Despite the IDF's limited resources in manpower and equipment, he was and remains the largest, most professional, and largest resource organization in Israel. 

Soldiers assist civilians in first corona wave // ​​Photo: Coco

Heading the security system during the Corona epidemic, watching the failure of the civilian system to deal with the crisis in an orderly and coordinated manner, and convinced that if the IDF could integrate the various systems, it would have been more successful. Even if the current danger is not (yet) defined as a security threat.

In the early days of Corona, Prime Minister Netanyahu seemed to enjoy talking to his citizens in prime time, instructing them to wash their hands and wearing masks, and to create a sense that there is a responsible adult environment capable of handling the plague as well as discussing its struggle. Suffers for several years) and the current defense minister (who has not been suffering for a year and a half) to include the handling of the issue as the IDF knows how to do. Perhaps now that he realizes that anyone who is identified as the rain-watcher finds himself guilty of the drought, too, will agree to the overall responsibility he has and let the IDF beat the Corona.

Prior to the 25th Independence Day, the years of state were divided among journalists in "Dabar", and I was assigned the task of describing 1950. During my work, I came across Avraham Ofer's article, and was surprised, because I knew him, 23 years after his article was published, as a definite establishment. 

It wasn't like winter 1950's for difficulty. In February, snow fell in Tel Aviv. Never happened like this since, nor before in the first Hebrew city. Towards the end of the year, heavy rains fell and floods created the camps and passages that housed the immigrants. The army is called to save the situation.

Mapai's young guard, Ashmorat, whose editor was Meir Bareli, published Ofer's defiant article under the name "What for the Army in the Passages?" Among other things, the angry young man wrote: "At first sight everything is fine, and even admirable ... The press dispersed fame and praise for the military and the Transition Operation. Nevertheless, this step raises some serious problems ... One has to ask, what happened to the role of existing institutions to do so to the military? ... By no means is the military, the appropriate framework - both in terms of economic efficiency and regime Inner - to perform the other roles in a democratic country ... Before the winter, the situation in crisis transitions came. There might have been no other choice but to call the army. But this step should not be welcomed without demanding an answer: why we came to the crisis and who are responsible for it. "

Ofer's conclusion, which later became the Minister of Housing and ended his life tragically, remains true today. When other systems fail, one must check why they failed, but the military is the address to which democratic society is addressing such a failure. Unlike the ISA, which its head is asking for, and rightly so, that it will not utilize its surveillance capabilities to investigate people who are not suspected of compromising state security, the IDF is willing and even seeking to include the treatment of the Corona fight.

The law allows him to do so (this is the reasonable interpretation of Article 18 of the "rule of law and order", which is still in force, and also of Article 2 of the GPA, which allows the IDF to perform civil functions, at the request of the police). If the role of the IDF is limited in time and under government and parliamentary oversight, its involvement - even at an overall level - will not be a danger to our democracy. √