At Audi they call it "Future Pact". A "transformation plan that further secures the future viability of the company". More soberly, it's about nothing less than a horse cure that should save Audi from falling.
For the once aspiring VW subsidiary is only a shadow of itself. For far too long had the company's superiors in Wolfsburg grant the Ingolstadt. The result is reflected in the figures: After significant declines over the past two years, sales are again below budget in the current financial year. By October, the minus was 3.6 percent. That was reason enough for CEO Bram Shot to issue a sales warning in early November.
A austerity plan passed in March envisages spending cuts, and staff cuts agreed on Tuesday should do its part. 9500 jobs will be eliminated - every sixth Audi workplace in Germany. In return, 2000 jobs will be created in areas related to the future priorities of electromobility and digitization. At the same time, Ingolstadt hopes that profits will rise again - because without the necessary funds for research and development, it would be difficult to regain the "Vorsprung durch Technik", which once distinguished Audi over its rivals BMW and Mercedes.
What's up at Audi? Which steps are planned? An overview.
Minimize costs
Audi has already made the first and most important step with the savings plan adopted in the spring. He should reduce the costs by 2022 by up to 15 billion euros. Part of the job cuts are already included. However, its total impact of an estimated six billion euros will not take effect until 2029.
Experts consider it less a deciding factor than a well thought-out concept of where to save money. But that is not recognizable so far. It's about a myriad of details, but also about big strategic issues. This includes, for example, how the problem areas in Ingolstadt and Neckarsulm should be set up in the future. The production planners want to follow the pure teaching and produce either only combustion or only electric cars. Workers' representatives demand flexible belts that can handle both types of drive. In that case, the risk of under-utilization would be lower and structural change would be easier to cope with, but the so-called "flexi-approach" is complicated and less efficient.
Clear specifications
Outwardly, the generational change seemed almost to follow a strategic plan. Rupert Stadler was followed by board colleague Bram Schot for a transitional period until ex-BMW man Markus Duesmann takes over the post of CEO in the spring of 2020. The stories behind it, however, make the process far less sovereign. Thus, the major shareholder family Porsche / Piëch held far too long to Stadler, who was persuaded by the Munich public prosecutor's office, in turn, for the most part, to thwart the clarification of smoldering since 2015 diesel scandal.
The affair certainly seemed to have paralyzed the management levels at Audi downright. There was thus no incentive for new developments that are indispensable in the premium segment in order to be successful. The developers of Porsche, VW and other sister companies, who were waiting for the contribution of their Audi colleagues to joint projects, felt the same way.
Audi
Markus Duesmann: His departure at BMW was not quite smooth
The effects can be seen exemplarily in the former successful model A4. Although the midsize car has fallen far short of expectations since the model change in 2015, the developers have only made a few visual retouchings over the past four years. Technically, in principle, everything remained the same. In the comparative tests with the competition from Munich and Stuttgart, the A4 now plays the role of veteran, who can keep the backlog mainly by a meticulous production within limits.
It is unlikely that the paralysis will be overcome so quickly. Because as "transition manager" Bram Schot brought the austerity plan on the way, but he was hardly able to set any future-oriented accents. And Duesmann will need it for a while, too. First, because he has to get used to it first. On the other hand, because the necessary technology fireworks can not be ignited simply by lighting a match.
In addition, Duesmann must first prove his diplomatic talent in the complex power structure of the VW Group. His departure from BMW in the summer of 2018 does not arouse a great deal of confidence there: With the notice he annoyed the superiors in Munich so much that they make it legally difficult for him to leave.
Convincing models
Sounds obvious, but especially in times of upheaval, it is a particularly difficult undertaking: a well-rounded range of models that provide answers to customers' wishes while at the same time appeasing the critics. At best, however, at best the SUV models are selling well, but they are not just considered a phase-out model for environmental fighters. For a long time, so much is clear, the too big, too heavy and too thirsty vehicles will no longer be the backbone of the model range.
The previous sales guarantors A3, A4 and A6 are not anymore. Thus, in Ingolstadt instead of the possible 600,000 just about 420,000 cars left the factory. In Neckarsulm a good 185,000 cars ran off the line - while the maximum capacity of the plant is 300,000.
