Israel and Hamas do little to avoid war • The two days of fighting against Islamic Jihad did not change anything: Israel approached the elections without getting into an unwanted campaign, and the terrorist organization gained some more air • Commentary
It is likely that before the election, rest will return to the envelope. Website bombed this week in Gaza // Photo: Reuters / Ibrahim Abu Mustafa
In closed talks this week, senior security officials estimated that even before the election, a red color alarm would sound again in the Gaza envelope. This does not mean that anyone in the Gaza Strip is seeking war by force. This does mean that we are shuffling from rocket to rocket, rotating to rotating, and without a major military operation nothing in Gaza will change fundamentally.
Israel and Hamas do not want war. Both sides do quite a bit to avoid it. But the gaps between the sides are so deep that it is difficult to see how they are bridged. Egyptian intelligence personnel and UN envoy Nikki Mladnov have built an effective mediation and coordination mechanism between the parties that allows for a relatively quick closure of violent incidents, but it is a local blockage where it requires root treatment.
Both in Israel and Gaza speak openly for the arrangement: a long-term agreement that will allow for a long period of time on both sides of the border. That's about the only thing that both Israel and Hamas agree to. From here, each side sees things differently. Hamas sees Gaza as open to the world, introduces workers and goods but also weapons, and exploits the peace to build a significant military force that will challenge Israel in the future. Israel sees a closed Gaza, which receives exactly the items it needs for civil-economic rehabilitation, but avoids any military buildup.
The chance of bridging these two contradictory desires is very low. And we haven't even talked about the issue of Israeli civilians and IDF cavalry bodies that Hamas holds, which also has a huge gap between the parties: Hamas sees before it a ruler 2 deal, in which it receives significant consideration against the assets it holds, and Israel sees a very limited transaction that involves minimal payment .
And still, both sides keep trying. Less in the belief that it will succeed, and more in the understanding that the alternative is worse. At the end of the fierce campaign, there will remain about 2 million of its inhabitants and endless problems, and if no solution is found for the next day - one that would include a very weakened Hamas or a Hamas substitute - it is better not to enter this film, which will take us back to the starting point under better conditions.
As in all recent months, the person responsible for the mess in Gaza this week is the Islamic Jihad. The assassination of Baha'u Abu Alta in November last year removed a troubling neighborhood bully from the road, but he did not really solve anything. The organization continues to ignite fires and pour oil on them for pleasure.
Two were allowed to replace Abu Alta - who officially commanded the northern sector in Islamic Jihad, but was practically the owner of the entire Gaza Strip. In recent months they have been trying to find their place, and some of it is undergoing combat. They want to prove to their people, and not least to Hamas, that they are here. That should be taken into account.
Illusionists
On Wednesday last week, the Jihad sought to launch a sniper attack on Israeli territory. The IDF conducted an intelligence and operational segment. Despite the long-range (and the fact that the Palestinian sniper was hiding in a shed), the US Navy managed to thwart the attack. The sniper is eliminated before the sniper. 1: 0 to Israel.
On Sunday this week, the organization tried to work again. Two terrorists were sent to lay a sling load near the fence in the southern Gaza Strip. An observation identified them and exerted force from a carob regiment. The terrorists were eliminated. 2: 0 to Israel.
Expression of pragmatism. Halevy // Photo: Joshua Yosef
So far everything went smoothly. Jihad was looking for an attack, Israel kept strong in defense and stinging attack. However, in Israel there is a policy (not new, as Defense Minister Bennett argued this week) to collect, if possible, the bodies of terrorists from the territory, for future negotiations on prisoners and missing persons. Not that anyone really believes it will help, but the terrorists in Gaza also have families, and so can be saved The funeral, which often turns into an emotional event that often ends with a nervous clash with IDF forces on the fence.
The IDF's directive at such events is not to send soldiers to bring the bodies, for fear of being trapped. It was decided to send a bulldozer to bring them. A short drive, 90 meters from the fence. The intention was to lift the body to the scales and bring it to Israel. And the bulldozer found it difficult to get his palm into it and swing the body. Time passed, and instead young Palestinians began trying to prevent the body from collecting. A riot began, which quickly became a violent and photographed event. Eventually the body (one of them) was brought to Israel, but the damage was already done. .
The Gaza Division has not yet completed the incident investigation. He is likely to learn that there was determination and adherence to the task, but not enough discretion. When the effort is to soothe the Gaza Strip - certainly on the eve of the election - it is not advisable to give the other party an excuse to fire the sector.
And that's exactly what Jihad needed: an excuse. At a 2: 0 lag, as the crowd ventured behind him against the "humiliation" of the corpse event, he went on the attack. From a tactical event, it became a matter of national honor. That's also why Hamas sat during the two days of fighting on the fence: not joining the shooting, but also not really interfering with jihad so as not to appear to be acting against the will of the people.
Jihad probably wanted a quick turnaround. Charge some price from Israel, and return to his business. This is evidenced by his care not to exceed the boundary of the envelope. The organization has no operational problem to shoot at the depths of Israel, but its seniors also realized that this was not the place nor the time to go crazy. The fact that Israel maintained a strong defense (and again: thanks to the Iron Dome) allowed another round to be completed without casualties and minimal damage. The fighting lasted a day beyond what was planned - mainly because of the Damascus air force attack that required the jihad to continue launching - but its ending was expected.
Hamas was the first to welcome it. As always, at the beginning of the round, his leaders went underground, fearing that Israel would seize the opportunity and try to eliminate it. From the ground they were prepared for the possibility of escalation, but urged the international mediators - to which the Qatari envoy, who arrived this week in Gaza with another dose of cash - joined in to close the story. It took a day beyond what was planned, and economic sanctions (closing closures, stopping workers' entry and preventing fishing) were also needed for this to happen, but in the end it happened.
On Tuesday, life was back on track. The work was resumed, and so was the school. On Thursday, Gaza also rests. Israel has reopened the crossings and restored the fishery to its original scope. But nothing really changed. Both sides bought time. Another week, no more. Israel was getting closer to the elections without getting caught in an unwanted campaign, and Hamas Earn some more air to sell the people of the Strip the constant illusion that Otto would be better.
The "Next Day" Questions
The defense establishment did not like the visibility of the visit of Mossad chief Yossi Cohen and the commanding officer of the Southern Rani Halevi in Qatar. Not damage, but it's the kind of event that would have been modest. This visit revealed what was known: that Israel is doing everything possible to buy quiet in the Gaza Strip. Including coaxing countries that do not have an open relationship to finance a terrorist organization that wants to be destroyed.
But even more, this visit expresses the pragmatism in the security system. That everything really needs to be done to avoid war, and even if we get into it - to realize that there is the day after. In this context, Halevy often mentions General Douglas MacArthur, who, after he defeated Japan during World War II, was in its rehabilitation. An upside was to Americans in the Second Gulf War; They overcame Iraq, but failed to formulate a civil-economic-diplomatic plan that would put it back on its feet.
Israel is currently doing everything possible to avoid the war in Gaza (regardless of whether it comes from the elections, the desire to concentrate on Iran, or the genuine and genuine attempt to turn every stone). It also does whatever it takes to be military to prepare for war, but it has no real political strategy for the day after.
Such a strategy is essential because Israel will be involved in the campaign in Gaza. In a slide included in his annual intelligence assessment, the National Security Research Institute elaborated on the possibilities Israel has with Gaza. It has six alternatives, from long-term or limited series, through ceasefire, fence events and limited combat rounds, to war. With a low chance of regulation (even limited), each round of combat brings the parties to war.
Maj. Gen. (Res.) Amos Yadlin, head of the institute and formerly the head of the UN, believes that Israel should not shy away from war. On the contrary, it must walk with its eyes open, understanding that only it will allow the situation in the Gaza Strip to change from the ground up. Although Israel will also be required to pay it Price - economic, and especially of those killed in the front and rear - but in the end it will be possible to come to a real series, which is based on deterrence and not on the current formula of quiet-answering, which leads to incessant fighting rounds.
"If, at the end of the war, Sinvar, Haniyeh and Muhammad Page are not present, and the Palestinians in Gaza see IDF tanks in the parking lot of Shifa Hospital, a real and stable arrangement can be reached," he says. "Every few years Gaza needs a reminder of Israel's power. It's been over five years since the last time. It is probably time for a new reminder. "
Yadlin believes that as part of its preparation for "The Day After," Israel must ask itself who it wants to control the Gaza Strip. It is itself (the negative answer), the weakened Hamas (some who support it), the Palestinian Authority (Netanyahu's policy for the past decade indicates that he has no such interest) or any other factor. Those who do not give themselves the answer to this before embarking on the battle may find themselves with a bad result in the end (from the collapse of the Gaza Strip to the takeover of an even more extreme factor by Hamas).
Meanwhile, Israel is running rounds. As mentioned, restlessness is likely to return to the envelope before the elections. And if not, then surely after them. Sometime he will break into the Israeli side. It will happen as a result of the casualties, or an informed decision. Bennett spoke this week about a surprise that Israel is preparing for Hamas. The IDF raised ears (and also rubbed their eyes) in astonishment. If that is a surprise, why talk about it. She is already quite veteran, and she is responsible for former Southern Command (and current Deputy Chief of Staff) Eyal Zamir, and former Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkott.
Hamas understands that Israel may go crazy. That the rope is almost stretched to the edge. Not every Purim day, and not every election night. That's why his heads are trying to calm down, avoid activity, send messages of hope. Everything, except to curb Islamic Jihad, ensures that the troll in the south continues - all the way to the next campaign.