The main task of the National Camp on Tuesday is to reach a majority of 61 without Lieberman. She appears to be impassable in the face of the feeling that what it would be and that the results of the next election, according to polls at the moment, would be similar to previous ones.

To clarify what can be done to meet the task, we recall the 2015 election events. Until the last few days, very close to the elections, all polls showed that the Zionist camp is leading across the Likud with several mandates. The polls were not necessarily wrong. They could not expect the move to take place on Election Day, a mass turnout of voters at the polls, which dramatically changed turnout rates.

In the 2015 elections, overall voting rates increased by 4.6 percent compared to the 2013 elections. However, this general increase did not occur in a similar way among different voter populations. A close look at the polling stations shows that in significant Likud strongholds, there was an increase of 5.75 percent, slightly more than one percent of the overall increase. In contrast, in the polling stations of the center-left, voting rates rose by only 1.4 percent, a 3 percent drop from the overall increase.

The studies almost always indicate that in the periphery, where the Likud consistently leads, voting rates are lower than in the center, especially in left-center support. However, the 2015 election proved that under certain circumstances and conditions, participation rates may be similar: in the center-left support rates, participation rates were approximately 2 percent higher than Likud's support concentrations (about 74 versus 72 percent).

The Likud must send an emergency order, 80 percent, to its potential voters. Even if it is a high threshold that will be very difficult to reach, at the very least, aim for it and approach it as much as possible. It is inevitable that 2015 voting data should be used and remind them of voters whose mobilization resulted in a clear and unequivocal victory that completely reversed all poll results.

The 80 percent order should also be sent to voters to the right of the Likud, especially the religious Zionists. Religious Zionism has always seen high participation rates of more than 80 percent. For example, religious Zionist polling stations had more than 81 percent attendance in April. In September, however, those polls saw a decline of nearly 3 percent.

But increasing participation rates would also not suffice if the right wing continues to lose many votes to parties that will not pass the blocking. These days, there are more and more voices supporting a united religious Zionist list, such as the Right. But one list to the right of Likud may turn out to be a mistake. The right, as we know, lost votes both from the ultra-Orthodox wing who did not like the renewed connection to the new right, and from the liberal wing, who did not like the list with the ultra-ultra-nationalist hue to its liking.

To the right of the Likud, two lists are to be tackled: one, a religious Zionist list that will include the Jewish power that will exhaust most of the votes of the camp interested in a sectoral party; The other, the new right-wing list, which serves as a mixed party for the secular, traditional and religious, attract the right-wing voices who are not interested in the Likud, but will not give their voice to a distinct religious list, especially one that includes Jewish power.

The Likud will contribute to avoiding the big party campaign, whose purpose is to transfer votes from the right-wing bloc parties to the Likud. The recent election campaigns, especially the failed attempts to form a government, have proven that the only thing that matters is the size of the bloc and the number of advisers. Netanyahu himself made it clear in his efforts to maintain the 55 block. Increasing Likud at the expense of bloc parties may turn out to be a detriment to the size of the bloc.

So remember the 2015 election, in which participation rates turned out to be the results of the polls, and in the end, even without Lieberman, the national camp achieved the majority.

Prof. Asher Cohen is Head of the School of Communication at Bar-Ilan University