Since it was introduced last week to the IDF's multi-year program - "Drift," criticism has been poured on it. It is said to be "more of the same", prone to over-reliance on technology while neglecting the dry army, and does not include preparations for certain attribution scenarios. It is also due to two minor factors: the first, a decrease in motivation for military service in general and combat service in particular: if in 1990 the proportion of recruits failed At about 75%, in January 2017 it was already at only 65%. A similar trend is also evident in the readiness for combat service, and the IDF has reportedly ceased publishing its traditional 2017 Motivation Survey for alarming data in this regard.

While some in the military believe that the claims of a "motivational crisis" are inflated and dependent on the methods of measurement, it is enough that they are prevalent in popular and academic discourse, to err in the impression that this is a continuing trend, and to provoke a public uprising due to inequality - a claim that should be heard Evaluations of the expected jump in exemption recipients in the light of their "art teachings".

In addition, the unflattering publications of the IDF have recently increased: reports of serious deficiencies in the reserve divisions, flooding of the Hatzor Air Force base, the prolonged forgery of the Haredi sector's recruitment data - and the fact that those responsible are not expected to take significant steps - all have a negative impact On public confidence in the military, which may manifest a decline in readiness for service.

The second factor relates to a prolonged and planned cut in the IDF's personnel. In recent years, thousands of permanent posts have been released, and on the other, the army has been trying to stem a "brain drain" from its ranks. Over the past five years, the reserve system has also significantly reduced 100,000 troops and training. In addition, in March 2018, the mandatory service for men cut from only 36 to 32 months, resulting in a shortage of thousands of soldiers in the combat support professions. Another July 30 short cut is also planned in July. Although Chief of Staff Kochavi opposes legislation passed during the period Izenkut, but her change seems impractical in the fragile political reality.

Not only is the Torah incomprehensible in terms of closing the qualitative and quantitative divide in manpower - the opposite is true: The dominance of the technology dimension of the program requires the opening of dedicated training and significant human resources supplementation, in addition to the three scenarios of warfare and sub-warfare. This requires, in addition, two reserve divisions that stars have already ordered to close, which is incompatible with operational needs.

Multi-year planning for the IDF, which was not customary until the Eisenkot era, is welcome, but should include the preservation and strengthening of all components of the long-term power building, most notably the human component - both in terms of strengthening motivation and public confidence in the military, as well as in inhibiting power cuts. These two aspects are, in fact, two halves of the same whole, and without them, the desire for a quick decision, which is at the heart of the plan, cannot be realized.