With the establishment of the fifth Netanyahu government (more precisely four and a half in collaboration with Gantz), the ultra-Orthodox Likud alliance has once again proven itself to be a strong political asset. David Zoldan, the founder of the ultra-Orthodox Nahal, expressed this feeling here yesterday ("another echoing speech of the rabbis", 10.05), explaining that, for the ultra-Orthodox (Lithuanian), the alliance with the right is not only political but also culturally-based, since it is based on closeness. Indeed, it is common to claim that the right is more traditional than the left, or that the Mizrahi are more traditional than the Ashkenazi, and therefore turned right, to the Likud. These claims are not necessarily accurate. Jabotinsky was an avowed atheist who began courting the religious public at a later stage for political reasons. Mizrahim mostly voted for Mapai in the first few decades of the country, so they were apparently even more "traditional". 

But despite the fact that the right-wing political success is credited quite a bit to the Likud-ultra-Orthodox alliance, its price must also be examined with open eyes, which were evident in the sharp political crisis that befell Israel. Netanyahu's full control of Israeli politics since he was re-elected prime minister 11 years ago is based on this alliance. With her help he also managed to secure his reign for another year and a half or two years. However, for a year and a half and three election campaigns, Knesset members failed to form a government. Avigdor Lieberman's surprising move to the opposition, and the breakup of his old alliance with Netanyahu, have created unprecedented paralysis and inability to form a coalition. Lieberman recognized his new status as the scales of Israeli politics, and did what he did. He has taken the place of the ultra-Orthodox parties since the '77 revolution, which has been widening in alliance with the Likud and losing their maneuverability. 

Netanyahu preferred the partnership with the ultra-Orthodox over important groups in the Zionist center in Israel, to which he only addressed the cliff. And while its competitors have failed to make a more effective alliance in the meantime, for the past year and a half, Benny Gantz has almost succeeded in overthrowing, in part thanks to a campaign promised by a liberal secular government. Large groups of Israelis serving in the military, contributing to its modern economy and vibrant culture, see how they are pushed aside for the benefit of separatist religious groups, some of which are in principle opposed to Zionism. 

In no way did Israel's resilience leaders decide in the shadow of the Corona crisis to dismantle the Alliance with Yesh Futur and the Talmud and join the Likud, to the chagrin of their partners. Netanyahu also compromised in favor of an equitable (private) government of the right bloc (58 mandates) with Israel's resignation ), Although its camp is three times larger, but the national emergency government will be very different from the unity governments established by the Likud and the Alignment in 1990-1984, we put in more than 90 MKs. Then there were two similar sized blocks. Yitzhak Shamir favored a broad government over a narrow right-wing government that would depend on the ultra-Orthodox. Some will say that Netanyahu's decision to equate power is a desperate step in the shadow of his trial, and some will say that the Corona has decided. But it also seems to be the result of Netanyahu's preferred line over the years, during which he formed the "right bloc" under his leadership, at the expense of the political center. Does the political crisis indicate the decline of the power of the Likud and the ultra-Orthodox?

Dr. Rona Yona is a history professor at Tel Aviv University and Oranim College