David Ben-Gurion, the founding father, established three principles on which Israel's concept of security is based: deterrence, warning and decisiveness.
Later, against the background of changes in the nature of wars and enemies, a fourth principle was added to them - defense.
All these principles have been put to the test in the current war.
There was no warning of a Hamas attack, and Israel was completely surprised.
Deterrence on the southern front also collapsed on October 7.
Israel was convinced that Hamas was deterred, weak, not interested in the campaign and preferred economic stability - by way of injecting funds and sending laborers to work - over war.
It became clear to her that the opposite is true: not only is it not deterred by a surprise attack - Hamas is also prepared to absorb the heavy price that comes with it, and in fact is ready to sacrifice the Strip, its residents and its infrastructure in order to advance its goals.
Various sources in Israel claim in recent weeks that Hamas did not correctly assess the Israeli response.
When the dust settles, they believe, its heads (whichever will remain alive) will regret what they did.
It seems that there is mainly wishful thinking in this claim - nothing in the conduct of Hamas and its leaders suggests that there is a basis for this.
Deterrence has eroded in other arenas as well.
In the north, Hezbollah is kept from starting an all-out war, but maintains an active fighting front against Israel that has driven tens of thousands of residents from their homes for an unknown period of time.
The threat of a wide-scale war, recently voiced by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff, is less impressive to Hassan Nasrallah and his patrons in Tehran, who refuse to permanently remove Radwan's forces from the border. Even if a diplomatic outline is finally reached that would allow this - Hezbollah will not respect it, just as it did not respect the decision 1701 of the Security Council, which ended the Second Lebanon War.
In Judea and Samaria, a wide-scale uprising, encouraged by Hamas, is avoided in the meantime.
This happens mainly thanks to the intense, daily military activity of dozens of reserve battalions, which rely on a feverish intelligence effort by the Shin Bet that has already led to hundreds of arrests of terror suspects. who do not go to work in Israel, and the tax money that is not transferred to the Palestinian Authority.
IDF forces in Khan Yunis, photo: IDF spokesman
The damage to deterrence is felt even in distant arenas.
The Houthis in Yemen regularly launch missiles and UAVs of various types towards Israel, most of which are intercepted by the American forces and the Saudi army. This is part of Iran's growing effort to challenge Israel in every possible arena, which indicates great self-confidence. Another evidence of this is in the decision to return to enriching uranium to the level of 60%, taking advantage of the fact that Israel is preoccupied with war and that the Western world is reluctant to face conflicts.
Damage to deterrence has far-reaching implications for Israel's future security.
It requires rapid rehabilitation, which can only be achieved in one way: decision.
Any other arrangement in Gaza, temporary or permanent, will teach that Israel is reluctant to go all the way.
This will be expressed in the boldness of the enemy - certainly if it is accompanied by an Iranian nuclear umbrella - and in the willingness of moderate Arab countries to promote agreements with Israel.
That is why the victory in Gaza is critical.
Not as revenge (justifiable interest in itself), but as an insurance policy.
Laser - and sprout in the head
The defense component also now requires re-examination.
In recent decades, Israel has been protecting itself knowingly.
High fences were erected at each border, along with walls designed to block direct fire and observations.
To all these was added advanced technology whose role was to watch and warn, and above all - an air defense umbrella that was supposed to provide an extensive response to the rear.
Israel has convinced itself that it lives in the MMD. That the enemy can arm itself at will ("the rockets will rust"), but will not succeed in undermining the basic security of the Israeli citizen. This concept almost completely collapsed on Black Sabbath. The enemy easily breached the impassable barrier - except in its underground component - and turned the most protected place, the home, into a death trap. This was immediately manifested in the mass abandonment of residents in the border areas, and in the anxiety that led to the arming of other sectors.
In Gaza, Israel has indeed gone on the offensive, but in the north it continues to defend itself from within the country's borders.
The security strip that existed in the past in southern Lebanon now exists in the Galilee.
The precise count of the terrorists and Hezbollah's assets that were damaged shows tactical victories, but the strategic picture is different: Nasrallah needs one rocket a day to keep the north on its toes.
There is no consolation in the fact that South Lebanon is also being evacuated of residents;
It has already been proven that Hezbollah is more correct in sacrificing its people in order to achieve its goals.
The well-known sports cliché states that the best defense is offense.
Israel has refrained from adopting it in recent decades, fearing that war would harm growth and prosperity.
The relative peace that prevailed (Benyamin Netanyahu boasted of the quietest decade of his time) was deceiving, and made it possible to direct resources to civilian purposes over security needs.
Israel did declare that it was a villa in the jungle - but it did not act accordingly, and instead of going on hunting expeditions, it relied on the fact that the defense systems it established would restrain the animals of prey.
IDF exercise in the Golan Heights, photo: GettyImages
The Second Lebanon War is the Archimedean point in this context.
During this period, Hezbollah launched several thousand rockets towards the Israeli rear, from the Haifa line to the north.
His longer range rockets were destroyed early in the campaign, and he was unable to maintain continuous supply lines from Iran and Syria.
His lesson was clear: equip yourself with masses of missiles and rockets for every possible range, including accurate ones that will enable the disabling of critical arrays in Israel - from air force bases, through infrastructure (electricity, water, communications) to government facilities and prominent symbols (such as the Azrieli Towers).
The Israeli lesson, on the other hand, was the opposite: defend yourself as much as possible.
The Iron Dome system developed following that war did indeed save thousands of lives, but Israel became completely addicted to it.
This was manifested mainly in the south - instead of launching ground attacks, which would have slowed down or significantly reduced the strengthening of Hamas, it was satisfied with short air strikes, which achieved partial and very temporary results.
The effect in the north was even worse.
Israel failed to prevent the strengthening of Hezbollah.
The campaign it waged on Syrian soil (the HBM) had significant successes, but they only delayed the process, and did not stop it. The inevitable result was that mutual deterrence developed on the northern border: not only Hezbollah fears a campaign that would destroy Lebanon, but Israel also fears damage Similar.
A military blanket is too short
The air defense system has many virtues that are a technological marvel.
The laser weapon, which is currently under development and will enter operational activity in the coming years, will significantly upgrade it.
But defense alone, no matter how strong, is not enough.
It must be accompanied by a sprout, which needs to be planted from time to time so that deterrence is maintained.
This sprout also cannot be surgical operations or unknown attacks attributed to Israel.
In Gaza it became clear again that Golani's ground-based brigade combat team is the best mind-burner.
Israel defined two more goals for itself in the systems it had in place.
The first - to transfer the decision as quickly as possible to the enemy's territory.
The second - to shorten as much as possible the duration of the systems it maintains, based on an understanding of the limitations of weapons and the limits of international legitimacy.
Both of these goals are now up for consideration.
Although in Gaza the campaign was immediately transferred to the enemy's territory, but in the north it continues to be conducted from within the territory of Israel.
Also the duration of the campaign - four months next week, and many more months according to all estimates - shows that the old concept requires at the very least clarification, and probably also a significant refresh.
In recent decades, Israel has avoided doing so, mainly for political reasons.
Hopefully she will behave differently in the future.
The current war requires this not only because of what happened, but because of the significant challenges for the future.
A discussion on "the day after" is required not only to shape the future of the Strip and our relationship with it, but to discuss a number of critical deep issues that have now become clear.
The concept of security is only one of them, along with the structure of the IDF, its size and budget, and its mutual relations with Israeli society.
The war taught that the IDF is small for the size of the country. Contrary to the estimates (adopted by the cabinet), it has difficulty conducting an effective large-scale war on two fronts at the same time. It needs more planes, more helicopters, more tanks, more combat and combat support frameworks, and much more weapons A multitude of types - offensive and defensive.
Some of these processes have already been started, with American assistance.
Some of them will be started, mainly in the context of the extension of the regular service, the increase of the permanent army, the expansion of the reserve service and its extension.
Some require clarification and decisions.
It will no longer be possible to avoid dealing with the elephant in the room - Haredim recruitment.
The IDF needs them, and those who it doesn't need can be employed in just as beneficial civilian activities, from hospitals to various community and social organizations.
It is nice to say that the entire State of Israel went under a stretcher during the war, but that is not accurate.
The noted "Is" of Zaka and the Hatzla Union is the exception that does not indicate the rule. The ultra-orthodox society should contribute more to the state, not only because it receives more than any other sector, but because it is just and equitable, and after the black Sabbath there are not and should not be No sacred cows here.
Israel's social cohesion is a critical pillar of its national strength.
It was badly cracked in the past year around the struggles over the legal legislation.
The question of who is responsible for Israel's weakening - the legislature or the protest - is less than a year old at the moment, and in any case it will never be possible to decide it.
Sinwar ordered the attack because he understood that Israel was conflicted, and by implication - weakening.
He was wrong to believe that it would be broken, but if the current campaign does not lead to a comprehensive repair - its damages will be many times greater in the future.
The essence of the pike theory
In recent weeks, too many signs have accumulated indicating that many in Israel have learned nothing.
They still live in the world that preceded Black Sabbath, and continue to wage that war where the enemy is us, and not Hamas or Hezbollah.
For them, what happened and is happening here in the last few months - the massacre in Otef, the kidnapped, the dead, the soldiers who fight, the reserves, the hundreds of thousands of evacuees and the heavy cost to the economy and society - is only background noise, and the battle should be focused on the other side.
Evidence of this could be found the other day, in an unprecedented announcement published by the Intelligence and Special Operations Agency, through the Prime Minister's Office, in which it was explicitly stated that an elected Israeli public official is a liar.
The one who received the flattering title was Knesset member Tali Gottlieb, who claimed that a few days before the October 7 attack, the Mossad intercepted conversations between Shakma Bresler's husband and Yahya Sinvar.
Gottlieb, who previously claimed that before Black Sabbath Bressler met with the head of the Mossad, Dedi Barnea, relied on a publication on a dubious website, and claimed that her sources were "cast of iron".
The Mossad responded that this was a lie, and that its head had never met Bresler.
"This is the second time that Knesset member Gottlieb is spreading baseless lies."
MK Tali Gottlieb, photo: Oren Bo Hakon
Factually, Gottlieb is indeed lying.
There are not and were not any conversations with Sinwar, and even if there were - Bresler's husband is not the one who would have held them, and the Mossad is not the body that listens or intercepts such conversations (which, as mentioned, did not take place).
To be precise, the last Israeli who had direct communication with Sinwar was Binyamin Netanyahu, who exchanged written messages with the Hamas leader about five years ago.
Lying isn't the worst thing Gottlieb does.
Worse than that is the continued exposure of Bresler's husband, which is against the law.
Those who know the man, his past and his present can only salute him for his contribution to the country - but Gottlieb is less interested.
She uses her immunity to continue her poor and dangerous journey of lies.
In other days, Gottlieb was not worth considering.
There are issues far more important than the lies she spreads, and there are people whose opinion is much better and more important.
Gottlieb is simply another testimony to the never-ending bottom of Israeli politics, and the unbearable ease with which a rumor or gossip becomes a tweet, and hence the short way to people's minds and hearts.
This is the whole essence of the fake theory - to spread it with confidence, knowing that there will be those who will believe it and turn it into fact.
Israel is at war, and such a pike is pure damage.
He sows in many people the belief that there was a conspiracy between the protest, the Shin Bet and Sinwar and the October 7 massacre. Anyone who thinks that only Gottlieb's type believe these lies and spread them is living in a movie. They also confuse much more mainstream groups, for example in WhatsApp groups whose members include Ministers and members of Knesset.
Fake news is one of the greatest dangers to world peace.
A nuclear weapon of words and lies.
It is not a new phenomenon - Holocaust deniers, for example, have always existed - but the reality of social networks allows it to be echoed more quickly and widely than ever before.
This is how many in the world believe that the massacre in Otef did not happen, that Israeli women were not raped, that Israelis were not kidnapped, and that it is all an Israeli conspiracy aimed at destroying the Palestinian people.
From here the road is short to demonstrations and various publications, to political pressures and discussions at the Court of Justice in The Hague, which is supposed to publish its decision today on the delusional claim of South Africa, according to which Israel is committing genocide in Gaza.
The fight against pike should be global.
It is in the interest of every reasonable person who wants to live in a reasonable world.
The problem is that there are two powerful parties who have an interest in the Pike continuing to exist: the social networks, and politicians.
For the first he brings traffic, advertising and money, and for the second he brings supporters and voters.
Israel can be a light to the Gentiles in this area as well.
Those who lie, and who spread lies, should be denounced and put on trial.
Immunity cannot be used as a refuge for all vanity, neither for Ofer Kasif nor for Tali Gottlieb.
The time has come for Israeli politics to clean itself up, as part of the general correction that is now required.
If she doesn't do this - it will become clear to all of us that after October 7, October 6 will come again.
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