Nearly 20 years after the assassination of Lt. Col. Yehuda Edri, an agent of Unit 504, by a Palestinian agent, the agent's intelligence file was uncovered: Hassan Said Ahmad Abu-Shaira, nicknamed "Honey Trap" • But many red lights came on
Agents are one of the most sensitive assets of intelligence organizations.
Those human resources that provide information from the environment in which they live and operate, in complete secrecy, that is critical to maintaining their security.
This secrecy is maintained even long after their activation ends, in order to preserve their lives, or the method and means of activation.
Even when an agent is exposed, the details of its operation remain the domain of only a few, and are almost never revealed to the public.
In the human intelligence world (agents), agents are never activated on their behalf.
Their identities are known only to individuals, and even the nickname they receive is kept in a limited circle of secret partners.
The information about each agent is put into a personal file, which is kept under extreme security.
Includes all the information about his operation from the moment he was contacted: all the information he passed on, all the briefings he received, all the contacts and meetings that took place with him, tests conducted on him and his operators' assessment of the reliability and quality of the information he passed.
When the agent's operation ends, his personal file is transferred to the archives of the intelligence body that operated it, out of reach of various snoopers.
He is buried there forever, unless there is an operational need for him.
Now, almost 20 years later, the Intelligence Division has allowed us to uncover for the first time the case of an agent who worked in the service of Unit 504. The case of Agent No. 225524, which was later nicknamed the "Honey Trap."
Each agent is given a nickname, which allows the information he transmits to be distributed without revealing his identity, which is known only to individuals.
Today it can be revealed that the real name of the agent was Hassan Said Ahmad Hassan Abu-Shira.
He lived with his family in the al-Gaza refugee camp in Bethlehem, was recruited and operated by the late Lt. Col. Yehuda Edri for seven months at the beginning of the second intifada, until he capsized and murdered his operative.
The information he provided during this time saved the lives of many Israelis.
* * *
Edri was unusual in the landscape of operators in the Armed Forces. The fourth son in a family of 12 children, who immigrated from Morocco and lived in Netivot. He attended a religious-elementary school, and in his youth went on trips and spent time with friends in discos and cinemas in the nearby town of Sderot He felt restless, and left a year later. At the age of 16, without knowing a word of English, he fell in love with the music of Pink Floyd and began to dream big. He left home, went to the port of Haifa and asked for a job in the merchant navy.
For three years he worked for Israeli shipping companies. He worked hard and saw the world. When he returned, he enlisted in Unit 504 as a driver. He accompanied operators' meetings with agents, and fell in love with work. At age 22, he married Annette, whom he had known as a teenager.
He studied Arabic on his own in his spare time and completed his matriculation. Nathan Barash, "says Maj. Gen. (Res.) Yoav (Foley) Mordechai, Edri's commander and later IDF spokesman and government coordinator in the territories.
"The Moroccan driver from Netivot made a school for everyone."
The unit realized that he was talented, and decided to promote him to the position of KTM (Special Position Officer), and in Hebrew - operator. He was sent to the Ramallah area. "Each operator has his own advantages and his own uniqueness.
Judah had a rare interpersonal ability that greatly helped him recruit and activate resources.
He was also very versatile, with a clear distinction between the main thing and the therapist, which is critical in this profession. "
At the age of 30, when he was a father of three (he later had three more; He later took a course in English, and in 2000 graduated with a bachelor's degree in political science from Bar-Ilan University.
"He was like that, investing insanely in everything," says his son, Major A., who continued on his way and also serves as an agent operator in Unit 504. He enlisted in the IDF in March 2000, just before the IDF withdrew from southern Lebanon, and was stationed in the northern area of 504. A year later, he took an officers' course.
Two years after his father's murder, A. contracted brain cancer.
After a long period of surgeries and treatments, he returned to the unit.
He was released a few years later, studying accounting, but his love of agents brought him back to 504 five years ago - this time to the Judea and Samaria region, where his father worked. Shortly afterwards, cancer returned. A. was treated again, and won again, and returned to the unit. .
"My father was a person with dignity and tremendous pride," he says. "he was also shielded and Duggan father was always available to us, despite working around the clock.
As an operator, I understand that his relationship with agents was extraordinary.
After he was assassinated, a senior Palestinian agent he operated contacted the unit and said he was not willing to work with us anymore.
He was so loved and appreciated, even by the Palestinian agents. "
* * *
Colonel R., the current commander of 504, was at the beginning of his career in the personal NCO unit that was subordinate to Edri.
A kind of assistant that every operator has, who works alongside him and assists him in his work.
"From him I learned everything I know," says R.
"He taught me Arabic, let me write meeting reports, and actually taught me to be an operator.
I do not approach his league in action - in my interpersonal ability, in my language, in my knowledge of the field, in my understanding of the Arab mentality.
He was a professional at other levels. "
Major S. (36), now an intelligence officer in the unit, was a 16-year-old girl when the second intifada began.
She was living in the Gilo neighborhood of Jerusalem at the time, which was at the center of the fighting: the neighborhood's extremist houses were attacked almost every night by gunfire from the nearby Beit Jala neighborhood, on the outskirts of Bethlehem.
S. remembers those tense days, and especially the nights.
The fear, the worry, the fear of terrorism.
Prior to this article, the unit commander instructed her to review the Palestinian agent's personal file.
To her surprise, she learned that she had an indirect connection to Edri: a girl from the Gila neighborhood who found herself suddenly attacked by gunfire, and the operator who brought intelligence that saved her life.
* * *
Before the outbreak of the intifada, the IDF worked intensively to recruit agents in Judea and Samaria, with the understanding that something would happen, and that it would be worthwhile to arrive prepared.
This decision, made by the then head of the Armed Forces, Major General Amos Malka, did not go smoothly: the GSS did not approve of it, and a great deal of tension developed between the organizations, which led to clashes between their leaders and the field personnel.
"The GSS did not really want to allow us to work in the Palestinian arena," says Polly Mordechai, who was then lieutenant colonel and commander of the 504 area in the Jerusalem and Judea and Samaria areas.
"They wanted to preserve their exclusivity in the field. But we realized we had a problem of access to resources, and we decided to close that gap. We built a whole program of recruiting agents, and when the intifada started, we were already in a much better position."
And yet, many of the agents recruited by Israel have stopped cooperating since the outbreak of the intifada, preferring to remain loyal to the Palestinian Authority and the terrorist organizations from which they came.
The lack of access to Area A, from which most of the attacks came, also created intelligence holes and required improvisation in an attempt to recruit agents to fill in the gaps.
"Yehuda was very creative in this field," says Mordechai.
"We then had old vehicles with Palestinian license plates, which we used. Yehuda used one of those vehicles to stage a car accident with someone he wanted to recruit as an agent. He succeeded, of course."
Edri was already a senior agent operator in the Bethlehem sector at the time, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, which he received as a personal rank in view of his excellence.
The shooting at Gila was at the forefront of his missions: he was instructed to do everything possible to bring in intelligence that would enable him to be thwarted and the people responsible for him to be located.
One day, Edri received a phone call from the former Jerusalem District Minorities Coordinator of the police.
He told him about a Palestinian guy who contacted him on the phone, giving him his name and number.
"You may need it," the coordinator said.
Edri called the number he received and arranged a meeting with the Palestinian at a 504 facility in a neighborhood in central Jerusalem.
This is a facility that is considered "burned" because it has been used extensively before, so it was convenient to hold recruitment meetings with new sources, without revealing more classified facilities.
This is also where the agent's file opens.
At this point, the agent has not yet been there, just a number: 225524. The practice in Unit 504 is that only after an agent proves himself and is recruited, and time elapses since it began operating, does he also earn a nickname.
For the new agent, whom Edri recruited two months after the outbreak of the intifada, it took a relatively short time.
He was nicknamed the "Honey Trap".
In conversations between them they spoke Arabic.
The summaries of the meetings that appear in the file were written by Edri himself after each meeting;
The intelligence reports are those transmitted by the agent.
22.11.2000, recruitment meeting
Abu Shaira introduces himself to Edri: 31 and a half years old, married and the father of three children, one of whom suffers from vision problems.
A member of the Tanzim (Fatah's field organization, which in those days was responsible for a large part of terrorist activity in the West Bank), was twice imprisoned in an Israeli prison.
He says he was orphaned by his mother at a very young age.
The father's father and second wife raised him and his brother.
He left school after sixth grade in favor of work and a livelihood.
His first job was as a plasterer with a Jewish contractor, who "treated me like a son."
He currently works at a nursing home in the Gilo neighborhood of Jerusalem, and according to him, he decided to leave the Tanzim, for fear of being fired from the nursing home due to the security situation.
"The introductory meeting is intended to map out who the man is and to understand how much he is willing to work for us," R. explains.
"Such a recruitment meeting lasts two to three hours. The operator does a psychological mapping of the target. He needs to assess the values of the source and understand what his motives are."
Edri notes in the summary of the meeting: "I was under the impression that the source has a lot of other information that he did not tell. This is a person of a medium level.
Be able to be a explorer: walk around the activity area and report.
But if it is not accessible to the targets, the treatment will be stopped "(i.e., it will no longer be activated; YL).
Immediately after the meeting, Edri gives Abu-Shira his phone number.
The Palestinian also receives a security briefing on how to behave and how to report, so that he is not exposed.
Shortly afterwards the reports begin to arrive.
At first laconic, but as time goes on they become more and more intimate.
Any such report is immediately forwarded to field officials, and a copy of it also appears in the agent's file: date, information reported, and to whom it was forwarded.
"We learned from this that it is evolving to where we hoped," says Polly Mordechai, who was then the commander of the area and commanded Edri.
"His reports turned out to be bingo. It was clear we had someone serious in hand."
Edri maintains an intense telephone relationship with Abu Shira, sometimes in long conversations until the wee hours of the night.
The Palestinian informs him that he has been summoned to a meeting in Tanzim, and the unit decides to schedule another meeting with Edri, at another 504 facility in Jerusalem, in order to strengthen ties with him.
15.3.2001, the second meeting
Abu Shaira talks to Edri about his little son, who needs eye surgery.
Edri emphasizes to him that he must maintain his personal security, because he is likely to approach the power elements in Tanzim.
At the end of the meeting, Edri offers him money, for the first time: 200 Jordanian dinars (today, close to NIS 1,000).
"Money is a tool in operation," explains R.
"It produces commitment. But we try to do it gently. Not to offer the money as payment, but to go around - travel expenses, ESL, refunds.
We understand that it works. "
Abo-sairh refuses to accept the money. He says Edri does not help to Israel for free, but to improve the situation and the situation of the Palestinians. Again Edri impressed he was hiding quite a few details, but refrained from pressing him to not "
A few days after the second meeting, Edri calls Abu Sha'ira again and invites him to another meeting. The agent tells him that he can not lose many working days, a meeting with him is
scheduled
.
" A meeting at the facility usually takes hours, and meetings at the car are shorter. " Says R. "We determine them when things happen and something is needed quickly, here and now, or when only a brief meeting is needed."
Before the meeting, the GSS also receives a good appreciation of the agent.
"They told us that the reports he was passing on were very accurate," says Mordechai.
"It is clear to us that this is a source worth investing in."
23.3.01, the third meeting
Edri met Abu Shaira in the car.
A security guard joins the meeting, according to the procedures.
The agent says that he is supposed to host Riyad Al-Amor, one of the leaders of the Tanzim in Bethlehem, at his home.
Al-Amor is a major target of the GSS and the IDF during this period - directly responsible for all the shooting attacks in the sector, as well as the shooting at the Gilo neighborhood in Jerusalem.
Edri again offers the agent payment, and he again refuses.
Instead, Edri gives him a card charged to his cell phone.
It is designed to make it difficult for the Tanzim to expose him, but also provides a kind of material reward, which tightens the bond between the two.
In the following days, Abu-Shaira reports quite a few reports, but then he disconnects for two weeks.
Only on April 18 does he contact Edri again and tell him about a squad of four Tanzim men who carry out shooting attacks from the area of the Paradise Hotel in Bethlehem and the parking lot next to the hotel.
He said, "The shooting took place from the southwestern end, and after the IDF response, the activists moved to the opposite end of the parking lot and hid there until the fire stopped.
Activists are armed with M-16 rifles.
Their financial situation is very bad.
They are having a hard time raising money for ammunition. "
Edri concludes the report:" The agent also complained about his dire financial situation. "As always, he states that this is" sensitive material that cannot be used without permission, "and adds his name at the bottom of the page: Yehuda A.
19.4.01, the fourth meeting
Edri meets Abu Shaira at the facility of Unit 504. He asks him why he disappeared for two weeks, and the agent replies that he was near Tanzim activists and had to cut off contact to maintain his personal safety.
Edri understands that Abu-Shira is beginning to approach the Tanzim activists responsible for the attacks, but knows he is undisciplined.
His disappearance for two weeks is suspicious in his eyes.
Despite his great value, Edri states in the summary report: "His operational commitment is questionable." The
agent also refuses to receive money this time, but receives a significant gift from Edri: a permit to enter Israel, after his previous permit was revoked due to the Intifada. For "real-time": No more retrospective information about events that have already happened, but advance warning of who will shoot and where, so that terrorist attacks can be thwarted. The main emphasis, he clarifies, should be on Riyad Al-Amor - who is already conducting as requested, compartmentalization and security.
shortly after the meeting, reports the agent Elamor expected to arrive on June 1 from Bethlehem to Hebron for analysis. on May 15, he set tests at the hospital before the operation. reporting is classified at the highest level - "purple taboo."
"each report has Color classification, "Mordechai explains." It was clear to us that this was very sensitive information, that if it was exposed, it could burn the agent.
Therefore, this unusual classification was determined, which greatly limits the number of people who can be partners in it. "The
information is immediately passed to the GSS, to consider Al-Amor's arrest.
Following consultations between the IDF and the GSS, a decision is made not to act, for fear that the agent will be burned if the Palestinians conduct an internal investigation into the identity of the leaker.
"This is a dilemma that accompanies any agent operation - how much it is worth risking it," says Mordechai.
"We decided to avoid the operation because we hoped it would provide us with more meaningful information in the future, and perhaps reach more senior officials through it."
3.5.01, Fifth Meeting
Edri meets Abu-Shaira again in the car, after the agent says he will not be able to miss another day of work.
After Edri's pressure, the agent surprises him and tells him that he is married to two women.
He claims that he does not love his second wife, and that he was forced to marry her because she is a relative.
Edri understands that his feelings about hiding information were accurate.
At the end of the meeting, the agent agrees, for the first time, to receive money.
Edri gives him 200 dinars in cash and asks him to sign a receipt stating that he received the money.
"The signing of the receipt is not done because we do not believe in our people, but to further anchor the commitment of the agent," R. adds.
Another reason for signing the receipt is actually related to the operators: how far they will be willing to go in operating their agent.
"When Kt"m returns activities, it is usually the first question people ask it here - signed or not signed?" Smiles Mordechai. This is internal competition between operators in the unit, a combination of courage to follow through with agents and professional skills to convince him to sign.
After the meeting, writes Edri has a sharpened paradox: on the one hand, the information is high-quality and very accurate; on the other hand, it is clear to him that the agent is not obligated and hides a lot of information. "Yehuda smelled something here," says R.
Edri Agent, the date was postponed by a few days.
10.5.01, the sixth meeting
Edri met with the agent at the facility of Unit 504, for several hours.
The meeting is also attended by a GSS representative and the facility commander (who was also Edri's direct commander).
Abu Shaira arrives tired and restless. He tells Edri that his son lost an eye as a result of the rare eye disease he suffers from, and he fears he will lose the other eye. He is assisted, but tells him that he feels he is not telling everything. The agent swears: "From now on I will not hide anything from you."
As proof of his loyalty, he says he received a new phone call from Tanzim (the organization used to use unrecognized phones as an encrypted means of communication). He was instructed to reach the areas from which shooting attacks are to be carried out and "clean up" them - to make sure that there are no soldiers or means that could lead to the exposure of the shooters.
He also says that he was appointed a member of Riyad Al-Amour's close security squad. Tanzim in Bethlehem and wanted No. 1 in the sector. He adds that he himself participated in several shooting attacks, and Edri understands that his involvement in Tanzim is deeper than he has said so far. For him this is further proof that the agent is hiding information from him.
After this meeting Edri raises the agent's risk level - That is, it is very dangerous for the safety of the Israelis who meet with it
Fifth between five levels, used to characterize agents: self, low, medium, high and exceptional.
The degree of risk is determined by the operators' assessments, and sometimes also with the help of a reliability check and a polygraph test, conducted in collaboration with the GSS.
A self-risk agent can meet his operator without the need for operator security. They vary according to the risk posed by the agent. An appropriate security package is tailored to each level.
At the end of the meeting, Edri offers money to Abu Shaira, but he refuses. "It was a tactical mistake by Yehuda," says Mordechai.
After the meeting, the agent begins to deliver exceptional reports of quality, and with high frequency. He reports plans for shooting attacks on the tunnels and Rachel's tomb, and planned shootings in the Gilo neighborhood. The reports are forwarded to the GSS and the spatial brigade's intelligence officer.
The IDF and the GSS thwart the planned attacks, either by early arrests or by placing forces in the place from which they are supposed to take place.
"We reached such a level of reporting that we could tell Gila residents when to shut down and when to leave," says Mordechai.
Colonel adds: “This is a very subtle equalizer, knowing how to use the information you get is dangerous.
"On the one hand, to save lives, and on the other hand, to disguise from the enemy the fact that you knew in advance what he was planning, so as not to burn the agent."
At the same time, Edri runs ten other sources, all of which report with high intensity. "They
were sleeping in the living room then, with tablecloths on their knees," says Mordechai. "Every few minutes the phone would ring, and another agent would report.
We would open the map, see what it was about, and report on.
It was a crazy time, with the flood of attacks of the second intifada. "
16.5.01, the seventh meeting
Edri meets Abu Shira in a car, for a relatively short time.
He throws suspicious questions at him and makes it clear that he does not believe him.
The agent replies that he does not understand what the problem is, and as evidence - the information he provided is up-to-date and reliable.
Edri is based on his feelings.
He realizes that something is wrong.
At the end of the meeting, he hands Abu Shira 300 dinars, but repeats the suspicion that he does not tell him everything.
The agent asks for a refund of half the amount, but Edri refuses.
Abu-Shira promises that he will now cooperate fully.
Edri's son, A., remembers a nightly phone call between his father and the agent, who witnessed it.
"Dad asked him to get someone's phone number, and he agreed to give only part of the number," he says.
"When the conversation ended, Dad told me, 'He's a liar, son of a liar.'"
"We were in a dilemma," says Polly Mordechai.
"On the one hand, we did not want to lose the operation and the agent. On the other hand, we could not trust him, because it was clear that he did not tell everything. Judah, who was a one-on-one wizard, was very suspicious of him. The information he provided, something smelled bad to him. "
Following this meeting, in an attempt to prove that he is fulfilling his commitment, Abu-Shaira is passing on a mass of intelligence.
Among other things, he reports in real time on a Tanzim operative who holds an anti-tank missile and plans to fire. The shooting is frustrating
.
He says that Tanzim has allocated 1,500 dinars in favor of the deal, and gives the names of those involved in the deal and the place and time when the weapons are supposed to pass into the hands of Riyad Al-Amor and Atef Abiyat. This information is defined as urgent and very sensitive: From attacks to be carried out in its wake.
Edri calls Abu-Shaira for an immediate meeting, in the car, to verify the details with him and try to get more information.
7.6.01, the eighth meeting
This meeting also takes place on the ground.
Edri arrives accompanied by another vehicle in which security guards, in view of the high risk assessment posed by the agent.
He is briefed by the GSS.
During the meeting, Edri slaps Abu-Shaira who is a liar because he refuses to reveal to him all the information he knows. The agent again points out the exact information he is passing on, but Edri continues to suspect. The agent's answers.
GSS personnel want to meet the agent to interrogate him. In Unit 504, they decide to take the opportunity and conduct a reliable test and a polygraph for the agent at the same time. Edri informs the agent that he will be examined.
14.6.01, the ninth meeting
On that day, all 504 people in Judea and Samaria go to a seminar at Yad Vashem. Edri does not participate, because he is supposed to meet the agent and take him for a polygraph examination at the GSS facility.
Because of the high risk, his commanders, unusually, decide to attach two security guards to him.
One of them, Asi, is sitting next to him in the yellow transit vehicle.
The other, Jonathan, is sitting in the back bench.
Edri is waiting for Abu Shaira on the side of the Jerusalem-Bethlehem road.
The agent emerges from the nearby olive grove and approaches Asi's window.
"Why did you come with two security guards?"
He slaps Edri.
"you dont believe me?"
Edri replies yes, but the angry agent tells him again, "You don't believe me," and walks away.
Edri calls him to appease him.
"For him, there was no chance that he would return to the facility without bringing the agent with him for inspection, as determined," Mordechai says.
After a few minutes, Edri manages to convince Abu Shaira to return to the vehicle and join them for a scheduled meeting.
The agent comes back, and again says to Edri, "You don't believe me."
He puts his hand in his pocket, takes out a handful of pods and throws them into the vehicle.
"I brought you backpacks that were shot yesterday, and yet you do not believe me," he says.
A second later he puts his other hand in the other pocket of his pants, pulls out a gun - and fires five bullets.
Edri was hit by a bullet in the heart and died on the spot.
Asi, the security guard, was moderately injured.
Abu Sha'ira starts running towards the olive grove.
Jonathan, the security guard sitting in the back, gets out of the vehicle and starts chasing him.
He approaches him, shoots him and kills him.
Only then is Jonathan freed to return to the vehicle to treat the two wounded and call for assistance.
He calls Eddie, the direct commander of Yehuda Edri, who is at Yad Vashem.
Eddie calls Polly Mordechai, the commander of the area, and tells him: "Shot in Judea."
Mordechai immediately leaves for the scene.
The report of the attack also reaches the intelligence officer of the Spatial Brigade in Bethlehem, without the names of the victims.
As is his custom, he immediately calls Edri, to find out the details.
The one who answers him is Jonathan, the security guard.
"Judah was shot," he says.
A., Edri's son, was in the middle of the officers' course at BAD 1 at the time. He sees his commanders approaching him and is convinced that they came to tell him that he was fired from the course.
"When they told me what happened, I did not believe it," he says. Dad was invulnerable. "
* * *
An investigation conducted after the assassination revealed that shortly before the last meeting, the Palestinians exposed Abu Shira.
There is no exact information as to when this happened, but it is clear that senior Tanzim officials, Atef Abiyat and his aide, Jamal Nawara, spoke with him and apparently threatened to eliminate his family members if he did not act.
They even trained him in gunfire.
The gun itself was given to him only very close to the time of the assassination.
As far as the Tanzim were concerned, the assassination of Edri was a great success, one of the significance of the organization during the second intifada.
In Israel, things did not get on the agenda.
Atef Abiyat was killed on October 18, 2001 in an attack on combat helicopters near Bethlehem;
Israel has made it clear that he was eliminated because he planned terrorist attacks, but there is no doubt that his involvement in Edri's assassination helped make the decision.
Riyad Al-Amor was arrested and tried for involvement in the murder of nine Israelis and three Palestinian collaborators.
He was sentenced to 11 life sentences, which he is currently serving in an Israeli prison.
Edri himself and the unit received a salary from the IDF in advance for operating the agent and for the terrorist attacks they prevented.
Following the assassination, Unit 504 changed its operating methods and rules regarding contact with agents.
The unit's combat unit, which secures the operators and accompanies every meeting with an agent, has been reinforced and specialized.
Many more precautions and safeguards have been taken to ensure that agents' operators receive maximum protection.
In the Gilo neighborhood, where Edri saved the lives of many of its residents, a public garden called "Gan Yehuda" was established after his death.
The memorial stone placed in it reads: "In memory of the late Lt. Col. Yehuda Edri, who physically defended the residents of the Gilo neighborhood and fell while fulfilling his duty."
Col. R .: "504 needs to run faster and know how to change all the time"
Unit 504 was established in 1949 and is responsible for operating agents and interrogating prisoners.
In the past, the unit was built according to geographical areas (north, center and south), but today it is thematically built: in addition to recruiting agents and operating them in the classic frontal way, the unit also operates a cybercommunity.
It also has fighters, who accompany the operation operations and are responsible for security, observations, and more.
"All the Hometown organizations in the world today face the same problems of operation in the cyber age," says the unit commander for the past two and a half years, Col. R. "The answer is dynamic, and constantly changing, because if we stay in this world and do not change, we will actually go back.
Therefore, the 504 needs to run faster and know how to constantly change motion.
"In the past, the world of the Hominette was much clearer. We worked with countries, and the main goal was to recruit officers from the regular armies who fought us, especially Egypt and Syria. The changes the region has undergone since then are amusement park for the hominid world. Rifts, threats - this is the opportunity for us.
"Take Syria, for example.
There is an American and Russian and European presence, there is ISIS and Hezbollah, there is tension between the Sunnis and the Shiites.
All this dynamism is a very big opportunity for us. "
R. enlisted in 504 as a soldier in the 1990s.
He was the personal NCO subordinate to Yehuda Edri, and in 2001 he himself became an agent operator (KTM).
He is married and the father of three, and lives on a kibbutz in the center of the country.
Next summer, he will end his position and be appointed IDF attaché abroad.
Most of the activity of 504 is carried out vis-à-vis the northern arena (Hezbollah and Syria) and the Palestinian arena (Judea and Samaria and Gaza). R. testifies that the unit's relations with the GSS and the Mossad, which also operate agents in these sectors, are "better than ever." A person from organization to organization. "
One of the major changes the unit has undergone in recent years is the entry of the technological-network dimension.
"In the past, the objective ability to talk to people around the world was much more limited. For example, you could not talk when you wanted to with an agent on the other side.
" Today you can talk to anyone you want, where you want and when you want.
Everyone is connected to technology, and it opens up endless possibilities for us.
The combination of these two areas - technology and agent activation - is the big advantage of Humint in 2020.
"The old practice of using classic, frontal agents will never go away. But we have greatly intensified the activity through cyber. In the technological world you can reach anyone, use any cover you want and try to persuade them to act. It allows for much faster action, and in larger masses, and that It also saves a lot of time, resources and risks. "
shishabat@israelhayom.co.il