Bruno Alomar, economist, author of
Reform or insignificance: 10 years to save the European Union
(École de Guerre 2018 ed.).
At first glance, Germany's relationship to the world is difficult to discern.
So much so that beyond certain partially chipped and partly contradictory totems, foremost among which Atlanticism and Europeanism, she sometimes seems not to know what she wants.
This is the case economically.
On the one hand, it proudly displays public finances in good (relative) condition and wants to be the guardian of monetary orthodoxy.
On the other hand, it has not opposed repeated breaches of the euro zone's monetary rules, pushes Europeanism to accept partial fiscal federalization, implements the most important national recovery plan in the face of the crisis etc.
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This is also the case geopolitically.
On the one hand, she has harsh words about the United States.
On the other hand, it no longer disguises its rejection in principle of French ideas of European sovereignty in the field of defense in order to continue to take shelter conveniently under the NATO umbrella, American understand.
We could go on.
Germany, which one believes without a compass in the vast world, has one, to the point of obsession: its industry!
If German thought seems hazy like some Wagnerian forests, we must not be mistaken: reality ends up emerging there.
And this revelation can, like the battle of Teutoburg, key in the history of Europe, be brutal.
Germany, which one believes without a compass in the vast world, has one, to the point of obsession: its industry!
This industrial obsession is expressed in the geopolitical field.
After much procrastination, Germany no longer disguises its priorities for the European Union, and has concluded its presidency of the Council in apotheosis by signing an investment agreement with China.
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"The German success is neither exemplary nor reproducible"
After a year 2020 where the least we can say is that China has not distinguished itself in terms of the "values" of transparency and respect for human rights supposedly so dear to Berlin , the main thing was not there: the main thing is that while France was without interruption Germany's first trading partner between 1975 and 2015, it is now China that has taken over this role.
It is quite remarkable, moreover, to note that many French observers, who usually have Chimene's eyes for Berlin, did not experience the conclusion of this agreement.
As if their eyes were beginning to open up on the reality of the German approach to Europe: a policy without passions, through the prism of its own interests, understand its industry.
Germany's industrial obsession and lone rider are found in different industrial fields.
That of the defense is speaking.
Germany's industrial obsession and lone rider are found in different industrial fields.
That of the defense is speaking.
Because if there is no question for Germany of thinking about European military capabilities to wage war, unlike France which, for its part, needs equipment to allow its soldiers to act on the ground, including benefit all Europeans, since the term "
industry
" can be added to that of defense, Germany no longer pretends.
In the field of submarines, the recent anger raised by the Minister of Finance, little suspect of Germanophobia, towards Volkswagen is remarkable in this respect.
But other examples could be highlighted.
Thus, following in the footsteps of what happened at Airbus, within which Germany skilfully took advantage of French hesitation to increase its influence beyond what its true industrial weight would have justified, the same pattern is repeated. in the field of armored vehicles.
Resulting from the merger between the French Nexter and the German KMW, KNDS experienced on December 14 a governance reform which worries the French side.
Germany, seized by its own hubris, believes itself capable of industrial achievements that go beyond its proven skills.
In the space sector, the parliamentary intelligence committee pleaded for "
restoring a climate of confidence
", a sign here of fears linked to the assertion, at the risk of creating imbalances between partners, of the German desire to endow its own optical capabilities, whereas until now French optical and German electromagnetic capacities were considered as complementary.
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"France sold off its electricity industry to Germany"
Germany would not mind creating a dependency on radar imagery to the detriment of France.
We could go on and cite cases in which Germany, seized by its own hubris, believes itself capable of industrial achievements that go beyond its proven skills.
Ultimately, while we have come to understand the structuring nature of industry for the economy, society and even more so the sovereignty of a country, Germany is not wrong to grant an important place to its industries, which, like its automobile, also suffer from poor choices, and to cultivate its outlets, including in areas where it was rather absent such as defense.
Everything is, as often, a question of measure.
Because when the priority turns to obsession, when "
excellence
" disguises the desire for hegemony to the detriment of often fragile political balances, Germany is doing Europe a disservice.
France, which also has industries and has neglected them for too long, should not be mistaken: Germany does have an industrial Sonderveig.
And too bad for the industries of others.