Complacency and politics, suspicion and legalization - led Israel to the great failure of the second wave • Faced with four big mistakes by the two governments, only three people warned in real time • "Israel Today" in a review of the chain of moves that enabled the jump in morbidity
May 24, Rosh Chodesh Sivan, was a crucial day in the history of the corona plague in Israel. On that day, two critical things happened that led Israel to lose the fantastic achievement that the first closure brought.
Photo: GPO
The first thing that happened on May 24 was the turnaround in infection data. After long weeks during which the number of new corona carriers decreased - the trend reversed. In real time it was impossible to know that this was a revolution, but in retrospect the picture is clear.
On May 23, there were still only five new carriers. On May 24th we went up to 13th. The next day, on May 25, we jumped to 22 contagious and after two days, on May 2, we were already standing on 50 carriers in one day. One week later, on May 29, Israel once again crossed the threshold of one hundred new infections a day.
However, on May 24, another decision was made that we will reach immediately. Looking back, one finds that a combination of reasons and circumstances - political, professional, operational and legal - has led to failure.
To understand what happened, let's go back a little bit. On Sunday, April 19, with the end of Passover, the government began removing the severe restrictions that have been accumulating since the onset of the plague.
Two governments facing one plague
At the end of long weeks of closure, the economy began to open up. Special education resumed, prayers outside the synagogues were renewed and shops received a permit to operate, until on May 15 the ballrooms reopened, albeit to a limited extent. As mentioned, in those weeks, the number of new patients was very low, so the government had every reason to continue the relief. But not one government opened the closure but two.
• The great danger: The health system is not ready for the third wave that may land in winter
• By all accounts: The plague is knocking at the door, and we do not have time to waste on unnecessary discussions
• Netanyahu hints at closure: "In order to preserve the situation, we will have to make the right decisions"
In the midst of the Corona plague, after three elections, the unity government was formed in Israel. It so happened that the government that imposed the blockade before Pesach was the one that also began removing it. But during the opening process, the government changed. On May 17, on a day when the number of new patients was only 15, Netanyahu and Gantz were sworn in as prime ministers - incumbents and alternates. A week later, on May 24, the trend of morbidity under the noses of the new ministers was reversed.
In real time they could not know that this would be the turning point, as economists call it, since the numbers always jump up and down a bit. Only from the distance of time could one know that there was a reversal of a trend. At that time everyone, including everyone, was pleased with the success in curbing the virus. "Make a living," Netanyahu sent the public to celebrate on May 26.
Meanwhile, the new ministers entered their offices, and each had new content worlds to learn, including the corona. While most Likud ministers have generally responded to the line led by Prime Minister Netanyahu, blue-and-white ministers then suspected and suspect today that Netanyahu is playing with the corona according to his political needs. Therefore, later, when the numbers go up and Netanyahu wants to go back to the restrictions - blue and white ministers will object. The unity government has failed to formulate a coherent policy. This was the first point of failure.
The ongoing opposition to spotting
Alongside the political process was also a legal event. On April 30, 11 days into the removal of the relief and when the plague weakens, the High Court banned the continuation of the GSS. The judges demanded that the transitional government enact a law regulating the placements. However, the transitional government did not have a majority in the Knesset to enact the law, nor was there such a majority in the unity government.
The reason: Blue and White refused to use the Icons, and resisted for weeks. Even on June 22, when the daily number of infections was already 342 men and women, Ganz and Ashkenazi did not agree in the Corona cabinet to renew the placements. It is important to say that the GSS also wanted, for its own reasons, weighty reasons to stop treating Corona. At this point, Prime Minister Netanyahu did not knock on the table.
It so happened that on that crucial day, May 24, when the trend of morbidity was reversed, the government stopped the use of spotting. This is the second incident that happened that day - and it is also the second failure.
Required: Radar
The ceasefire has turned Israel into a plane that does not know where it is in the sky. It has no radar or orientation of its own - our phones have stopped telling the Ministry of Health if we have come in contact with a Corona carrier - nor an air control that will target it because there are no epidemiological investigations. This is the third failure.
With the formation of the new government, the top echelons in the Ministry of Health also changed. Former Minister of Health Yaakov Litzman has left. Former CEO Moshe Bar-Siman Tov was already with one foot out. Minister Edelstein just got into things and looked for a CEO. No one thought that with the cessation of the placements there would be an urgent need to increase, 10 times or 100 times, the set of investigations.
No radar and no epidemiological investigations. That's how we got into Vertigo, and after Vertigo comes a crash.
Mass infection centers
But that's not the whole story. In the weeks that followed, from the end of May to the beginning of June, when it was already clear that the corona was returning - the government did not take any real steps to stop it.
For example, Netanyahu's words from June 8: "There is a very sharp increase in morbidity. We may already be within the doubling index within ten days of the rate of infection. In the coming days. One exception is banquet halls - we will allow them to operate in accordance with the guidelines of the Ministry of Health and we will report to you later. " That is, do not continue to ease but also do not impose new restrictions.
What is? Allow event halls to increase capacity to 250 people. It was a disastrous step. Weddings and parties have become mass hotspots, in part because no one has followed the guidelines. According to unofficial data, at least 2,500 weddings were held throughout the country during the halls' operation. The data clearly show that two weeks after the extensive activity in the halls resumed - the morbidity jumped alarmingly to 485 infected a day.
This was the fourth point of failure. Instead of taking urgent steps to stop the morbidity, the government allowed the expansion of hall activities.
The three alarms
Thus, the situation continued to deteriorate and only at the beginning of July, when we reached a thousand new infections a day, the government enacted the GSS Localization Law in a swift procedure. The contagion of 90 percent of the new carriers was unknown.The government lost control of the situation.The fantastic achievement of stopping the first wave stumbled under the corona.
Amid this tremendous failure, it is possible to point to only three people trying to save the situation in real time. Ministers Yuval Steinitz and Ze'ev Elkin were the only ones in the government who opposed the cessation of GSS personnel.
"Precisely because of the decrease in the amount of infection, we must stay with our hand on the pulse and remain on high alert, with all the tools at our disposal in case of a new outbreak. We will not be in another wave, our hands will be tied, then we will have to make another decision to return." Delaying our ability to react and interrupting the chain of infection, if any. " The scenario that Steinitz predicted occurred in a one-on-one reality.
He shared his opinion, but without the right to vote in the government, was the head of the National Security Council, Meir Ben Shabbat, who felt he had to warn at the gate. As a senior GSS member, he recalled that a great intelligence investigator, Robert Jarvis, stated: Moreover, the second mistake would be an underestimation. " Therefore, on May 27, at the first meeting of the Corona Cabinet, when the trend had already reversed but the morbidity figures were still relatively low, Ben Shabbat tried to warn the ministers against continuing the easing. "There are weighty risks. The public's awareness and willingness to give up everyday habits is declining. People do not want to be tested and are not willing to infringe on privacy. The risk of infection is great because everything is open. The reaction (to open the economy; etc.) can be dangerous." Fell on deaf ears.
Another factor that put the brakes on, but belatedly, was Health Minister Yuli Edelstein. In the first weeks of the job, Edelstein led the relief, and even allowed in the days of the bush to remove the masks. It took him several weeks to make a U-turn. In mid-June he ordered an expansion of the set of epidemiological investigations and demanded the return of restrictions. It was too little and too late.
Bottom line, a mix of a lot of complacency and politics, with a dash of judicial activism and a government that has just changed, degraded Israel, according to Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Health, Prof. Itamar Grotto, yesterday (Monday) in the Knesset, to a situation where " The worst in the world. "