The military has not been challenged in significant combat since Tzuk Eitan in 2014, and this "security silence" harms its image • This does not prevent it from remaining a tribal bonfire • Commentary
"A decrease in the level of public trust in the IDF," the Israel Democracy Institute's report announced according to data from 2020 published today (Monday).
The survey, conducted among a broad and representative sample of the population, found that "only" 81% of the public express great trust in the IDF. This is compared to previous years, in which the level of trust was 90%.
IDF activity in the village of Deir Nizam following stone-throwing, last week // Photo: IDF Spokesman
According to this report, the IDF is still the most reliable institution in relation to the Supreme Court, the Knesset, the government and the police.
And yet - how can one explain the figure of a decline in confidence relative to previous years?
Just to mention, a similar figure was obtained after the Second Lebanon War.
It is worth mentioning that in recent years, not much more than 50% of the population serve in the IDF, which means that a significant part of the Israeli public does not really know the IDF, and it is mediated by various communication channels.
So what could be the reasons for the decline in public confidence in the IDF?
First, the IDF has not fought for almost seven years, since Operation Resilient Cliff in the Gaza Strip in 2014, which ended after 51 days of fighting with ambiguous results - "acidity", as it was then called.
Since then, the IDF's preoccupation has been mainly with ongoing security along the borders, and we have enjoyed long years of relative calm in all arenas of action, except for sporadic incidents. According to operational data, these are the quietest years since the establishment of the state.
It is important to emphasize this because it makes sense to assume that in times of quiet, the military is not in the headlines, and military researchers actually find that these are years in which the motivation to enlist is not particularly high.
It can be assumed that this silence has moved the IDF from the core of public engagement in recent years.
At the same time, there are aspects of the essence, which against the background of "security silence" damage the army's image - from the Elor Azaria incident, through the various accidents, known as the serious injury of the paratrooper fighter Ili Hayut, after which a failure in the military system.
In times of security silence, the military is measured by norms of routine - and here we report morning news on normative issues, see as a recent example the treatment of the 13th Battalion commander in the Golani in the phenomenon of rebellious veterans.
In terms of routine, the IDF is perceived as quite sloppy and wrinkled - and this is not really new.
To this must be added the IDF's response to the corona plague. The IDF has made three efforts in this regard: the Alon headquarters to cut off the contagion chains that were operationally activated since last November, and the results of its activities are not yet noticeable, if at all.
The second effort is the Home Front Command activity, which is probably not sufficiently felt by the general public;
And above all, the fact that inside the IDF internally these days more than 1,000 corona infections are being dealt with. The army, delicately, does not look good in this context.
Alongside all this, research I have been conducting in recent years raises chronic claims among soldiers in the contexts of very poor medical care, conspicuous non-utilization of manpower in the military ranks, and a very prevalent sense of waste.
The IDF, therefore, has not been challenged in significant combat in recent years, and finds itself engaged in routine and dealing with the corona virus. This pattern of action does not bode well for the way the military looks, and hence radiates on its level of confidence. Quieter in security contexts, and even then the IDF gained a lot of critical momentum from the public, so much so that the then chief of staff, Amnon Shachak, claimed that the connection between the IDF and Israeli society became oppressive and stifling.
To be honest, there is an interesting paradox here - precisely when the organization trusting our security receives more stinging criticism when there is silence in the security dimension, but as mentioned, this is not something new.
It is worth mentioning that 81% trust in the entire public is still a very significant achievement, especially when it comes to the IDF maintaining its status as the most reliable body in Israeli society. The dilemma for army commanders is whether to address this report and work to restore trust to a higher level, or Accept this dynamic with understanding, and continue to prepare the military for combat.
And here, perhaps the most essential aspect comes in - and that is the question of whether the IDF is ready for war?
In this context, retired General Yitzhak Brick Brick, former Commissioner of Soldiers' Admissibility, published a scathing critique about two years ago of a culture of lying in the army, and of low-level readiness of reserve units.
It is worth reading what Brick argued, as it is possible that the gaps he pointed out permeate public criticism.
In an age where less than 10% of society serve in the reserve significantly, it can be assumed that Brick's words speak to very attentive ears, so it is recommended that the IDF re-examine what he says, and try to address the significant gaps it raises. Brick talks about readiness for war - and that The IDF's "bread and butter".
Without it there is nothing, certainly not public trust.
The author is a former commander of an armored brigade, currently a researcher of military-social relations and author of the books "Clear Direction" and "The Man in the Tank."