As part of discussions on approving the annual US defense budget, it was decided last week to impose sanctions on the foreign companies involved in the "Nord Stream 2" project, which is essentially doubling Russia's natural gas transmission capacity to Western Europe, which is currently conducted through "Nord Stream 1". As part of the project, the double gas pipelines will bypass northern Poland, Ukraine, Belarus and Slovakia, which have so far served as transit countries and have shuttled fertilizer transport commissions.

The project, about 87 percent of which has already been completed, has led to a fierce dispute between Eastern European countries and its center to Western European countries, some of which share the project. Particularly puzzling is Germany's support, in view of its traditional support for exerting EU pressure to curb Russia. Are we witnessing a wide-ranging policy on the part of Germany towards Russia, having been desperate to expect an appropriate American balance against Russia and decided to make Russia an enemy of love?

Support for the venture is also at odds with the Union's energy agenda, which emphasizes the importance of decentralizing EU energy sources to avoid exclusive energy dependency at source. In addition, on September 10, the European Court of Justice ruled that EU membership had an obligation of energy solidarity - an assertion that Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, supporting the project, elegantly ignored, given the severe economic damage expected in the current transitional countries.

Countries opposed to Nord Stream 2 claim that Gazprom's profits - the Russian government gas company believing in the project - are actually used to finance Russian involvement in eastern Ukraine and Syria, as well as to fund the activities of the far-right parties in Europe. The project may also have a direct impact on the security of the Baltic states, on which the pipeline passes. Russia may intensify its armed forces in their territory, on the pretext that this is necessary to protect the construction sites from tampering, which could make it difficult for NATO to conduct maneuvers in the region in the future.

Given that the Union limits the amount of natural gas it can import from Russia, and that already the supply of natural gas from Russia exceeds demand in Europe, it is evident that the Russian interest in executing the project exceeds economic viability. Moscow has already shown that it does not hesitate to close the gas tap as a means of pressure. For example, in previous disputes with Ukraine regarding gas tariffs in 2006 and 2009, Russia stopped supplying gas to the country in mid-winter, a move that led to widespread gas supply disruptions to Western European countries as well.

It can therefore be assumed that the completion of the project will give Putin a powerful weapon capable of bending the hands of European countries and serving as another bargaining chip in the conduct of his foreign policy. While the US has a clear economic interest in curbing the project, as it wants Germany to buy gas from it, the Trump administration also fears that under the auspices the Russians will install underwater spy equipment in the Baltic Sea.

To counteract the economic consideration argument, the United States offered Germany to import gas from other sources, including Israel. Whether the imposition of sanctions is economic or not, its execution is a matter of time, and it is hoped that it will hinder the completion of the project, which is a tangible geopolitical threat. About European countries.