As of: January 27, 2024, 9:14 a.m
From: Foreign Policy
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The Iranian military has fired missiles at areas in Pakistan, Syria and Iraq.
They wanted to show strength and determination.
- Since the beginning of Israel's war in the Gaza Strip, Iran, in collaboration with its proxies, has promoted an agenda against Israel and the USA.
- Iran has attempted to demonstrate its military strength and resolve with missile attacks on three neighboring countries.
- Pakistan was the only one of the three states attacked to respond with action and launched an airstrike on Baloch dissidents in Iran.
- Iran and its proxies are trying to assert themselves as the main power against Israel and the United States.
This article is available for the first time in German - it was first published by
Foreign Policy
magazine on January 23, 2024 .
Tel Aviv - Since the start of the war between Israel and Hamas, Iran and its archipelago of proxies have pushed a joint campaign against Israel and U.S. forces in the Middle East.
This campaign has drawn the United States into an expanding conflict.
With its recent missile attacks on three neighboring countries, Iran signaled a potential new phase in the unfolding unrest, one that appears to be moving the Middle East closer to a region-wide war.
With these attacks, Iran sought to demonstrate its military strength and resolve.
But they also betrayed something else: Iran's inherent weakness and its strategic limitations.
Syria, Iraq and Pakistan: Iran fired missiles and drones
On January 16, Iran used a combination of ballistic missiles and drones to attack targets in Syria, Iraq and Pakistan that officials said were linked to Israeli intelligence and anti-government terror groups.
The attacks were reportedly in response to suicide bombings in the southern city of Kerman earlier this month that killed at least 84 Iranians.
Although the Islamic State claimed responsibility for this bloodbath, which struck a crowd commemorating Major General Qassem Suleimani of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iranian officials also blamed Israel and the United States.
In brazen response, the IRGC launched a barrage of ballistic missiles and drones that hit buildings in northwestern Syria and destroyed the villa of a prominent Kurdish businessman in Erbil, Iraq.
Iranian officials accused the businessman of being an Israeli agent.
The rockets also hit the mud-brick home of a Baloch family in the rural Pakistani town of Koh-e Sabz.
Iranian officials claimed it was linked to the anti-government terrorist group Jaish al-Adl.
The action was a testament to Iran's sophisticated missile capabilities and made clear that Tehran can violate the sovereignty of neighboring states at will and without significant consequences.
Iran's missile and drone strikes: Civilians killed
Although not much is known about the attacks in Syria that hit rebel-held territory, Iraqi and Pakistani officials reported that the attacks hit family homes in their countries.
At least six innocent civilians are said to have been killed, including two young girls and a toddler.
For the Iranian leadership, the victims were less important than the demonstration effect of the action.
With its decision to retaliate, Iran wanted to send a clear message to its enemies, especially Israel and the United States: any aggression against Iran will be met with swift and harsh retaliation.
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Iran has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to respond to its enemies with missile attacks on neighboring states.
In 2019, Iran attacked Saudi Arabian oil facilities with cruise missiles and drones to retaliate for Riyadh's support for the Trump administration's pressure campaign on Iran.
In 2022, in response to a series of sabotage attacks in Iran that were linked to Israel, the IRGC fired a volley of rockets that destroyed a Kurdish facility in Erbil.
Iranian officials claimed that the facility was used by the Mossad to plan operations in Iran.
Even more provocatively, Iran responded to Suleimani's assassination by firing rockets at US forces stationed at Ayn al-Assad Air Base in Iraq in January 2020.
This attack could easily have turned into a shooting war with the United States had it not been for former President Donald Trump's erratic decision-making and the IRGC's downing of Ukraine Air Flight 752 with an anti-aircraft missile.
If the missile had been mistaken for a US missile immediately after the attack, there might have been a firing squad.
Yet in all of these attacks - none of which were fatal, with the exception of the downed flight - Iran did not have to take military retaliation.
The lack of response reinforced Iran's behavior and helped recognize its policy of retaliation as a realistic option.
An abandoned medical facility that Syria says was hit by Iranian missiles.
© Omar Albam/dpa
Iran attacks are intended to demonstrate the willpower to escalate
Iran's recent attacks should remind its enemies that it has both the will and the ability to escalate.
Its missiles are precise and can be used against targets anywhere in the region.
But while Iran has managed to demonstrate its resolve and capabilities, it has done so by attacking messengers.
Although he blamed Israel and the United States for the suicide bombings in Kerman, he has not retaliated against either.
And despite its vocal support for the people of Gaza, Iran has not sought to use its military might to benefit them.
Instead, Iran fired ballistic missiles at isolated family homes – not military targets – in weak states.
Iran chose to take actions against countries it believed would not face serious consequences or serious escalation.
Pakistan did not just respond with words and launched airstrikes
The Syrian government did not recognize the Iranian attack, and since the missiles fell on rebel territory, it likely supported the attempt.
The Iraqi government, controlled by politicians close to Iran, appeared embarrassed and alarmed by Iran's actions and took modest action, recalling its ambassador and issuing a diplomatic demarche in protest.
However, due to Iran's outsized influence among Iraq's heavily armed Shiite militias and within the Iraqi authorities, Baghdad was unable to do much more.
Pakistan was the only state capable of responding to Iranian aggression with something other than words.
The Pakistani military not only withdrew its ambassador from Tehran and banned the Iranian envoy from entering the country, but also immediately launched airstrikes on Baloch dissidents in Iran.
But after Iran took the same action in an exchange that killed at least 11 civilians and left smoking rubble in neighborhoods in both countries, the Pakistani government issued a statement.
In this they described Iran as a “brotherly” country and asked for de-escalation.
As the Iranian leadership surely foresaw, Pakistan had no desire to prolong hostilities, which meant that the Iranian actions would once again have no major consequences.
Iran is therefore able – and dependent on – to position its deterrent.
Despite the regional importance of its military, Iran does not have the power to take the fight to its enemies or to compete directly with more powerful opponents.
Even in the wars in Syria and Iraq, in which the IRGC was heavily involved, Iranian-led forces struggled in both conflicts until Russia and the United States intervened.
Under the protection of Russian air power, Iranian-backed forces managed to turn the tide against the Syrian rebels, and it was the US-led coalition that was primarily responsible for defeating the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.
Attack highlights weakness: Iran's air force appears weak
Iran has impressive missile and drone capabilities, but these capabilities can only be used to a limited extent.
Compared to some of its neighbors, Iran's air force is weak and relies on aging Cold War-era platforms such as the F-4 Phantom.
Iran's ground forces may be less formidable, but they are stronger in defense and they cannot easily capture or hold territory beyond Iran's borders.
The capabilities of Iran's Shiite militias are similarly limited.
They are most effective when they act as insurgents in their home areas or as political disruptors.
Unless they are provided with a favorable environment or supported by a more powerful foreign military power, such as in Syria, they are unsuitable for conventional operations.
They can plant roadside bombs, fire mortars, launch rockets and drones, kidnap and kill local rivals, and carry out ambush attacks, but that's all.
Such tactics can still be effective, particularly because it is difficult for foreign state militaries to counter them without engaging in sustained campaigns and committing significant forces.
The use of Shiite militias against US forces in Syria and Iraq is a good example of this.
Although the United States has occasionally retaliated in a limited manner, it has largely hesitated to respond to the more than 120 missile attacks on U.S. forces carried out by Iran-backed militias since October.
This is because there is no easy way to take action against these militias without fighting them directly.
Not only would this drag the United States into another war in the Middle East, which would undoubtedly be unpopular in American domestic politics, but it would also jeopardize ongoing U.S. efforts against the Islamic State as well as relations with Iraq.
USA should withdraw military from area: Iran is exerting pressure
The Iraqi government's response to the recent US strike that killed a militia leader in Baghdad seeking to end the US military presence in the country is an example of the political sensitivities.
The Iranian military has fired missiles at areas in Pakistan, Syria and Iraq.
They wanted to show strength and determination.
The Houthis in Yemen are using a similar strategy to try to block shipping through the Red Sea.
Again, the Houthis rely on missiles and drones and are willing to tolerate limited setbacks from the United States.
You can assume that the United States does not want to wage war in Yemen and therefore will not commit enough resources and firepower to seriously threaten the Houthis' control of their homeland.
The Houthis are willing to accept some losses because they believe the political benefits of their efforts outweigh the risks.
The same applies to Iran and its other proxies, which is why they continue to apply pressure.
They hope to entangle the United States in an unwinnable situation that could eventually lead Washington to abandon its military commitments in the region rather than commit further resources to maintaining the status quo.
Iran's proxies can risk limited blowback from the United States and Israel because they have little to lose.
Iran, on the other hand, would have much more to lose if it were to trigger a direct conflict with the United States or Israel.
For example, Iran could not repeat the Houthis' naval blockade in the Strait of Hormuz.
While he could try, the risk of triggering a direct escalation with the United States, not to mention the strain it would place on relations with China and its neighbors, would be significant.
Against Israel and the USA: Iran wants to become the most important power
The desire to reduce risk is why Iran outsources much of the violence to its employers - and why its employers have taken the lead in military action against foreign adversaries in the current crisis.
By conducting his strategic activities through proxies, he keeps the fight away from Iran's doorstep and thus shifts the costs to other countries.
In the current situation, as Iran and its proxies seek to assert themselves as the main power against Israel and the United States, they have few cards to play.
This applies especially to military actions, where they are usually limited to diversionary tactics.
They can shoot at targets from long distances and use the threat of doing so as a means of exerting pressure on neighbors and enemies, but Iran and its clients cannot do much more.
They cannot take their war to Israel or liberate Palestine by force.
Instead, they are limited to provocations in an attempt to influence the political environment.
For Iran, such actions demonstrate both what can be done and the limits of what Iran is willing to do for its cause.
To the author
Afshon Ostovar
is an associate professor of national security issues at the Naval Postgraduate School and author of Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and the Revolutionary Guards of Iran.
Twitter (X): @AOstovar.
We are currently testing machine translations. This article was automatically translated from English into German.
This article was first published in English in the magazine “ForeignPolicy.com” on January 23, 2024 - as part of a cooperation, it is now also available in translation to readers of the IPPEN.MEDIA portals.