Submarines 7, 8 and 9 were supposed to replace the first three • The debate is about the timing of the replacement and the nature of the long-term contracts • And what about the Egyptian submarine?
• Interpretation
"As part of my job, I have never been confronted with a problem with the purchase of submarines"
Photography:
Gideon Markovich
Much has been written and said about these affair and it seems that the confusion is great.
I would like to contribute to the discussion from my personal experience as Chief of Staff and as the person who was responsible for all three and a half years for all the criticisms of the defense system by the system auditor.
As part of my duties, I held hundreds of meetings with senior members of the system from the Minister of Defense and below and with the field officials, and I was never presented with any allegations of any problems with the issue of submarine procurement.
This is not the case with the area ships, where there have been allegations of the Navy's decision to change the operational requirement from purchasing Korean ships to German ones.
The debate over the years about submarines revolves around the question of whether Israel needs a total of five or six submarines. A submarine is a strategic tool, and the definition of need is an issue of national security that goes far beyond the naval level that actually operates the tools. Basis for the question of how many submarines are needed.But one thing is clear: at any given time only a small portion of the submarines can be at sea for a variety of reasons of maintenance, crew refresh and mission duration, so each additional submarine is a substantial matter and operational multiplier.
Since it is a purchase in shekels and not aid dollars, and shekels are a rare commodity, there is undoubtedly a built-in and understandable tension between the military echelon as to the best use of the budget.
An example of this is the decision of then-Defense Minister Amir Peretz, contrary to the army's recommendation, to purchase iron domes, or the prime minister's decision to build the fence on the Egyptian border - a long debate that cost us dearly, with tens of thousands of infiltrators that could have been prevented.
The obvious question is where did submarine number 7 or 9 come from?
The answer is that this is the next set of submarines that are supposed to replace the first three, whose capabilities are dramatically less than the new ones.
The debate is about the timing of the exchange and the nature of the long-term contracts.
I have not encountered any discussion about expanding the SDK beyond six submarines.
As for the Egyptian submarine, unlike the situation in the US, where a law requiring the preservation of Israeli military advantage over Arab countries has been passed, Germany does not have such a law. Moreover, Germany does not need an Israeli permit to sell its submarines to Egypt or any other country. There is a dialogue between the countries, in which Israel tries its best to reduce sales to countries that it does not want to intensify, and if it is impossible to reduce then at least get some value - whether in terms of purchase, or in areas not related at all but politically important, and other security issues national.
In this context it is clear that there has been, is and will be a fruitful and comprehensive dialogue between the Prime Ministers and their staff, with each side trying to maximize profits for its country while reducing potential risks.
This discourse is sensitive and takes place with great compartmentalization.
It is important to understand, if Egypt allocates money to buy a submarine - it will buy a submarine, the only question is who it will be from.
Spaceships - Following the gas discoveries, the Navy's need to intensify on several platforms, which will enable it to meet the task of securing the rigs, along with the Corps' many ongoing missions in the BTS, and ensuring the freedom of navigation of the State of Israel.
After strenuous staff work, the Navy presented an operational demand for the purchase of ships from South Korea.
These ships were smaller than the assault ships.
After a while, the Navy changed its mind from end to end and introduced a new operational requirement: to purchase German ships that were significantly larger than the Korean ones and that cost significantly more.
The reason for the change has never been investigated in depth, so it is not clear to this day what the considerations were behind the decision.
The defense establishment should have delved into the issue for learning.
In conclusion, there are three completely different issues here, all three of which have aspects of dialogue between the IDF, the Ministry of Defense, the National Security Council and the Prime Minister's Office, and all three have bilateral interests and a dialogue between prime ministers that goes far beyond the IDF and Defense Ministry. Security procurement is a complex world, with many interests and many mediators who stir in the cauldron, and sometimes unfortunately also slips into crime when in these situations it is right to allow the legal system to exhaust the investigations. The risks.
The author is the founder and CEO of the security movement, a former deputy auditor of the defense establishment