something that didn't happen. One day we'll talk."

"IDF needs address"

At the height of the civil war in Syria, wasn't it right to contribute to the ouster of President Assad?

"It was a serious dilemma, and we debated a lot of it. But from my experience, in the space where we live it is desirable to have an address. This trend that comes from the precursors of democracy - it will take generations to reach it. Therefore, the Israeli interest is that we have an address, and if need be, And not chasing anyone who decides to fire a rocket at us. It's true in the north, and it's true in Gaza as well. "

You have been criticized for not exercising power in Gaza.

"You can't deny the fact that when there were fires and balloons, they hurt the sense of security in the Gaza Strip. But I have to see where I stood, and I didn't have the privilege of being a populist. I saw the fighting in Iran's foundations, in Hezbollah's armor, the tunnels they built for the Galilee, and at the same time - We have also used force against Palestinian violence.

"I mention that in 2018, Yahya Sinwar set himself the goal of breaking the blockade by triggering violence. We stood as a wall and did not allow him to do so, and they paid heavy prices for dead terrorists. Unfortunately, they also pushed civilians forward, and although they did not intend to, There were also civilians who were hurt here and there. "

Are you disturbed by the possibility that it will lead Israel to the International Court of Justice in The Hague?

"No. We showed the High Court all the material, the intelligence. These were not innocent and spontaneous processions on the fence. In every such procession there were Hamas men with Muslim weapons, who wanted to attack or kidnap a soldier or enter the settlement. "

Still, officers may face prosecution. you too.

"We did what had to be done. Factually, when you look at the years since the cliff with them, the least Israeli civilians and the least Palestinians have been killed."

Maybe because you didn't use enough power. Perhaps those who are right claim that the jurors are castrating the army.

"It's a scam. The disturbing thing is that it's part of an approach designed to weaken the justice system and threaten the Attorney General, claiming there is legalization in the IDF. We exerted a great deal of power, and there was not a single case that Sharon Afek (the Chief Military Advocate; JL) raised a flag. During my time there was one single case of prosecution for operating an IDF weapon. The famous case. "

Alur Azaria.

"Yes".

So what, is everything political?

"Everything is political. The judicial system in the military is professional, matter-of-fact and supportive of the military's actions, but at the end of the decisions are by commanders. And during my term a great deal of power has been exercised. But we have an institutionalized attack here, and to me, the problematic part is that not all the Israeli leadership has come out now to condemn the threats to the life of the attorney general, who is a straight man who does his job reliably, professionally and matter-of-factly. "

Those who attack him today accuse him of preventing the Harpaz affair, which you know closely.

"These are nonsense. I think it's a mistake that doesn't open everything, but there is nothing in this event. Maybe an insufficient score in behavior."

You must also be threatened after the Alur Azaria affair. Sing "Capricorn, Capricorn, Be Careful, Rabin Seeking Friend."

"I did not address it, and certainly I was not excited. It is ridiculous to me. If there is anything that bothers me, then and today, it is that state leaders do not stand up and denounce these things. That is the problem, and it is something that cannot be accepted."

"Say goodbye to the Palestinians"

Is it possible to reach agreements with Hamas?

"Yes, but they should be based on the agreements reached in Cairo on the last day of Operation Protective Edge: a complete ceasefire, the opening of the crossings and fishing grounds, the return of the Palestinian Authority to the Gaza Strip and the beginning of the Gaza reconstruction, the settling of the prisoner and missing issue, the opening of the Gaza air port and the establishment of a maritime port" .

Would you allow them to set up a maritime port?

"After they return the civilians and the bodies of the soldiers, and after they strip the strip of their heavy weapons - yes. Because we have an interest in there being hope, not poverty. What is there today is a murderous ideology of Hamas that wants to destroy us, along with 57 percent Unemployment, poor quality water, half a day's electricity, burning, poverty and hopelessness. What can grow from it? "

How far should you go in the prisoner and missing deal?

"There have been a lot of deals in the past. The model of a Shalit deal must not be repeated, because in the end, it released a lot of terrorists and gave a very serious breath of terror. We paid heavy prices for it."

So what is it?

"I think the Goldwasser Regab deal was paid the right price. They got Samir Kuntar and four other prisoners and 120 bodies. So we have to bring them to the realization that they pay a price for holding two Israeli civilians who went in non-combat there and holding soldiers' bodies. And abusing families. "

What price do they pay?

"The policy that I advocated as chief of staff is to give Gaza the required minimum - food, water, electricity, medicine and sewage, and to open the Gaza Strip when the operation is complete. For me, Operation Strong Cliff will end when the two soldiers sent into battle return. "

The possibility of annexation in Judea and Samaria is at hand today. What is your position?

"I make a distinction between the Jordan Valley and Judea and Samaria. In the Valley we have excellent security relations with the Jordanians, who make a serious strategic contribution to the State of Israel, far beyond what the public sees. It is our highest interest to maintain good relations and stability with Jordan, in the face of the common enemies "It doesn't contradict the fact that Israeli security control in the Jordan Valley is not under negotiation."

That is, you would avoid annexation of the valley.

"The Israeli interest is to maintain the peace agreement, strengthen it and avoid unilateral steps that could jeopardize it. Unlike others, I do not think the king will cancel the agreement in the event of annexation, but I do not think it should be put to the test. Jordan's relationship should be strengthened That's what I did as chief of staff.

"In Judea and Samaria, the situation is more complex. I do not see an agreement in the foreseeable future, but the Palestinians need to understand that time is working to their advantage, and we need to manage in a sophisticated way, which will not create a situation where they believe they can achieve achievement by using force.

"It is in Israel's interest to have a Jewish, democratic and safe state here, so our interest is to say goodbye to the Palestinians. To be the State of Israel, and to be a separate entity, because I do not want 2.8 million Palestinians here.

"Trump's outline should be the basis for any future negotiations. It should try to advance it as a plan, and not unilaterally with the annex only. Unilateral steps are undesirable."

"Army with a professional state"

Isenkut remotely monitors the twists and turns of the "yearly" program of a stellar replacement. As chief of staff, he was able to implement most of the plan outlined, "Gideon", among other things, thanks to a budget agreement reached by then Defense and Finance Ministers Moshe (Boogie) Ya'alon and Moshe Kahlon. "I think the sons of Gantz and Israel Katz should now initiate the Kfar Achim agreement. (The seat where Gantz was born and Katz resides in it) to ensure the IDF has a stable budget framework.

"A multi-year program is not a privilege for the military, it is a functional need. The IDF needs a multi-year plan, and it needs a five-year budget outline to handle all the critical components - training, full, armament, operational activity, people, ongoing subsistence and empowerment. ".

When you see Kochavi's cross - is it good?

"I am one of those who believe in conservative innovation. The IDF is not a high-tech company or a speed-bot company. He carries aircraft. The military requires innovation, but it has to be conservative because there is no time for experimentation, you have to be ready at any given moment to run the whole army. I thought that after 70 years, the army should be taken from an army with my kingdom to an army with my kingdom which is more professional, and also more diverse and rewarded.

"During my time, the IDF grew in all parameters: in training, in stocks, in arms. The increase in targets was thanks to former Air Force commander Amir Eshel (who will be appointed in the coming days for the Defense Ministry's chief executive), under whom the chief of staff has built a machine capable of attacking thousands of targets a day. It's an ability that maybe three countries in the world have. "

So the current plan is pyrotechnics?

"Spring presented his plan to me, and I think the directions he goes in are reasonable."

You have been criticized for refraining from exercising power, thus compromising the military's competence.

"It bothers me, because it is sinful to the truth. I initiated the campaign against Iranian consolidation. I personally commanded the events of the 'size of the hour' (the individual intifada; YL) and defeated them. I took the threat of tunnels in the south and interrupted it, and I took the threat of tunnels in the north and interrupted it, and for me we did more than 1,000 attacks in depth, in actions that surpassed any imagination.

"But I did not want to wave that. I just said that I simulate the security challenges of the State of Israel to the glacier, and what the public sees is just its edge, but below are huge challenges that we have dealt with."

"When required - apply power"

Major General (ret.) Yitzhak Brick argues that the land army is in the worst condition since the Yom Kippur War.

"I'm assuming that Brick came from a good place, and that he wants to look after the future generations and the security of the state. There is something strange about the fact that for nine and a half years he was a commander of soldiers, and no one heard a word from him; neither Gabi, not my son nor me. Five months before his job is over, he fires a bomb and says the military's qualifications are poor. "

you spoke to him?

"I called him. I introduced him to what we were doing: the improvement in armament, inventory, the increase in training and quality of training, the acquisition of the new Chief of Staff and the new cannon, the exercises. Unfortunately, there was a gap between my conversations with him with four eyes and what he later said outside. "

And maybe he is right? Maybe you guys in the chief of staff really don't know what's going on down there, in the middle classes?

"Nobody claims that reality is 100. Clearly, there are gaps and constraints. For 40 years, we have not purchased trucks, lacked ambulances and forklifts, and not all of the Peaks-trained divisions. The IDF is a huge army, and not everyone is fully qualified.

"But during my time, we invested another NIS 3 billion in the land army each year, and I think we made progress. With a NIS 31 billion budget and more American assistance, we need to optimize and balance the best of all components. I am convinced that our strategic balance sheet is improved relative to the enemy, and contrary to what Brick says "I am convinced that the IDF will win every war, and that it can simultaneously attack on two fronts, and launch fire on a third front."

And still, the prevailing view is that the IDF is reluctant to use force.

“We are not sending armored and infantry battalions to fight to raise the morale of the commanders or the public. When it is necessary to exert force, we exert force. Take Operation Khan Yunis: It was a creative operation that got into trouble. There were dozens more of them, which made a huge contribution to the security of Israel, and more than many dozens in other arenas. "

What was that night in the Strip?

"It was two months before I left the post, and I already started my separation visit from the army. That evening I flew in agony with the squadron commander, and from there I went to HFC. The operation unfolded as it evolved, and I immediately realized that this was the most serious situation of this kind, but I had great confidence that the force that was there was the strongest force in the Middle East.

"I heard them, and I saw the commander of Colonel H-General's patrol and his security, and I trusted them, together with the realization that there was a serious event that could be even more complicated. I had already started rolling out a broad assault and the possibility of bringing in forces, because I was not prepared for the incident Like Gilad Shalit will repeat himself.

"I picked up a phone call to Norkin (Air Force Commander; JL) and told him to be ready with all the Air Force's ability to crush whatever it took to get them out. For me, there was no question at all that we would do all that was necessary and return them. "

All you need is war too?

"Until war, yes. It didn't occur to me to leave soldiers there."

During those minutes in the pack, does the stomach turn over?

"Thoughts come after it ends. In real time, the focus is on making the right decisions, and how to get them out alive."

Was there a huge failure or heroic action?

"This operation was super essential, and such actions are the ones that give us the ability to be ten steps ahead of our enemies. But it is also an action that involves risks. Although a lot has been done, this time the mission was not performed. Point. Operational action also involves failures, unfortunately , Though from the moment the power was discovered, he acted heroically. "

There was criticism of the powerlessness and mistakes.

"Factually, there were failures and mistakes as well. But such operations - I as a chief of staff, sample between six and ten times before they leave. From a central idea that is presented to me and program approval and operation approval, then I come to one model and another model, and I discuss cases and reactions, and I meet the force, then meet him again for a handshake with the people before they leave.

"There may have been some internal criticism there, but when I asked the fighters if there was anyone out there who thought the operation and its risk were worthwhile, or they were unwilling and worth not leaving - no one said a word."

In retrospect, was this operation unnecessary?

"If I did not execute this operation, I would be promoted in my position and not give my replacements tremendous benefits that would allow them to continue to face Israel's security challenges."

Damage was caused?

"Yes. There have been errors, and damage has been done, and unfortunately some of the things have also come up in the media. I would have preferred that this work be in the shade, without credits and without fame."

"No national security concept"

Izankot was one of those who believed that the IDF and the Ministry of Defense should not be held responsible for handling the Corona crisis, but should help as much as they could and as needed. "When we did exercises in the military, we asked ourselves what kind of scenario the IDF is taking responsibility for. Land with 7,000 dead, 100,000 injured, 300,000 homeless and 200,000 destroyed homes. This is a scenario where the IDF should take responsibility. This has not been the last two months. The Corona is a civil event. "

Failure, he believes, is in the absence of a national security strategy. "The decisions made were sound from the health point of view, but this event touches on all elements of national security - in the economy, in society, in regions, in international, and in security. Therefore, it is an event that has seized Israel at its weak point - the lack of a national security concept. Of the state, followed by the execution bodies.

"F-35 is important, digital is important, carriage mark 4 is important, but national resilience is the most important. For the first time in the history of the country, there was a formative event here. For 72 years there were two tribes that fought, the secular and the religious, and there were two tribes that were outside the Israeli experience. This one - the ultra-Orthodox and the Arabs. Suddenly there is an event that is not a war, in which all four tribes are present, and this event strikes 70 percent of the ultra-Orthodox, and the medical staff has 21 percent of Arabs. And the fifth tribe - the Diaspora Jew - experienced this event in New York, Los Angeles. , In London. This experience is possible and should be exploited. "

how?

"Service for all. In the community for all 18-year-olds in Israel. The IDF will choose its fighters, and national service for the rest.

The Arabs and the ultra-Orthodox will come?

"When I was a chief of staff, I tried to promote with the ultra-Orthodox an idea called a reserve. I offered to open them two Glatt Fitness bases, only their own, without women. They will all come and undergo training for two weeks, so that if there is an earthquake with 100,000 deaths they will be able to take care of themselves and if there is a third murder intifada they will be able to defend themselves. They come, do two weeks with a uniform, get a stamp and go. I think there's an opportunity now to do that, and don't miss the moment. "

"I want to return"

On Tuesday, Eisenkott celebrated his 60th birthday. "I try to believe that 60 is the new 40," he smiles. He now has time to devote to his family, his wife Hannah, an architect by profession, his five children and his granddaughter. He goes to sea, reads a lot and spends quite a bit of research writing as part of the National Security Research Institute at Tel Aviv University. In November, he returned from Washington's six-year sabbatical, which he also used for academic writing and battery stuffing.

What next?

"I completed a position a year and a half ago. I did all the positions, from a Golani squad commander to the chief of staff, and I was always offered the next job, without even asking for one. It happened thanks to the action. Now, after a year and a half that I'm in some kind of comfort space, because it's very comfortable in my personal life, I want to come back and make an impact. "

where?

"It can be influenced by doing in the public market, by doing value, maybe in a different way."

politics?

"I look at my predecessors - my son, Gabi, Pioneer, Mofaz, Boogie, and also back, Barak and Rabin and others. After landing and staying in a comfort zone, I look at what is happening here, and I want to make a better country and influence, and come up with a shine in my eyes. Lightning in the eyes? Wait a bit longer. "

In the past, anyone who knows you said politics is wrong for you, that you will never enter. It doesn't sound like that today.

"I was a military secretary to two prime ministers, Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon, and stood by them for 16-12 hours a day. I saw closely that the impact was through leadership and through the systems. Sharon told me that he greatly appreciated thinking and planning, but most importantly performance. For the military - once you decide, everyone does what you decide - in politics from the moment you decide, everyone works to thwart your decision.

"And yes, I think the military has traits that may be less appropriate for politics, but it's important that we keep them: business, state and personal example."

shishabat@israelhayom.co.il