At no point was it claimed that nine submarines were needed, there was no mysterious document, and the memorandum of understanding was unanimously approved • When talking about the vessel affair - the whole truth should be told • Interpretation
The affair, which is mistakenly referred to as the "submarine affair" instead of the "vessel affair," refuses to go down in the headlines, for reasons reserved to those who want it.
This time it was affidavits to the High Court, articles and interviews of those who know but do not tell the whole truth, and also those who do not really know and recycle.
Photo: Shmuel Buharis
I found almost nothing new in the publications, which was not examined by objective factors and found to be irrelevant.
What stood out was the use of bombastic words such as "a huge line of deals", "a waste of billions", "the most serious affair in the history of the country" and other statements that are far from the reality I know.
There is no position here on the demands raised in the context of the affair, and certainly not on the in-depth investigations conducted by the authorities in charge of it, and I trust their conclusions in these affair.
I would now like to present the correct facts, as I know them subjectively, because it is not enough to tell the truth, one has to tell the whole truth.
Not really nine submarines
The truth about the purchase of the new submarines (seven-nine) is distorted in the biggest way.
For years, the legitimate question of the number of submarines required for the State of Israel - five or six submarines - has been discussed in closed rooms.
It is clear that five are cheaper to purchase and hold, while six will provide a better operational response.
Whoever compares the number of planes or tanks to the number of submarines is wrong and insists that the decision that prefers the number of different tools is in the hands of the chief of staff. The position of the chief of staff and commanders of the arms is very important, but submarines are strategic weapons. The government and the cabinet, having heard all the considerations of the professionals.
After professional discussions, it was decided that the total number of submarines in the long term would be six. The IDF and the ISA retained the right and duty to re-raise the need when the three new submarines arrived, and so the procurement process was built. At no point in time was I talking about nine Submarines, or on any roof greater than six.
A document quoted in the media (guidelines for August 2015) states that preparations should be made for the purchase of three more submarines; anyone who interprets it as a directive to reach nine submarines is misleading and knows this.
A staff work from October 2015, conducted at the National Security Council in full cooperation with the head of the department responsible for the issue in the Ministry of Defense ahead of Prime Minister Yossi Cohen's trip to Angela Merkel, stipulated that the German commitment to sell three submarines (and German ownership) must be signed soon. - We will not be ready in time. This is not a billion deal "that will soon be signed" (in practice it was not signed until this moment and the negotiations continue), but talks about accepting a German commitment to sell and share ownership, with Israel having the right to give up.
In order to establish a German commitment and meet deadlines, it was necessary to quickly sign the MOU, which is basically a political agreement, and start negotiations between the defense ministries and shipyards. Everyone agreed that this was the way, including very senior Defense Ministry representatives, and strange if the ministry management did not know A detailed exchange plan was built and written between the new and old shadows, and nine submarines were never mentioned.
The Prime Minister and the head of the National Security Council went to a meeting with the Chancellor in October 2015 and received her agreement in principle to submit a draft MOU in February 2016.
Upon his return to Israel, the Prime Minister updated the cabinet.
Not really a Hollywood script
When I took office as acting head of the National Security Council in January 2016, my first task was to prepare the meeting with Merkel in February 2016. A draft was written on the basis of past agreements and it was forwarded to the comments of the Director General of the Ministry of Defense.
This draft is the same "mysterious document that was ejected from the Ministry of Defense's red and holy fax machines and caused a storm in the ministry," as Mr. Ronen Bergman dramatically wrote of a Hollywood script in Yedioth Ahronoth.
The draft sets out the German commitment to the sale of three submarines and the participation in the financing, and the fact that Israel is not obligated to carry out the procurement.
The draft did receive a negative response from the Ministry of Defense, but mainly for fear of a possible impact on the current budget (this goes beyond the issue of the above-mentioned ships, which entered the draft by mistake due to a wrong process in 2015, and they dropped from the draft under the Prime Minister's guidance). Opposition of the Ministry of Defense).
The Ministry of Defense sought to postpone the negotiation process for a year and leave a future option to reach a total of five submarines instead of six.
All the changes requested by the Ministry of Defense, with the exception of the postponement of the start of negotiations, were included in the draft with which the Prime Minister later traveled to the second meeting with Merkel, in which it was agreed to continue negotiations between the two countries.
Upon returning to Israel, the head of the National Security Council updated in a classified document the top members of the Mashabat, in which he explicitly referred to the request of the then head of the security-political wing, Amos Gilad, to ensure that issues related to the sale of submarines to Egypt remain his responsibility.
The Prime Minister also updated the Cabinet on the results of the second meeting.
Contrary to reports, from February to May 2016, negotiations continued continuously with the participation of Mashabat representatives, which were determined by the CEO. Allegations of circumvention and division of the ministry's professionals, including the director, are incorrect.
The director general of the ministry rightly decided that there was no need for a tunnel because it was a political and unprofessional negotiation. It was agreed that after the signing, a tunnel would enter the picture, and so it was.
The signature on the memorandum of understanding was brought to the cabinet, not in a hurry, and was unanimously approved with the support of the Minister of Defense and the IDF, headed by then-Chief of Staff Gadi Izenkot.
I do not know of any work by the National Security Council since the summer of 2015 that ended with a decision on five submarines. The operational need is clear, but the decision is always in the hands of the Cabinet.
Ships without tender
Regarding the purchase of the area ships, the activity took place at a time when I was not the head of the National Security Council and I know the information from the staff work performed in my position as head of the National Security Council.
The facts published are partial, starting from the middle of the process and in some cases inaccurate.
The one who demanded that the ships be purchased without a tender, at least twice in the process, was Mashabat. In 2012 when he wanted to buy Korean ships and in 2013/4 when he wanted to buy from Germany, in light of significant reductions and the Navy's determination that German ships are superior in quality, price and operational experience. The management of the Mashabat at that time was tainted with foreign considerations when it sought to purchase ships without a tender?
Of course not.
It was only when it became clear that the Germans were withdrawing from the reduction, for political reasons, that he asked the UAV to go out to tender. The Prime Minister acted by political means to obtain a reduction from the Chancellor.
His office forwarded to the Mashhab the explanations for the need to stop the tender. Contrary to an explicit written instruction from the Prime Minister's military secretary, the Mashavat went out in the middle of "Eitan Cliff" during an improper course of the tender, even though he was told that the Prime Minister and the Chancellor had agreed in principle. So maybe this abnormal behavior should be investigated. In practice, when the agreement between the prime minister and the chancellor reached in writing, the tender was canceled at the written request of the defense minister and his director general.