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Writer: Contributing Writer
2020-06-08 17:30
Date of last update: 2020-06-08 17:30At the end of May, the United States responded to Beijing’s decision to formulate the “Hong Kong version of the National Security Law.” Secretary of State Pompeo said that Hong Kong’s special status will be cancelled because Hong Kong has lost its autonomy. However, there is currently no evidence to prove that the "Hong Kong version of the National Security Law" is incompatible with a high degree of autonomy. Hong Kong is the region where the United States recorded the largest trade surplus last year. US-funded companies have nearly 300 regional headquarters and more than 400 offices in Hong Kong. If the United States sanctions Hong Kong, it is indeed a political and ideological decision, and it will also mark the official unveiling of the "new cold war" between the United States and China in Hong Kong.
As the Secretary for Security, Mr. Li Jiachao, is studying the establishment of a department to cooperate with the implementation of the National Security Law, Hong Kong security workers must start planning a security intelligence mechanism. However, the former British intelligence agency "Special Branch" was disbanded in 1997, and related documents and mechanisms have been destroyed. The security intelligence work in Hong Kong has not been carried out in the past 23 years. The establishment of a security intelligence department will face considerable challenges and must be supported by Beijing and internationally.
This article reviews the experience of the establishment of two major national security intelligence agencies, the Intelligence Bureau and the Research and Analysis Wing during the Cold War period in India in 1947 after the British colonial rule was discussed. Decolonization challenge. "Decolonizing intelligence" refers to the process by which post-colonial regimes establish their own security agencies. By overcoming various challenges, security agencies develop from inside to outside into a tight organization that combines both internal security and external intelligence forces in order to maintain national security. .
The former British intelligence agency "Special Branch" was disbanded in 1997, and the relevant documents and mechanisms have been destroyed. (Profile picture/Reuters)
Intelligence Bureau's early challenges
Similar to what happened to the former British Political Department of Hong Kong, after the British colonial government withdrew from India in 1947, it did not hand over security intelligence resources to the post-colonial government. The main reason is that the colonial government used the intelligence system to attack, weaken and discredit the Indian leaders fighting for independence. This led to the problem of lack of manpower, training, intelligence network and modern intelligence practice expertise and system in the early days of the establishment of the intelligence bureau.
After India became independent, it immediately fell into a crisis of national division. A large number of Muslim intelligence personnel during the British colonial period chose to leave India to establish the Pakistani state. The Indian Ministry of Military Affairs and Police Intelligence compete fiercely for resources and political support. The post-colonial India's security intelligence group was heavily divided. In addition to being busy dealing with community violence against Muslims by Hindu nationalists, New Delhi is also concerned about the threat of subversion by the Indian Communist Party. The Kashmir region, which is in dispute with Pakistan, also has an urgent need for intelligence, but the ruling elites of India have not trusted the intelligence bureau because they have suffered from the British colonial intelligence agencies.
In 1947, the then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru appointed TG Sanjeevi Pillai, former deputy inspector general of the Political Department of the Chennai City in southern Chennai, as the first director of the intelligence service, requesting him to define, analyze and Report regularly on various threats to Indian national security. Although Sanev successfully recruited a group of elite university graduates to join the intelligence bureau, but because of insufficient resources and the Nehru government's distrust of the intelligence bureau, he sought help overseas.
In 1948, Sanev went to London to meet with Guy Liddell, vice president of MI5, a British intelligence agency, and reached a cooperation agreement. MI5 immediately discovered that Sanev had not informed the local government when he dispatched intelligence officials to the place. Although MI5 understood that he wanted to bypass the distrust of the ruling elite of India and the internal bureaucracy and obstruction of the bureaucracy, he was worried that Sanev would make too many enemies and would weaken the intelligence bureau.
Since the beginning of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1947, both the MI5 and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States needed to cooperate with the Indian Intelligence Agency to combat the communist forces in South Asia. Sanyev took the opportunity to develop close cooperation with them. Later, when the United States wanted to deepen its relationship with the Nehru regime, the CIA planned to recruit Nassanev as a Cold War ally. However, in 1950, Sanev was removed from office because he had not informed Nehru's political ally, the Indian ambassador to the UK, Krishna Menon, before coming to London to meet MI5.
(Profile picture/Reuters)
Pro-Western anti-communist stand firm
Bhola Nath Mullik, who succeeded the post of chief, was the deputy of Sanev and was responsible for political security. The intelligence bureau led by Mei Li was gradually recognized by the Indian political community, but it also caused the military to be suspicious and accused him of providing false intelligence to Nehru. Meili then adopted a more active anti-communist policy, deepened the anti-communist intelligence cooperation with MI5, and concentrated on the hidden intelligence plan against Pakistan and launched a national armed threat against the borders with Myanmar and China. Through MI5, Meili contacted the CIA and intelligence agencies in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Although Nehru was vigilant that Meili was too close to Western intelligence agencies, he did not stop it.
In 1955, Nehru pursued a "non-aligned" foreign policy after the Indonesian Association Bandung Conference. However, the Indian Intelligence Agency had a deep relationship with the CIA, and the CIA aircraft was allowed to fly over Indian airspace to support the Tibetan protests. In 1959, the Tibet incident failed and CIA agents successfully sent the Dalai Lama to northern India. In the same year, the CIA and the National Congress of India cooperated to prevent the elected representative of the Communist Party of India from serving as the head of the local government in the southern Kerala state. By secretly providing funds to the local branches of the National Congress Party and worker leaders, the CIA successfully overthrew the communist regime in Kerala. In the 1960s, the CIA had deployed a penetrating intelligence network throughout India.
But the pro-Western Mei Li did not grasp the danger of the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations, and his neglect of Beijing became the national security blind spot of the Nehru government. In October 1962, with no preparation from India, the People's Liberation Army drove straight from North India to defeat the Indian Army. Nehru was under pressure due to the defeat, died of illness in 1964, and Mei Li also resigned in the same year.
The situation on the Sino-Indian border continued to be tense, and the People's Liberation Army was exposed to gather troops on the Sino-Indian border. (Profile picture/CCTV screenshot)
Sino-Indian War for Investigation and Analysis
In 1966, under the influence of the Sino-Indian War, Nehru's daughter, Mrs. Indira Ghandi, took office as the Prime Minister of India, determined to establish a new dedicated foreign intelligence organization. She accepted Gore's suggestion to establish the "Investigation and Analysis Bureau" as a foreign intelligence agency and appointed Gore as the first director. Despite strong opposition from colleagues in the intelligence bureau, Gower calmly and effectively deployed the human resources and resources in the intelligence bureau responsible for external intelligence work. In 1968, he used more than 200 intelligence bureau officials as the backbone to formally establish an investigation and analysis bureau, and established an economic intelligence bureau for the investigation and analysis bureau based on the different intelligence technologies of the CIA, Britain, France, Japan, and Israel’s foreign intelligence organizations. , Ministry of Science and Technology, Decoding and Satellite Supervision Department, Psychological Warfare Department, Information Department and Public Relations Department.
When the India-Pakistan War broke out in 1971, the intelligence provided by the Bureau of Investigation and Analysis played a decisive role in helping India succeed in separating "East Pakistan" from Pakistan and becoming Bangladesh. The Bureau of Investigation and Analysis provides intelligence to decision-makers and the military on Pakistan’s political and military intentions and strength. It also trained local “freedom fighters” in East Pakistan to launch armed coups, contacted, persuaded and countered local government officials to support the establishment of Bangladesh, and launched psychological warfare. To vilify the Pakistani military regime with international public opinion.
The Bureau of Investigation and Analysis under Gore developed relations with intelligence agencies in the West, the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and countries around the world. In order to strengthen intelligence collection in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, Gower strategically cooperated with the French intelligence agency "Foreign Intelligence and Counter Spy". In order to collect intelligence on U.S. activities in the region, he also cooperated with Iran’s “Intelligence and National Security Organization” (SAVAK). In Southeast Asia, when it is in India’s interest, the Bureau of Investigation and Analysis cooperates with the CIA to limit China’s influence.
(Visual China)
In summary, the experience of India's two games during the Cold War has the following characteristics:
First, everything is difficult to start: the intelligence bureau was not trusted by the Indian elite at the beginning of its establishment, but it was not easy to satisfy the needs of national security intelligence. After independence, the internal and external environment of India was extremely unstable, and the first director, Sanev, only served for three years. In fairness, he successfully established the intelligence bureau and the development cooperation relationship with the Anglo-American intelligence organizations, which laid the foundation.
2. When the intelligence bureau’s work was recognized in the country and faced with competitive pressure from the military’s intelligence department, the second director Mei Li developed the surrounding national intelligence network and deepened the intelligence cooperation with the West to support the Tibetan independence movement with the CIA And suppressing the power of the Communist Party of India has also planted the consequences of the Sino-Indian conflict. The 1962 Sino-Indian War was a turning point in the development of the Indian intelligence system. India learned lessons and established an investigation and analysis bureau dedicated to foreign intelligence work, and played an important role in the 1971 India-Pakistan war and the Bangladesh independence incident.
3. From the perspective of the development experience of the two bureaus, although the Indian national security agencies were pro-Western at first, when the two sides gained a foothold, the two bureaus actively developed cooperative relations with non-Western intelligence organizations and also obtained intelligence from the United States and other Western countries. In this regard, India’s policy policy of “information decolonization” during the Cold War period has remained unchanged, that is, it has implemented Nehru’s “non-aligned” independent country development route.
As long as the principle of "one country, two systems" is correctly understood and the "Belt and Road Initiative" is taken into account, it will definitely make a difference. (Profile picture / Photo by Zhang Haowei)
Implications for Hong Kong
I believe that the Indian decolonization intelligence concept has the following implications for Hong Kong security intelligence workers:
1. The Hong Kong security intelligence industry should first establish a good relationship with the Mainland security intelligence agencies as a foundation, and it must be trusted by Beijing, Hong Kong and overseas investors, and strive to maintain Hong Kong's security. Although this is not easy, as long as the principle of "one country, two systems" is correctly understood and the "Belt and Road Initiative" is focused on, it will definitely make a difference.
2. With the mature development and achievements of the internal security intelligence work of the Hong Kong security department, Beijing may be authorized to develop cooperation in external intelligence, and to develop cooperative relations with foreign intelligence agencies in accordance with the "non-alignment" policy to help the security information of the southern countries. Institutional development is more suitable for decolonization intelligence practices in their respective national conditions.
3. Use the "Belt and Road" as the future space for post-colonial Hong Kong's intelligence development, establish an inclusive, diverse and global security intelligence cooperation network that can guarantee the safety of the world's human beings, and promote the future multi-polar rule of the new world order.
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About the Author:
Huang Bernong
University of Bath
Associate Professor, Department of International Studies in Politics and Language Development
The above excerpt is from the 217th issue of "Hong Kong 01" Weekly Report (June 8, 2020) "The Challenge of Decolonizing Hong Kong Security Intelligence."
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