No dismissal of Netanyahu, no economic benefits, and nothing else will solve the constitutional failures in Israel. The protest should have one requirement - the establishment of a constituent assembly that will prepare a complete constitution that will be approved in a referendum. 

One problem is the unbearable ease of changing basic laws. A complete and rigid constitution must be adopted in which the rules of the game will be anchored through a rigid change procedure that will prevent the constitution from being a victim of secondary and short-term considerations. In the 20th Knesset alone, 13 amendments to the Basic Laws and two new Basic Laws were enacted. By comparison, 27 amendments to the U.S. Constitution have been passed since 1787, 10 of which were passed in 1791. The rigid American model should not be adopted. A gradual mechanism should be established. The other sections will be changeable by a majority of 80, while individual sections relating to the basic values ​​and basic rules will be changeable by a majority of 90 members of the Knesset or by a majority of 80 in conjunction with a referendum.

A second problem is the Bill of Rights. Our system of government, which gives small parties disproportionate power, has so far prevented the receipt of a comprehensive Bill of Rights. Israel in this sense is a prominent global exception. Today, the average Bill of Rights includes 35 rights. We have 11 rights that are explicitly protected by constitutional protection. And unlike the vast majority of democracies, basic rights such as the right to equality, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, the right to education, etc., do not enjoy explicit constitutional protection. The only constitutional protection afforded to certain aspects of these rights is by virtue of a judicial interpretation of "human dignity" that may change in the future. A full human rights charter must be adopted. 

The relationship between the governing authorities must be regulated. In order for the Knesset to carry out its legislative and supervisory functions in the best possible way, the number of government ministries must be limited and the number of Knesset members must be increased. The number of 120 did not change during the existence of the State of Israel, although the population increased 12 times. In a global perspective, the Knesset is a significantly smaller legislature relative to the population. The status of the court must also be regulated and the jurisdiction over laws must be anchored, as stipulated in the constitutions of more than 85% of the countries in the world. 

There are more problems. All of them will be discussed by the members of the Constituent Assembly, which must be external to the Knesset and that will consider long-term considerations. Due to representative problems, the police system does not allow for its change and attempts to propose a constitution in the Knesset have failed. Therefore, the requirement should be: the adoption of a law for the establishment of a one-time constituent assembly limited to free elections for one purpose - bringing a constitutional proposal for approval in a referendum.  

Over the past 50 years, more than 200 constitutions have been adopted in times of crisis. Hardly any democracy has completed a comprehensive move of constitutional change other than in circumstances such as revolution, war, empire withdrawal, or civil war that have been a catalyst for change. It is said that in Chinese the words "crisis" and "opportunity" are the same bookmark (this is a mistake - they only share the same bookmark); The current crisis must be turned into an opportunity and a rigid and democratic constitution adopted.

Yaniv Roznai is an associate professor at IDC Herzliya