One of the common mistakes in reality is to prepare the army for the previous war, but also those who assume that what was will never return - gambler • The IDF must have a strong ground army • Interpretation
In recent years, and more so these days, there has been a debate about the strength of the IDF's ground forces and the decisive power of the ground maneuver. In the last generation, the IDF has made profound changes to the ground system, Mark 4 chariot and anti-aircraft guns. In addition, training that is mainly aimed at fighting in urban areas, works out to the relevant threat scenarios in the northern and southern arenas.
Naturally, in order to carry out such reforms, many cuts are required, and this is reflected in both the order of the forces and the frequency of reserve training.
Brick's report pointed to significant failures in the power building on land, and later on, the current chief of staff, Aviv Kochavi, also commented on the existing gaps.
In recent years, the IDF's offensive activities have relied mainly on the air and intelligence arms - which constitute the main participants in the system of wars between the wars (MMB), the purpose of which is to reduce the enemy's offensive capabilities and deter it from war.
The MBM deals with geographical threats that are not on the Israeli border, while the ground forces deal with the protection of the borders, and dealing with intense events on the borders of Gaza and Lebanon.
This reality leads to claims related to ground maneuvering capabilities, and some argue that decision makers avoid operating the maneuver because they do not trust its results, hence the investment in it is reduced.
Looking at the ground moves of the ground army in the clashes of the last generation shows that it did not reach a clear decision in any of the clashes, except for Operation Defensive Shield, in which the ground move overcame the terrorist organizations in Judea and Samaria.
Is the declining investment in maneuvering due to a lack of confidence in its results?
When examining this argument, one cannot see the change in the nature of the military conflicts in which the IDF has participated since the establishment of the state. Since the 1980s, in fact, the IDF has not dealt with armies, but mainly with sub-state terrorist organizations This usually focuses on fighting on the lines of contact and tactical depth of a few miles.
The IDF's reference descriptions deal with these spaces, and hence the power building is adapted.
Add to this the technological capabilities developed in recent years, many of which compensate for significant gaps in power generation, and you get a clear reason for the way in which ground forces are being built in the last generation.
The reason for the status of the land in the IDF, therefore, does not lie in the maneuvering results as seen in recent systems, but in the reference descriptions and scenarios faced by the IDF in the last generation and in the foreseeable future.
The investment in land in proportions that were in the past is irrelevant these days, as there is no justification for it, neither in the reference descriptions nor economically.
And yet, despite these arguments, the question arises as to why the ground arm in the IDF is portrayed as inefficient and ineffective? After all, we cannot expect to continue to maintain a ground force order as we had in the 1970s and 1980s. The situation has changed for the better in terms of security.
The answer to this question is not simple.
The military is building for 20 years ahead, trying to adapt capabilities to existing and expected threats.
It is difficult to predict what will happen in the future, see for example the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt at the beginning of the previous decade, if their hostile rule continues, there is a perfectly reasonable possibility that Egypt will return to the conflict zone.