The events of the second intifada // Photo: Roni Shitzer, Tal Cohen, A.P.
To some extent, the atmosphere in the Israeli public in the days of the Corona is reminiscent of the mood exactly 20 years ago, in the days of the second intifada: general depression, fear of taking to the streets, fear of riding buses and crowding malls and entertainment centers (long live the difference).
Even today, as then, the questions arise as to when it will end, how human life can be saved and how to curb the event.
Even 20 years after the outbreak of the second intifada, opinions are divided on whether it was a popular outbreak or a deliberate terrorist attack.
The head of the research division at the time, Maj. Gen. (Res.) Amos Gilad, told Israel Today this week that before the outbreak of the terrorist attack, he issued a strategic warning to senior military and state officials that Arafat intends to launch a terrorist attack without taking responsibility.
"Prime Minister Barak did not receive my professional assessment. The only one who received the assessment was the then chief of staff, Shaul Mofaz, who ordered the IDF to prepare," he told Israel Today this week.
Whether one accepts the Israeli establishment's version that Arafat initiated the violent outbreak, or the Palestinians' version that it is a spontaneous outburst of popular outrage, one can assume with a high degree of confidence that the conflict would have started anyway at the time it began.
The trigger for the outbreak of violence was the visit of the then chairman of the opposition, Ariel Sharon, to the Temple Mount.
Despite estimates that his visit to the Temple Mount could ignite violence, Sharon decided to ascend the mountain on Thursday, September 28, 2000, exactly 20 years ago.
Sharon ascended the Temple Mount just before 8:00 p.m.
In practice, the visit lasted less than an hour, and passed relatively without any special incidents.
Only a day later, after Friday prayers, thousands of Palestinians of all ages began throwing stones, iron rods and Molotov cocktails at the intensified police force on the Temple Mount, and at the nearby Western Wall plaza, where Jews were praying at the time.
About 15 Israeli policemen were wounded, while seven Palestinians were killed and about 100 wounded.
The harsh hand shown by the police in suppressing the violent demonstration in the holy and symbolic place, which evokes strong emotions, unleashed unbridled restraint for months and even years, and the intifada was renamed the Al-Aqsa Intifada, which commemorated the place where it began.
From that point on, events got out of hand, and a wave of protests erupted across the West Bank.
Scars in the memory of the nation
In the Gaza Strip, too, events picked up speed, even intensifying after a Palestinian photographer caught 12-year-old boy Muhammad a-Dura in a violent eye with his father.
The two were killed after desperately trying to take cover (the IDF later claimed that the boy was not killed by Israeli fire). The photos were broadcast in every possible media outlet in Israel and around the world, and a-Dora became a national hero who united the Palestinian ranks with his death.
The atmosphere of tension increased with the outbreak of a wave of riots by Israeli Arabs inside the Green Line on October 1, in which 12 Israeli Arabs were killed by security forces fire.
The violent events created a major rift between Israeli Arabs and Israeli society.
Not long after, another serious incident occurred that was engraved in the national memory - the death in the tomb of Yosef of a border policeman from Madhat Yosef.
The army prepared to evacuate him to the grave, and at the same time tried to coordinate his evacuation with the Palestinian authorities, but Yosef died of his wounds a few hours after he was wounded, before being evacuated.
The affair damaged the IDF ethos, according to which no casualties were left on the ground, and public anger in Israel was great.
On October 12, another difficult event took place that also became one of the symbols of the second intifada.
Two reservists accidentally entered Ramallah, and encountered a violent lynching by an angry mob.
The harsh memory is etched in the Israeli memory in which one of the soldiers is seen thrown from a high window, and one of the rioters waves to the crowd with his hands redeemed by the blood of the Israeli dead.
As time went on, events escalated.
The Palestinians went on road attacks, sending suicide bombers to the territories of Judea and Samaria, and later also terrorist attacks in the territories of the State of Israel. The news, and suicide terrorism managed to intimidate and frighten the Israeli public who rarely went out to the malls and weighed every bus ride.
Operation - and withdrawal
It was these attacks that shaped most of the army's responses.
As events escalated, the IDF escalated into airstrikes, assassinations of terrorists, and killing Palestinians, which only fueled the conflict. At the political level, at least initially, there have been attempts to negotiate with the Palestinian Authority in order for it to contain the fire and stop the violence.
On the eve of Passover 2002, a suicide bomber exploded at the Park Hotel in Netanya, killing 30 Israelis.
The attack was not very different from its predecessors, but its timing, in the middle of Seder night, was the straw that broke the camel's back for Israel, which decided to launch Operation Defensive Shield in March 2002. During the operation, the IDF took control of terrorist strongholds and reconquered the West Bank.
The Defensive Shield failed to interrupt the series of numerous terrorist attacks in Israel and Judea and Samaria, which lasted even longer.
Although the army has not officially announced this, it is said that the disengagement from the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2005 is the practical end point of the second intifada.
On repression and extremism
One of the direct consequences of those bloody days is the loss of confidence of a significant part of the Israeli public in the possibility of peace with the Palestinians.
"Today there is no occupation of the Palestinians at all," complains Maj. Gen. (Res.) Gilad. "A permanent settlement will probably not be with them, but we should at least talk to them. Unfortunately, this does not interest the Israeli public at the moment, because the Palestinians do not create a concrete problem." "About 500 attacks a year. If only ten percent of these attempts were successful, we would be somewhere else. The success means that no one thinks he has to deal with the Palestinian problem, but it is a tragic mistake, because reality is taking shape."
One of the main lessons of Maj. Gen. (Res.) Gilad from the second intifada is: "When there is an intelligence alert, it must not be ignored."
He further believes that "we must talk to Abu Mazen and maintain security coordination with him in order to avoid danger. Today the economic situation in the PA is deteriorating, there are no salaries for the public sector, there is no security coordination."
He said, "Abu Mazen is closer to the end than to the beginning. His heirs will compete with each other over who is more violent towards Israel. Hamas and Iran tell Abu Mazen 'you say your way has failed,' that is, the right way is violence and radicalism."
Another lesson, according to Maj. Gen. (Res.) Gilad, is that reality requires renewed strategic thinking, in part because Israel's reliance on the United States will not necessarily last forever in the face of the possibility of change in the United States.
"The concept of 'peace for peace' will not last forever. The United Arab Emirates also conditioned the peace agreement with Israel on Israel withdrawing from annexation. In the long run, the military arm can not be relied on, dialogue and security coordination must be renewed," he concluded.