The key to understanding the Jordanian dilemma on the question of sovereignty in the Valley lies in the long history of the survivalist maneuvers of the Hashemite kingdom.

Jordan is one of the few successes of the Arab world. Despite its ongoing economic hardship, despite its internal internal tensions, despite its large Palestinian population and the prominent weight of the "Muslim Brotherhood", its residents have secured a hundred years of relative stability. It succeeded, though artificially established, without economic resources, trapped among neighbors who are usually greedy, hostile and violent, and a cursed affinity for the Palestinian issue, which threatens it at home and abroad. Relative stability exists thanks to the Hashemite establishment. Of all the rulers of the region, he is the only one who has been responsible for generations, consistently and courageously, responsible policy, within the context of almost impossible constraints. 

The most difficult constraint has been the tension between the responsibility of the Hashemite dynasty and the destructive radicalism that has brought a lasting ruin on Arab societies in the region since they gained independence. Its roots are deeply rooted in the growing delusions that the Arab political public has become addicted to, and the Arab society's unwillingness to turn them into an internal construction enterprise that will secure its place in the modern world. The Chinese are also of the opinion that they are destined for greatness, and they have been working hard for generations to enable achievement and birthright. The Arab radicals are convinced that the leading position in the region and in the world has been robbed of dark schemes, and sits with a combination of unruly violence and unbridled rapture. 

Against this backdrop, a variety of exciting and sometimes pathetic Arab leaders were gaining public support, from Jamal Abd al-Nasser at the one pole, through Saddam Hussein and the Assad dynasty to Muammar Gaddafi, Arafat, and ISIS's barbarians at the other pole. Most of the general Arab public (in Nasser's days), and many within it, including a large portion of the citizens of the kingdom itself, blamed the Hashemite leadership for betrayal, precisely because it was not swept away by the destructive adventures of these radicals. In order to legitimize the regime in the eyes of this enthusiastic public, King Anos had to pretend to support his vile slogans. The kingdom's political story is the history of the maneuvers between this pretense and the responsible leadership that Jordan wants to uphold. 

Jordan-Israel relations reflect this tension. Emir Abdullah has close ties with Israel even during the days of the Mandate. In 1948, the king operated only his army in the face of the general Arab plan to destroy Israel. In fact, with Ben-Gurion's quiet agreement, he strived to take control of what was later called the "West Bank." Although the Legion clashed with the IDF in an attempt to prevent the connection to the lowlands, in Jerusalem itself, Israel and the Jordan agreed to divide the city between them to prevent its demise. Abdullah allegedly fought to "liberate Palestine"; in fact, Israel was his partner, and the national movement Palestinian and Egypt were his enemies, had 

it not been for Arab pressures and their influence on the Jordanian elite, Israel and Jordan would have established peace as early as 1949. In the 1950s and 1960s, Hussein was forced to maneuver between Israel's and Jordan's common interest in fighting Nasser and the Palestinians (led by Brotherhood). Shukeiri), and the need for the king to pretend when the shoulder in the struggle against Israel, at the public in Jordan itself indulged in fantasies of Nasser. maneuverings of Hussein allowed the survival until the summer of 1967, when forced to give Nasser and join the war.

after the Six Day War was not possible to implement an arrangement between Israel to Jordan, which would return to Hussein the vast majority of the West Bank, mainly because until the Sadat initiative peace was impossible with Israel, even for the entire territory. Since the mid-1970s, the PLO has established its status in the Arab world and internationally to such an extent, even after the initiative. Sadat could not bring Jordan back Its sovereignty. Over the next decade, the Hashemite regime recognized the need to withdraw its hands from the prosecution to return to the West Bank in order to disengage from the Palestinian threat to its status at home in the East Bank. 

Since then, the King of Israel has been strong in dealing with the Palestinian national movement, keeping its threats from its realm: steadily increasing Israeli control over the West Bank, preventing the establishment of a truly sovereign Palestinian state, and cutting Israeli soil in the Jordan Valley. He manipulates the tension between the strategic need in all of these, and the political necessity to say in a frantic way the exact opposite.