Scary Missiles: The Red Line Against Hezbollah Israel today

The planned "launches" to the campus, the monitoring of the improvement efforts and the "red line" that must not be crossed in the quality and quantity of armaments: this is how the Israeli defense establishment deals with the threat of Hezbollah's precision missiles

• During the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah fired about 200 rockets into Israeli territory every day.

  In the next war he plans to launch thousands.

  Hezbollah march in 2009

  Photo: 

  IP

This is probably

one of the few threats that the Israeli public is not fully aware of.

A significant strategic threat, which could lead Israel to launch a pre-emptive strike, even though the pretext is not nuclear weapons.

This is also the most burning issue currently on the table of the General Staff: Hezbollah missiles.

It will be said immediately: Israel has no intention of starting a war in the north.

Hezbollah also does not have, as far as is known at the moment.

Since 2006, a balance of mutual deterrence has been built on the northern border, which precludes almost any adventurous idea that may come to the mind of one of the parties.

This is evidenced by the hesitation of Hezbollah, which for several months has not carried out its words of revenge following the killing of the organization's operative at Damascus airport in the summer.

Israel is also cautious, and has not responded to the launch of the anti-aircraft missile at the UAV Air Force in Lebanon, so as not to escalate into escalation.

But behind this restraint, both sides are preparing for war.

It can happen in an instant: the killing of a Hezbollah operative in Syria, which leads to harm to Israeli soldiers or civilians, which leads to a reaction, which leads to a counter-reaction, and hence it is already a matter of nerves and containment mechanisms whose effectiveness has not been tested.

It is no coincidence that two weeks ago the IDF practiced exactly such a scenario, of degenerating into "battle days" in the north; a similar scenario was also the basis of the exercise carried out by the Air Force last week.

Hezbollah concluded the Second Lebanon War with quite a few lessons.

He has publicly claimed victory, of course - like any terrorist organization, non-loss is victory.

But at the boarding school he was required to learn some difficult lessons from the blows he received.

Hassan Nasrallah then admitted, in a rare moment of sincerity, that he would not have started a war if he had known what the consequences would be.

Like any serious organization (and Hezbollah is a very serious organization), they carried out an orderly process of interrogation and learning there.

In defense, they found themselves helpless in the face of the Air Force's superiority and accuracy: in the Dahiya district of Beirut, about 180 targets were attacked in buildings, all of which were accurately hit.

They were also surprised by the intelligence that at the beginning of the war rockets could be hit in the medium and long term, which limited their ability to hit south of Haifa Bay.

In the attack, Hezbollah noted with satisfaction the shock caused in Israel as a result of the launching of 4,000 rockets, especially in cases of precision strikes such as at the train depot in Haifa (eight killed) and at the point of reorganization of the reserve force in Kfar Giladi (12 killed).

Another offensive lesson produced by the organization was the desire to transfer the fighting to Israeli territory.

The tunnels unearthed two years ago on the Lebanese border were the means designed to enable it to "conquer the Galilee" and consciously decide the battle already during its opening.

Immediately after the

Second Lebanon War, and ignoring Security Council Resolution 1701, which imposed a full embargo on arms transfers to Hezbollah, Hezbollah launched a huge logistical operation, with billions of dollars in Iranian funding, in which it equipped itself with tens of thousands of rockets and became the world's most powerful terrorist army.

The term "terrorist army" is very common in the IDF, although it is controversial - some experts believe that it gives the organization too much credit, because after all, it is a terrorist organization and not an institutionalized army.

According to the latest estimates, Hezbollah currently has 140-120 thousand rockets For a short range of 

45-40 km, covering the northern third of the country, including Haifa Bay and Tiberias;

Several thousand rockets with a medium range of up to 90 km, which reach the Sharon and the northern outskirts of Gush Dan; and several hundred rockets and missiles with ranges of hundreds of kilometers, including Scud missiles that came from Syrian army depots, and hit any settlement in Israel.

Hezbollah rockets and missiles are scattered throughout Lebanon. It holds short-range rockets mainly in the south of the country, in an area close to the border with Israel, to make the most of their range. They are hidden in houses within 230 Shiite villages, ready to operate at any moment. From there, the organization plans to rain incendiary fire on the Galilee If the IDF decides to enter the villages from the bottom to stop the launches, it will encounter an array of fortifications set up by Hezbollah, as an ambush for the forces.

The other missiles, made in Iran and Syria, are scattered around sites throughout Lebanon.

The longer their range, the more Hezbollah can launch them from the depths of Lebanon.

This makes missile hunting much more challenging for intelligence and the Air Force.

Israel's air defense system is not built to deal with such an amount of rockets.

As a rule, it is designed to operate from light to heavy, with most of the effort concentrated on long-range missiles and the protection of strategic sites.

Those who are supposed to handle these missiles are Iron Dome systems and a magic wand;

The latter is also responsible for intercepting cruise missiles.

Air defense systems are supposed to distinguish accurate missiles from others and prioritize interception, if necessary.

The huge amount of missiles held by Hezbollah is intended to deter Israel from starting a war.

But in fact it is part of a broader plan led by the Quds Force commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Qassem Suleimani, who was assassinated last year by the Americans in Iraq.

His idea was to surround Iran's enemies with missiles and terrorism from every possible direction, and Hezbollah's lineup was only one component of the plan.

Another component is the aid that Iran is transferring to Islamic Jihad and Hamas.

Iran has sought to establish another front against Israel, in Syria, of militias that will act on its behalf and under its direction.

The idea was to establish naval, air and land bases of Afghan and Pakistani fighters, to equip a large amount of weapons (mainly rockets, but not only), and to carry out attacks and shootings into Israeli territory.

Israel recognized this trend in time.

Much of the attacks attributed to it in recent years have been aimed at thwarting the Iranian establishment, not only in the Syrian territory close to the border, but in the entire Syrian area.

Thus, the Air Force last month was attributed to an infrastructure attack in the Deir a-Zor area on the Syrian-Iraqi border, intended to be used by these militias, which moved east to the Iraqi border after failing to settle deep in Syria.

This was the first time that Air Force planes have attacked the area since the destruction of the reactor in Deir a-Zor in September 2007.

Israel's determined activity in Syria rests mainly on the Lebanese failure.

By the end of 2012, Israel had watched Hezbollah's armament with all its might, and did nothing, due to fears of the political echelon getting into another war in the north.

The statements by the Israeli leadership at the end of the Lebanon war, according to which "Hezbollah cannot rebuild its power," remained uncovered.

A monster was built to the north.

The civil war in Syria changed the picture.

After a period of adjustment, Israel realized that it had an opportunity - and began to act.

Under the name of the laundered code "Foreign Sources" thousands of airstrikes have been reported in the Syrian area, and if in the beginning any attack would have shaken worlds, today it is barely reported.

These attacks are anything but ordinary: they are complex, and often dangerous, operations that could result in the downing of a plane or injuring civilians.

The fact that this does not happen (except for one case, in which an F-16 plane was hit and its pilots were abandoned in Israeli territory during an attack in 2018) is proof of the absolute superiority of the Air Force in the arena.

After the accelerated intensification

following the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah concluded that it was saturated in terms of the amount of missiles, and began investing in improving their accuracy.

This concept, to be precise, may be misleading for those who do not work in the field, but it is critical: most of Hezbollah's arsenal today, and also of Hamas, is that of statistical, "stupid" rockets.

The one who launches them cannot control the place of their hit, and in order to inflict actual damage, a large amount of rockets must be fired.

Thus, almost half of the rockets fired by Hamas in Operation Eitan fell in open areas or in Gaza, just as happened to a large part of the Scud missiles that Saddam Hussein sent to Israel in the first Gulf War.

Accurate missiles are a different world.

They are equipped with a navigation mechanism, which allows to hit the target with great precision.

One of Hezbollah's main missiles is the M-600 ("Tishrin"), which is manufactured in Syria and is based on the Iranian Fatah-110 missile.

This missile has many versions, and has a range of about 250 km and a warhead of about half a ton. Its current accuracy is a radius of tens of meters from the target. Other missiles are accurate at a level of about 100 meters. This means that if Hezbollah puts the cross on a building The General Staff in the Kirya in Tel Aviv can strike anywhere between Azrieli, the Sharona compound, Ichilov Hospital and Ibn Gvirol Street.

For those who just want to kill civilians in quantities it is good enough, but those who want to silence a country need more than that.

Hezbollah wants to be able to do to Israel exactly what it did to it in the Second Lebanon War: to attack strategic facilities (mainly electricity), military facilities (mainly the Air Force), and government institutions (mainly Jerusalem), to present a picture of victory.

Therefore accuracy is critical. 

The person who led Hezbollah's accelerated armaments project after the Second Lebanon War was Imad Mornia.

Following his assassination in February 2008 in Damascus, in an operation attributed to the American-assisted institution, he was replaced by his cousin and brother-in-law, Mustafa Bader a-Din, also one of the organization's founders.

In May 2016, a-Din was also assassinated, in a joint operation for Hezbollah and Iran: the official excuse was his fondness for alcohol, women and making money on the side, but the real reason was a series of frictions with Suleimani over Hezbollah's involvement in the Syrian civil war.

The assassination transferred the project to the exclusive management of Nasrallah and Suleimani.

In the beginning, Hezbollah's acquisition of precision weapons was awkward.

The precision missiles were manufactured in Iran and flown to Damascus.

In 2013, during the tenure of Chief of Staff Bnei Gantz and Air Force Commander Amir Eshel, Israel began a campaign to prevent precise capability for Lebanon. This campaign continues to this day, with each operation or attack taking place within it being given a different name. Attacks

in Lebanon accelerated in 2014, slowed Slightly in 2015, when Russia joined the campaign to save Assad's rule, and accelerated again in 2016, when Israel realized that it had extensive freedom of action, despite the Russian presence in Syria, then something fell on the other side as well: Suleimani realized ISIS was defeated and Assad survived, recognizing an opportunity to establish hegemony Iranian in Syria: Three key issues were at stake: the establishment of the Iranians and their emissaries on Syrian soil, the indoctrination of the Syrian people through Shiite clerics who had been flown from Iran, and the takeover of the Syrian arms industry.

Syria has

a well-developed arms industry, the result of Russian knowledge and years of local development in favor of the Syrian army arming itself in preparation for a future war against Israel.

Eikra operates under the Syrian National Institute for Scientific Research and Study (CERS), the well-known name of the Syrian military industry. 

Suleimani's idea was simple: to produce the missiles on Syrian soil, thus eliminating the need for shipments from Iran and preventing their attack.

Iran will fund, Syria will produce, and from there the missiles will be transferred to Lebanon.

Assad had no ability to oppose this idea;

He owes his life to the Iranians and Hezbollah, and also owes them about $ 80 billion for the equipment, aid and loans he received.

Beyond that - working for the Syrian factories, which also means earning a living for thousands of people, was blessed in his eyes.

Israel recognized the process and began systematically attacking the facilities and production infrastructure on Syrian soil.

According to overt publications, many dozens of such attacks have been carried out, of factories and storage sites.

Israel's determination to attack has run into Iranian determination to produce.

If production on Iranian soil failed, and production on Syrian soil failed, the next step was to move beyond production in Lebanon.

This time it is not a complete production of a missile from the ground up;

To produce a missile, you need to know how to create an accurate metal shell that can withstand the pressures, and then pour a liquid explosive into it, in a process that is risky.

Engine production is also a complex process, and building a warhead is a process that requires experience in casting and assembly, certainly speaking of large quantity and high quality and reliability.

Hezbollah does not have such a capability, which requires a developed military industry with dozens of scientists and large manufacturing sites.

Instead, choose a name in the process of conversion: take an "stupid" rocket of the old type, previously smuggled from Iran and Syria, and make it accurate using GPS and wings, which together with a small computer can maneuver it to the target.

The computer, the size of a laptop, is inserted into a cylindrical shell worn in the middle of the rocket.

The destination is entered into it, and navigation is performed using the GPS.

During the flight, which lasts several minutes, the computer performs trajectory calculations, and if necessary, moves the wings to make corrections in the trajectory.

All the exact equipment can be purchased online, but Hezbollah gets it from Iran.

The computer itself is based on an algorithm with fairly simple aerodynamic equations;

The conversion process is also not complicated, and takes several days.

At the end of the process adjustment and calibration are required, as well as testing for the wings, to make sure they are moving in the right direction.

According to various publications, the conversion process is capable of bringing the rocket to an accuracy level of 30-20 meters.

Good for hitting a power plant or building, but not enough to put a missile in a specific window or to kill someone.

This already requires accuracy on another level, as well as real-time intelligence, which only military powers have.

Seemingly any rocket can be accurate.

But such a project on hundreds of thousands of rockets is an expensive and unnecessary process, and in order to hit Kiryat Shmona or Haifa, Hezbollah will be satisfied with statistical weapons.

In other words, the statistical weapon is intended to threaten the population, and the precise weapon - the quality targets.

The size (or rather, the small size) of the elements needed for conversion, and especially the computer, show how complex the challenge the IDF faces, and how great its achievement is. The missile becomes accurate. Given the quality of intelligence required in real time, and the level of risk and accuracy of the Air Force, this is an impressive operation by any standard.

During the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah fired about 200 rockets into Israeli territory every day.

In the next war he plans to launch thousands.

Israel does not have the ability to intercept all of them, or even most of them, so the damage to the Galilee will probably be great.

On the other hand, the potential damage of each rocket individually is relatively limited, and the protected areas (MMADs and shelters) are supposed to provide protection against the rockets.

As part of the war

on the precision project, Israel operates not only through net military means, but also in other ways - from diplomacy and international pressures, through an economic campaign, to conscious and explanatory moves.

Twice in recent years, Hezbollah missile sites in Lebanon have been publicly exposed by Prime Minister Netanyahu: the first in a speech at the UN General Assembly in 2018, in which he unveiled three sites; and the second in a recorded speech to the UN General Assembly in 2020, in which he unveiled facilities Others, including rocket depots in the heart of a civilian neighborhood in Beirut.

In both cases, Hezbollah denied the allegations.

The denials are mainly aimed at Lebanese ears: the situation in the land of cedars is worse than ever, and Lebanon is facing the deepest economic and social crisis in its history.

Hezbollah, which has long been part of the government and in many ways controls the entire country, is seen as sharing responsibility for the situation, and it is doubtful whether the Lebanese public has empathy for anyone who could bring another disaster, certainly after the trauma of the Beirut bombing last summer.

Israel's decision to purchase new armaments for the Air Force and other interceptors for air defense systems (along with fighter jets, assault helicopters and refueling planes) was mainly due to looking north.

In its annual report, the Institute for National Security Studies placed the probability of war in Lebanon in the first place, higher than the Iranian threat. The latest name given by experts to this war, in publications and exercises, is "First Northern War" - assuming the war does not remain Lebanese even Syria (and perhaps even Iraq): perhaps Syria itself will act against Israel, to reward Iran and Hezbollah have given generous support they gave her during the civil War; and can be carried out missile attack a Shi'ite militias in Iraq, and perhaps even by the Houthis in Yemen, supporters of Iran.

Besides The statistical rockets, another threat from the north, is the infiltration into Israeli territory. The blockade of the tunnel project severely damaged Hezbollah's plans, but did not completely thwart them. Those who have recently visited the Rosh Hanikra or Metula area must have noticed the high walls that rise along the border, and are intended to reduce the topographic advantage of those in Lebanon and make it difficult for Hezbollah to fire at Israeli territory.

In recent years, Hezbollah has also invested in drones.

Skimmers are already in the Second Lebanon War, but have come a long way since then, and today it has a wide range of small drones and skimmers of various types, including those that carry explosives for ranges of hundreds of kilometers.

IDF there are many ways to deal with this threat. One is the activity spectrum (frequency block), which is supposed to disrupt and sometimes intercept the attacker tool. The main challenge is how to do it without disrupting the media on our side.

Above all these threats, paragraph The first, from the IDF's point of view, is the "exact" issue.

This is such a serious matter that the chief of staff and his deputy deal with it themselves, on a regular basis. It means ongoing discussions, plans and close monitoring of what is happening on both sides of the border. The basis of this preparation is in the Archimedes plan, formulated under the previous chief of staff. Gadi Izenkot, and defined the threat, the response required and the processes of equipping and building the force to deal with it.

The prevailing view in the IDF at the moment is that the "accurate" threat is tolerable, and can be dealt with. The calculation takes into account the nature of Hezbollah's missiles, their potential damage ability, the intelligence picture that will destroy these means at the beginning of the next campaign and the ability to disrupt this firing. Assuming that some precision missiles will still be able to penetrate, the question is what damage they will cause.

All this should lead to a magic number, which should be Israel's red line. A figure beyond which Israel cannot complete, and its crossing should launch the IDF into a preemptive strike. , Knowing that its price will be lower than that of a future war.

So far, Israel has avoided such a number.

Some experts point to 500 accurate missiles, others to 1,000.

As mentioned, Hezbollah is still far from that, but the horizon is clear: it continues to produce and tries to smuggle.

Proponents of avoiding a clear statement of a red line believe that this is a dynamic reality, in the framework of which Israel is also accumulating various tools that change the picture and the account.

On the other hand, the fear is that Israel will exercise itself every time to the new situation.

Like the frog, in which the water she dips in the pot gradually heats up, for her enjoyment, until it is completely cooked.

Israel has been boycotting itself in the face of the tens of thousands of statistical rockets accumulated in Lebanon, and the same could happen to the exact rockets.

The prevailing opinion in the IDF and among civilian experts is that Israel must define its own red lines, and the fact that it has not yet done so is a serious malfunction that needs to be rectified soon. 

Chief of Staff Kochavi recently said in closed discussions that he intends to do so with the new government. Will find in the government a partner for binding definitions, because of the fear of the political echelon that it will not meet the red lines it has set for itself.

And yet, the very discussion will be blessed.

"Hezbollah wants to

reach such a mass of precision, which will deter us from dealing with it," says Brigadier General Eran Niv, head of the Shiloah Division (Combat Methods and Innovation), whose area of ​​responsibility also includes the threat of precision.

Its division connects the three systems - the BMB (the campaign between the wars, which is the joint responsibility of the Operations Division, the Intelligence Division and the Air Force); the operational plans for the war (which is the responsibility of the Operations Division and Commands), and the Arms "We are running a 100-meter sprint and a marathon at the same time," he says.

Under Niv, there are teams that deal with defense, attack, MBM, intelligence, consciousness and influence and future technological potential. Their main focus today is on precision, from two families: missiles and rockets (which make a ballistic trajectory, and against which air defense equipment was developed), (Flying in a straight line, at ground level; some of the air defense systems have been converted to deal with them as well.)

"Apart from the Iranian nuclear program, this is the biggest threat to Israel today," says Niv. "This is the incident.

The situation assessments are being conducted on him.

This is the scenario in the exercises.

Everything is aimed there, but the answer is also aimed there.

If Hezbollah crosses the threshold of quantity or quality, we will be required to act.

It's a difficult decision, but we can not run away from it.

In the meantime, we are trying to act in other creative ways that will not allow them to get there. "

Niv is one of those who believes that Israel must define red lines for itself. Not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively. For example, Hezbollah's transition from mass smuggling kits to Lebanon. We need to mark a quantitative threshold and a qualitative threshold, the passage of which will oblige us to other actions, "he stressed.

Hezbollah is not there yet, but that may change soon. The removal of economic sanctions on Iran, as part of the expected return to the nuclear deal, will also flow a lot of money back to the sponsors. If Tehran and Beirut feel that the Americans are either restricting or supporting Israeli activity, they may feel more confident in attacking the precision project and moving from tweezers to widespread activity.

Niv emphasizes that there are elements in Hizbullah's missile attack preparation. The most prominent of these is the state of protection in the north.The 2017 government plan, the "Civil Northern Shield," which was supposed to address the protection gaps in the north, has never been implemented, and more than half of northern residents have no security or shelter.

"The hurricane is on our doorstep, and we can not afford to sink," he says.

"We have to look ahead and make the right decisions for the future."

Israel has

never launched a preemptive strike on an enemy force building.

The only exception is, of course, nuclear weapons: twice Israel attacked nuclear reactors in the region - in 1981 in Iraq and in 2007 in Syria - as part of the Begin Doctrine, according to which an enemy state should not be allowed to develop nuclear technology.

Decisions about these attacks were complex, but determining the red line that required them was easy: a moment before the miners became "hot."

In contrast, determining a red line when it comes to accuracy is more elusive.

Certainly when that "existential threat" does not exist in its classical form.

For comparison, Israel did not launch a pre-emptive strike against the threat of tunnels from Gaza (until it saw terrorists exiting a tunnel near Kibbutz Sufa and launched Operation Eitan), nor a pre-emptive war on Palestinian terrorism, despite hundreds killed (until the Seder attack on the Park Hotel in Netanya Protective wall).

Israel also refrained from launching a similar counterattack on another strategic threat - the enormous amount of chemical weapons that Syria held until the Civil War.

In Israel, it was estimated (and rightly so) that Syria would refrain from using this weapon, and would be content with producing a mutual deterrence equation.

Many experts believe that the exact ones pose a different kind of threat to Israel.

It is no longer possible to say that "the rockets will rust in the warehouses," and action is called for.

Quite a bit of it is already being done now - aggressively (according to Kochavi, in 2020 Israel carried out more than 500 such), and in diplomatic components (intelligence cooperation and exerting pressure on governments in the West) and consciousness (such as Netanyahu's speeches and publications in the international and Arab media). Hezbollah from possession of thousands of precision missiles.

"Hezbollah sees us just as we see it - as those who plot to attack it," says Mizrahi Prof. Eyal Zisser of Tel Aviv University.

"He wants precision to deter us. He will not have a few thousand more missiles, but precision is a breach of equality for him. And because he is having a hard time smuggling an accurate capability from Syria, he wants to produce it in Lebanon."

The head of the Institute for National Security Studies, Maj. Gen. (Res.) Amos Yadlin, is one of the prominent voices who claim that Israel must hold the strategic debate with itself right now, and set red lines for itself.

"The right timing for action against the precision project must be examined and defined, while understanding that it can lead to a broad escalation," he says.

"The presence of hundreds of precision missiles in the hands of the Iranian axis, and in particular in the hands of Hezbollah, which can cause widespread civilian damage in Israel and paralyze vital systems, is a strategic threat that must not be allowed to develop."

According to Yadlin, the defining event in the context of accuracy is the Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia's oil infrastructure in September 2019. Dozens of precision missiles and cruise missiles then hit Aramco facilities and shut down about half of Saudi production capacity.

Iran has indeed tried to distance itself from testimony, and those who took responsibility for the attack were the Houthis in Yemen, its protégés;

But solid information indicated that the missiles were launched from Iranian soil.

The Iranians realized in this incident that accuracy was indeed the next thing, so they decided to attack it on all fronts.

It is more complex for them in the absence of Suleimani, but as Yadlin defines - "the train travels".

Cruise missiles (or UAVs armed for thousands of kilometers) have already been handed over to the Houthis in Yemen, and are found in lower numbers in Iraq and Syria, and possibly in Lebanon as well.

"Israel is not in Saudi Arabia's situation," he says. "We have better intelligence. , And we are likely to know of such an attack in advance.

We have an impressive ability to thwart and we can attack before launch, and we also have the ability to detect and defend, but the threat as a whole is problematic and requires a change in strategy. "

Yadlin points to four possible strategies that Israel has: deterrence (making Nasrallah understand accurate missile strikes will lead to the destruction of Lebanon);

Protection (more investment in interceptors and other means);

Attacks and other actions within the framework of the BMB (which means postponing the end), and a preemptive strike (which will take Hezbollah from the capability, but put Israel in total danger of war).

"The problem is that deterrence may or may not exist if Hezbollah has a large stockpile of precision, and defense is expensive. Very, and may not suffice in the face of large quantities and barrages.

Therefore the important discussion is in prevention.

Ostensibly we do it all the time, but should already be thinking about the next step.

"We may have to apply the Begin Doctrine to precision missiles as well."

The

former

head of the research division at

the Israel Defense Forces, Brigadier General (Res.) Itai Baron, who wrote the annual assessment of the Institute for National Security Studies, thinks otherwise.

"The exact ones do pose an unusual threat in their power, but they are not nuclear weapons," he says.

"Precise they are not all-inclusive in terms of Hezbollah. They are part of a larger picture.

" Hezbollah does not want to battle long but severe blows, shorten the duration of the war and its damages, and that maybe they had a small amount of accurate, it runs alongside a mass of fire statistically and incursions into Israel .

" 

The problem is that with a small number of rockets Israel is easy to deal with, both offensively and defensively. In the face of a large number of accurate, the story will be completely different. Israel will have a hard time locating and destroying them all; a few rockets will penetrate the dense arrays of the air defense to cause significant, physical and mental damage.

A possible way to deal with this threat other than through an initiated blow is to seize opportunities. Against the backdrop of one event or another, Israel can seize the opportunity and act not only on a one-off basis, but more broadly, as it has done in recent years in Gaza, taking advantage of every negligible event on the border that would deprive Hamas of production and intensification capabilities. Because of the magnitude of the threat and the price of war.

If Hezbollah continues at the current rate of missile production, it will take years to reach the Red Line. But if it accelerates, or moves to industrial production in Lebanon, the duration will be significantly shorter. In that case, Israel will have to decide whether to act. Cut off the great and dangerous conventional threat b

More facing her, or living with him. 

shishabat@israelhayom.co.il