In the background, artillery is heard again and again while Syrian President Bashar al-Assad gives a speech. "The Idlib offensive is the prerequisite for resolving the chaos and terrorism problem in Syria," he told a group of military personnel in the southern part of Idlib province. The state television broadcast this - again and again with dramatic music - speech on Tuesday.
As the world looks to Syria's northeast, where Turkey launched an offensive against the Kurds last week, Assad's attention is now shifting to the northwest of the Civil War. There, in the province of Idlib, he was not allowed to invade with all brutality - the result would probably be one of the largest humanitarian catastrophes in Syria. And that means a lot in this country.
So far, a Russian-Turkish settlement of September 2018 prevented a real Syrian ground offensive in Idlib. But is this old Sochi agreement still valid? Or did Russia's ruler Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan replace it with another one in Sochi on Tuesday?
This point should soon be wrestled. Because the summary of the new agreement published on Tuesday states:
- Turkey recognizes the territorial integrity of Syria, with the exception of the 1998 Adana Protocol.
- This treaty allows Turkey limited raids in Syria to fight the Kurdish Workers' Party PKK.
This contradicts a previous agreement in 2017 between Iran, Turkey and Russia, which has since led to the establishment of 12 Turkish observer posts in Idlib.
Who is a terrorist - and for whom?
Another point of the new Sochi agreement is likely to be interpreted differently by Ankara, Damascus and Moscow. So, Erdogan and Putin agreed to fight "terrorism" and "separatist aspirations" in Syria. At the same time, Turkey and Russia have been arguing for years about whom they classify as terrorists in Syria:
- Russia considers the Turkish allies in Idlib to be terrorists.
- Ankara, on the other hand, believes it can work with these Islamist militias - against even more radical groups that are also fighting in the rebel stronghold.
- Assad's position on this is clear: for him, all oppositionists are terrorists, whether armed or not, Islamists or secularists.
After eight years of war, only the province of Idlib remains as a refuge for opponents. Among them are peaceful activists who have been deported to Idlib from already recaptured areas.
Idlib has priority for Assad, not for Erdogan
For the northeast of Syria, Assad seems for the time being hardly interested. This has fallen back into his lap since the withdrawal of the Americans, at least on paper - with the exception of a 120-kilometer corridor between Tal Abiad and Ras al-Ain. This area is contested between the Syrian allies of Ankara and the Syrian-Kurdish militia YPG.
THE MIRROR
Assad will benefit if the Syrian allies of Turkey and the YPG continue to fight and weaken there. Only a coalition of convenience connects him with the latter, until the decimated Syrian army is stronger again. For Erdogan, on the other hand, it is the other way round:
- For him, the border region in northeastern Syria is more important, as is the northwestern province of Afrin. There are Kurdish strongholds.
- But the province of Idlib, in which the PKK has little backing, Erdogan could do without.
It can not be ruled out that Putin and Erdogan in Sochi have agreed on such a barter: Idlib for the Russian-backed dictator from Damascus - a free hand for Turkey in northeastern Syria.
Not all parts of an agreement are always published, let alone between two autocrats. The fact that Putin could have granted his Turkish counterpart Erdogan, without consideration, access to the northeast seems unlikely. He currently has the longest leverage in Syria.
