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Kissinger also needed an apprentice: the American official who initiated the territorial formula in exchange for peace

Retired General Brent Scoutcroft served as Henry Kissinger's deputy during Israel's difficult time - the Yom Kippur War. Four decades later, he provided insights from his perspective on the IDF, the leaders and the Israeli-Arab conflict. "If we had not made a mistake in deciphering regional logic, war could have been avoided."

• Henry Kissinger
• Ronald Reagan
• Yom Hakkipurim War
• Golda Meir
• Anwar Sadat

Amir Oren

George Schultz, 99. Henry Kissinger, 97. Jimmy Carter, 95. James Baker, 90. Involvement in the Israeli-Arab conflict is probably a virtue for longevity for American statesmen. Last weekend, one of its key members, retired General Brent Sceacroft, the national security adviser to the administrations of Gerald Ford and George W. Bush (Sr.), also 95-year-old Carter, was deducted from this list.

During Israel's most difficult time, during the Yom Kippur War, Scoutcroft was with Kissinger as his deputy on the National Security Council in the White House - a stronghold that Kissinger refused to give up even after his appointment as foreign minister; He coordinated staff work on the Kissinger campaigns for the ceasefire agreements and the separation of powers with Egypt and Syria; A dozen years after Ford's loss to Carter, Schaucroft returned to office in the Bush administration, which sent Secretary of State Baker to advance a settlement of the conflict; He also organized a Western-Arab-Soviet alliance against Saddam Hussein and launched the Madrid process following the 1991 war, which for the first time brought together an Israeli delegation with Palestinian representatives, in a joint framework with Jordan.

Skåcroft was Kissinger's second deputy, after Alexander Hague returned to the army. The two officers represented polarly different models: the ambitious and political ambitious Hague, came to Washington from the field in Vietnam as a colonel and advanced under Nixon and Kissinger to the general. This is while the humble Skyroft excelled as a staff officer who did not try to overshadow his superiors and succeed them. In Israeli terms of the Chiefs of the National Security Staff, Haig was Yossi Cohen, Skaucroft - Giora Island.

In Washington and Kuwait, in recent days, we have marked 30 years since Operation Desert Shield, to contain Iraq. Skocroft was then an important pivot in the squad, which included Bush, Baker, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell. Since Bush's loss to Clinton, Skocroft has remained out of the next two Republican administrations - Bush (son) and Trump, but his advice was requested and considered. John McCain said ahead of elections in 2008 that if he wins the presidency would launch the Middle East the most talented person familiar - Skaokroft (or Baker, but Baker "is not as Ehud" in Israel).

formula of land for peace, IN Resolutions 242 following the Six Day War and 338 at the end of the '73 war During the period of Ehud Barak's contacts with Hafez Assad, Scoucroft publicly supported the deployment of an American force in the Golan Heights, as a guarantee for Israel's security in a peace agreement with Syria.

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The war could have been prevented in '73

This, too, was the lesson of the 1973 miss: a severance in Washington's ties with Cairo and Damascus - and, at the same time, Jerusalem in a severance from Moscow - that contributed to the blindness of Yom Kippur. In an interview with the series "The Land Will Not Quiet" (Amit Goren Productions), four decades after the war, Scoucroft provided important facts and insights from his angle as a pilot on Kissinger's plane, while Captain Nixon sinks, depressed and drunk, into Watergate's black hole; Because every master as a Kissinger needs an apprentice as a Scavenger.

In an interview, Sceacroft argued that the war could probably have been prevented. "But this is a classic example of a so-called logical assessment error, because the goals of the various players are not well analyzed," he said. "In retrospect, it benefited the region because it is a fact that without it there would be no process. We identified the annual exercises of the Egyptian and Syrian armies, and did not estimate that they would succeed in the war according to the success indices attributed to them.

On Anwar Sadat's underestimation he explained that "we underestimated him". According to Scoutcroft, the then president of Egypt "was clever, wanted to negotiate from a psychological atmosphere different from that of the Arabs in general and the Egyptians in particular, following the defeat in 1967. How to do it? "He and the Egyptians regained their dignity. We did not really know them, it was only after the war that a vital bond of understanding developed between us."

In an interview, Scoucroft described his admiration for the IDF's capabilities. "We admired him because in 1967, albeit in very specific circumstances, Israel's forces and strategy excelled in their determination, and we estimated that a continuing war would also bring disaster to the Arabs. We were very surprised both by the outbreak of the war, and by the success of the Egyptian and Syrian armies at the beginning and the losses of Israel, especially in equipment. This is how the problem of flying supplies to Israel arose. I spent a lot of time convincing the Pentagon to overcome the obstacles to the air train's performance. "Ambassador Simcha Dinitz called me 'the head of the IDF's warehousing division,'" he said.

"The decisive consideration was the need of the IDF"

Defense Minister Schlesinger, his deputy (oil tycoon) Clementes and Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Murer then objected to aid to Israel. "They feared our too overt bias in favor of one side," he said. "The danger of an oil embargo hovered in the background. In the end, the decisive consideration was the clear need of the Israeli army to fill the shortage of equipment. "

On October 9, the feeling of despair in Israel matured to the point of launching or demonstrating doomsday weapons. Scaucroft claimed he was unaware of reports that there were some in Israel. Who have ever considered the use of nuclear weapons. He said, "It will not surprise me, as a line of thought of military personnel, but to the best of my knowledge we have never received information in this direction, nor have we acted out of fear that it might happen. I can not completely rule out the possibility that there was such a signal, but if there was - we were not affected by it.

" The siege with or without us. We sent telegrams to all the arenas, to raise the alert. We waited three to four hours, making sure the Soviets noticed an unusual volume of communication, and then I called Ambassador Dobrinin and reacted sharply to the warning. The usual comparison to the Cuban Missile Crisis is incorrect. In 1962, a military crisis really took place. Here we used alertness to signal. "There was no real need for increased alert on the part of the Panama Canal, for example."

Scoutcroft described that Nixon "had no direct contact with the crisis management team. He would communicate through Kissinger or Haig, the White House chief of staff. I hardly saw him throughout the crisis, but he was the final decision-maker. It was he who decided to operate the air train, in principle. "In a discussion about the response to the Soviet warning, Haig left the room to call him and update him."

He described Kissinger as "one of the greatest strategists I've ever seen, and here at his best." He detailed that "after the initial error in the question of war, he brilliantly managed the crisis, skillfully led the other ministers and other members of the National Security Council, and operated the Israelis, Egyptians and Soviets in a sophisticated manner."

In those days there were legends about a conspiracy that was allegedly concocted with Sadat, Kissinger and Golda, or Moshe Dayan, to break the stalemate during my war. Four decades later, Scoutcroft dismissed the allegations: "When it is done with talent, it is presented after the fact as a conspiracy. No. These were real people with real goals, not maneuvers on a chessboard. There were very tense moments. Unlike the successful ending, it was in different aspects. On the verge of disaster. "

In an interview, Skaukroft spoke about his acquaintance with the Israeli leaders. He testified that he did not know Golda well, "but I attended conversations with her and was impressed by her strong personality. Very strong, very decisive, very positive. She listened to the arguments, but did not seek guidance. She was more on the claiming side. She could do anything, but in my opinion all "Sadat was still in the mood for the '67 defeat, he was not in a bargaining position. I do not know that history does not deal with alternatives, but Golda also did not have a proper mood for negotiations."

Dayan was described as "very smart, very talented." He also spoke in praise of Ambassador Dinitz: "Brilliant, quick-thinking, he always understood where you were heading even before you finished the trial."

Skeacroft met former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin during his tenure as ambassador to Washington. He said, "He was not rigid. We remained in touch with the upheavals of Israeli politics, including his return to the prime minister, before the horrific assassination. He developed from his time as ambassador to the recognition that Israel's security lies in understanding, arrangements and proper relations with its neighbors."

The question of who won the Yom Kippur War was answered by "The World". He said, "An Israeli-Arab dialogue has begun. An American-Soviet conflict has been avoided. And on a narrower view, a Soviet exit from the region has begun."

"Opposes American or Israeli attack on Iran"

Scoucroft claimed that he had never spoken to Israelis about the nucleus. "What was discussed with them preceded my arrival in office. It was in the background and gave Israeli politicians confidence in their moves," he said.

"I oppose an American or Israeli attack," he said, referring to the Iranian nuclear program. "It should be made clear to the Iranians that we are not seeking to overthrow the regime and that we recognize their security problems, but that is not the way to solve them. Because at least Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia will also develop nuclear weapons, and Iran's security situation will deteriorate."

On the formula for resolving the Israeli-Arab conflict, he said that "there are four fixed points known to every president, and they are not enough because the fifth is always missing - a presidential willingness to act for a just and beneficial settlement."

The former US official criticized the Republican Party, even before the Donald Trump era. "Although I am a Republican, I am not considered that in the eyes of many Republicans. It is not my views that have changed - the party has changed," he noted.

Due Diligence: The author is the screenwriter of the series "The Land Will Not Quiet"