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Horst Neumann (2nd from left) and Karlheinz Blessing (2nd from right), former VW Group HR directors, are about to start the trial in Braunschweig's town hall with two other defendants
Photo:
Moritz Frankenberg / picture alliance / dpa
It was only fifteen minutes before his name was mentioned for the first time. Martin Winterkorn, former head of the VW Group, is said to have learned of diesel manipulation in the USA by May 2014 at the latest. By the end of September 2015 at the latest, he should also have known that millions of vehicles in Europe were also affected by the fraud. But Winterkorn, according to the accusation of the Braunschweig public prosecutor, did not act. He did not take manipulated cars out of circulation in time, he “did not stop the further spread,” according to Chief Public Prosecutor Elke Hoppenworth.
For around an hour and a half, she reads the charges against four former VW managers. Winterkorn is mentioned again and again. From 2007 to 2015 he was at the head of the largest car company in Europe. At that time, the diesel affair, which began in 2006, took its course. According to the public prosecutor, Winterkorn was the "responsible supervisor". According to the investigators, he should have prevented further crimes after learning of the fraud. However, that did not happen: "He decided against disclosure and hoped to be able to avoid the legal violations further."
One of the largest fraud cases in recent economic history has been dealt with in the Braunschweig town hall since Thursday. It's about nine million vehicles that only appeared clean on the test bench, but turned out to be dirty when on the road, emitting many times the permitted amount of toxic nitrogen oxide. It's about millions in bonuses that former VW managers are said to have pocketed with the help of diesel fraud. Above all, however, the question is who is responsible for the scandal: engine and software developers from the management levels below the board of directors? Or the executive suite?
Almost exactly six years ago, on September 18, 2015, the US Environmental Protection Agency made Volkswagen's manipulation public.
The news came as a shock to the entire auto industry.
The advertising campaigns for the »Clean Diesel«, with the help of which VW wanted to conquer North America, turned out to be the only smut.
Around the world, the diesel engine, the pride of German engineers and the driver of Volkswagen's record profits, fell into disrepute as a fraud technology - with devastating consequences: since 2015, the number of new diesel registrations in Germany has almost halved.
In the USA, VW is still suffering from the image disaster.
The defendants face up to ten years imprisonment
Ironically, the most prominent accused is missing at the start of the trial in the Braunschweig city hall. Because winter grain has health problems. He had two hip operations, first in March and then last week, a few days before the start of negotiations. A medical report from the University Clinic in Munich, obtained from the Braunschweig Regional Court, confirms that he will not be able to stand trial for the foreseeable future. In order not to have to postpone the start of the process again - it had already been postponed twice because of the pandemic, the court separated the Winterkorn proceedings.
In any case, the camp of the long-time VW boss is of the opinion that the proceedings against him were arbitrarily appended to the other proceedings, after all, he was only accused of one act by omission, namely that he did not stop the diesel sales.
The lawyers of the former Audi boss Rupert Stadler, who was accused in Munich, had argued, but he has had to defend himself together with three engineers in court for a year.
That is how the public prosecutor in Braunschweig would have liked it.
But here the current main hearing is directed against four defendants from the lower hierarchical levels.
There is a lot at stake for them: The prosecution is bringing charges of gang fraud against them.
The law provides for prison sentences of between one and ten years.
Heinz-Jakob Neußer, ex-head of development on the VW brand board, has the highest rank among the defendants. Just like co-defendant Jens H., he is said to have known about the fraud, but not to have stopped it. Instead, according to the prosecutors, the manipulations were concealed. Two other accused engine experts are alleged to have been involved in the development of the fraudulent software. Neuss has not yet commented on the allegations.
A separate hearing is now planned for Winterkorn, who like H. has always denied the allegations. However, this should only begin after the process that has now been started has been completed - and it is scheduled to run until the end of August 2023. Those involved in the proceedings fear that Winterkorn may not have to appear in court at all if his condition does not improve. Some are already talking about the "death of the Winterkorn trial".
This is unfortunate for the public prosecutor. The investigators do not want to give the impression that the judiciary only concerns executives from the lower floors. The authority has lodged an objection against the separation of the Winterkorn proceedings at the Braunschweig Higher Regional Court. The exact content of the complaint is not known. However, it can be assumed that the authority will require a further medical opinion. A decision by the OLG is expected at the end of the month. Should it cash in on the separation of the Winterkorn process, the whole process would have to be restarted again.
The defense attorney of another accused therefore warned against a "sword of Damocles" that was hanging over the whole trial. The fact that "the so-called Winterkorn Trial" took place without Winterkorn was "a disaster," criticized Andreas Mroß, lawyer for the accused engine expert Thorsten D. He had previously spoken out in favor of postponing the process until Winterkorn recovered. "Taking responsibility for your own behavior," he said to Winterkorn's address, "looks different".
The criticism of the defense attorneys was directed against the public prosecutor on the first day of the trial. Neusser's defense attorney, Annette Voges, requested that the proceedings be suspended; the public prosecutor's office had not yet investigated the matter despite years of preparatory work. The mountain of investigation files is still growing, answers to several requests for mutual legal assistance from foreign authorities are still pending, as is an expert opinion from the Federal Motor Transport Authority. In general, one does not even know who was deceived and when. In addition, the court had commissioned numerous follow-up investigations, instead, according to Voges, it should have returned the case to the public prosecutor's office.
Winterkorn's absence also has a pleasant side effect for the defense lawyers: public interest in the process is clearly decreasing, and their clients are less in the limelight.
Of the 100 seats in the town hall, only about half were occupied on Thursday.
Numerous seats that were reserved for international media representatives remained vacant.
The start of the process offered some entertainment and insight value.
Many technicians at VW were apparently very well aware that they were violating the law - this was made clear by the descriptions of the public prosecutor's office.
At a meeting in November 2006, the fraud is said to have been decided in order to conquer the US market with apparently clean diesel vehicles.
A VW manager at the time is said to have told his colleagues: "Don't get caught."
In 2012 VW then faced a huge technical problem: the software reliably recognized test benches. But even on US roads, many diesel cars suddenly switched to low-emission test mode. The cleaning systems of the vehicles were not designed for this, however, and the particle filters threatened to clog. The VW technicians therefore decided to expand their fraudulent software: a so-called steering angle detection should identify the driver at the wheel - a sure sign that the vehicle was not on the test bench. "If we're screwing up, we'll do it right," one of the technicians in charge is said to have said in a similar manner.
Winterkorn is said to have found out about the problems in 2014.
A study by the US organization ICCT revealed that supposedly clean VW diesel cars sometimes exceeded the permitted nitrogen oxide limit values by 35 times.
But for a long time nothing happened, even though individual employees had already calculated impending amounts of damage.
Only when the US authorities threatened to no longer allow the next generation of VW diesel models did the nervousness at the Wolfsburg headquarters increase.
At the so-called damage table on May 27, 2015, VW technicians want to have informed Winterkorn about the shutdown device.
The ex-boss denies having learned of a violation of the law that day.
The public prosecutor sees it differently.
She assumes that the VW top then decided to continue to conceal the defeat device from the US authorities.
"Be careful when dealing with the authorities," Winterkorn is reported to have said.
Damage of up to 78 billion euros
Compared to the other defendants, the allegations against Winterkorn are less serious: According to the indictment, the ex-boss is only responsible for a comparatively small part of the damage: According to the public prosecutor's office, around 1.3 billion euros are attributable to him. The investigators attribute huge damage sums between around 38 billion and 78 billion euros to the other accused - depending on how many fraudulent vehicles were sold during the period in which they were in operation. Even before the proceedings were opened, the possible amounts of damage had been fiercely disputed. From among the defense lawyers it was said that one could not use the full purchase price as a basis, but only the costs that diesel drivers had to incur to retrofit the exhaust gas cleaning system.
Even if they attribute less damage to Winterkorn, the prosecutors have repeatedly emphasized the importance of the ex-boss in the diesel scandal.
From the point of view of the prosecutors, the whole affair is difficult to assess without the presence of the then top corporate executive.
The court is facing a mammoth trial.
The public prosecutor's office has been investigating for three and a half years.
The indictment comprises 692 pages, the investigation results 300 volumes of files with around 75,000 pages.
The process that began on Thursday is just the beginning; further separate negotiations will follow.
The proceedings include a total of almost 100 suspects, around 30 of whom the public prosecutor's office has already brought charges.
The scandal has already achieved one thing: the diesel engine, which has fallen into disrepute, hardly plays a role in the future strategies of car companies. Volkswagen is now converting its fleet to e-mobility. As early as 2030, 70 percent of the cars sold in Europe should be pure electric vehicles.
