Benjamin Morel is a lecturer in public law at the University of Paris II Panthéon-Assas
FIGAROVOX.-Liberation
made its
headlines
this weekend, announcing that part of the left-wing voters would refuse to block Marine Le Pen in the event of a new second round: Le Pen / Macron.
Does this surprise you?
Benjamin MOREL.-
What is surprising is the astonished reaction that this one has aroused.
Most second-round surveys showed this phenomenon.
The most recent, a Harris poll of January 27 suggested that one in two left-wing voters would give up moving in the event of a second round between Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen.
On the other hand, we also see a possible vote of part of the left electorate for Marine Le Pen.
In an IFOP survey for Le Figaro in November 2019, 43 %% of LFI voters said they were ready to vote in the second round Marine Le Pen against Emmanuel Macron.
There is therefore a real porosity today between these electorates as soon as we do not take into account the non-voters of the second round.
We also note in the same survey that 23% of socialist voters and 28% of green voters would do the same.
We often talk about the reserves of votes to the right of Marine Le Pen in the event of a second round.
In number, these are at this stage more important, because abstention would be less.
But relatively, 38% of LR voters would fall back on his name in the second round.
That's less than LFI voters and only ten points more than EELV voters.
These surveys have no predictive value, but they show that something has changed.
The RN developed during the Philippot era a social Gaullist software which clearly made it possible to address the electorate of the first left.
How do you explain it?
There are many explanations.
The RN developed during the Philippot era a social Gaullist software which clearly made it possible to address the electorate of the first left.
There is therefore a game of communicating mud that is already old, but which is growing between the left and the RN.
The really new phenomenon concerns the Social Democratic electorate.
The latter lost his house with the choice of Benoît Hamon then the collapse of the PS in 2017. He found a lifeline in LREM then, by default, in EELV.
This electorate is the most macrocompatible in terms of adherence to economic and societal liberalism.
It is also an electorate who finds himself on the importance of the sovereign state and on the fight against communitarianism.
To read also:
"Macron-Le Pen: the return match is far from being written!"
But this is where the shoe pinches, it is also an electorate very attached to public freedoms.
The Asylum and Immigration law, the anti-breaker law, the yellow vests crisis, the Global Security law, have created a wedge between Emmanuel Macron and this electorate.
This is not so much linked to the substance of the texts as to the blunders shown by the government.
The pension reform which also affected first and foremost this wealthy and active electorate has completed to deepen it.
Besides that, the RN played extremely well.
Marine Le Pen was able to disturb this electorate by often agreeing with him against the government.
She thus produced a strong cognitive dissonance which ended up making her prefer abstention.
Can that still change between now and a possible second round?
Obviously.
The presidents elected one year before the deadline have been called since 1990, Delors, Balladur, Jospin, Royal, Strauss-Kahn, Juppé.
At this point predicting who will even be in the second round is a matter of astrology.
This is all the more the case since in all European countries the crisis has frozen the voting intentions of the electorate.
At the same time, we are witnessing a real change in the values of these voters.
The day when the latter repoliticize themselves from an electoral and partisan perspective, the movements can be important.
For the rest, the main weakness of the RN today lies in what makes its strength.
He capitalizes on a captive electorate who votes for him without asking questions about his political identity.
This windfall is extremely stable and allows Marine Le Pen to be very agile in her speech by overplaying moderation.
Still, she takes a risk.
In the CEVIPOF barometer of April 2020, 74% of French people believe that it is up to the French state, and not the European Union, to control national borders.
A candidacy like that of Eric Zemmour, or even an LR candidate who would not hesitate to assume a vaguely sovereignist software and would recall that Nicolas Sarkozy did not hesitate to suspend Schengen could cause trouble.
This is all the more the case since according to the IPSOS barometer, French fractures of September 2020, the RN electorate 72% think that France's membership in the EU is a bad thing.
This desire to reassure Europe is also at the cost of a weakening of the RN's social discourse on the edge of a major economic crisis.
Emmanuel Macron will have a speech on what he calls European sovereignty and the control of common borders;
and this in full French presidency of the EU.
The RN's room for maneuver will therefore be limited.
The President needs to keep enough left-wing voters so that right-wing voters still find it useful to vote for him.
The Macronists and some observers denounce a betrayal of the ideals of the left.
Do you share this point of view?
Macronism represents a fairly coherent alliance between part of the second left and the Orleanist right according to a social logic very marked by the over-representation of the upper classes.
Emmanuel Macron was fairly loyal to the foundations that made him elect while knowing how to adapt to situations.
It is interesting that the legislative program, adopted in 2017, was largely served as a solution to the yellow vests crisis and then to that of COVID.
To read also:
"Faced with Marine Le Pen, the Republican roadblock soon obsolete?"
The packaging of the texts has changed, but most were in germ at the start of the quinquennium.
There was no deception on the merchandise, just adjustments to sales policies.
On the other hand, there were many communication hiccups and a contempt for the political history and identity of the rallied voters who could not merge and commune with a party, LREM, which remains rather evanescent.
Is this the end of the Republican Front?
No doubt, at least in its traditional form.
It is not very surprising.
The political space has been reconfigured with the election of Emmanuel Macron and the moderation of the RN program.
The political space has evolved and is starting to resemble what it is in other European countries.
Right-wing voters (outside the center) no longer have the same modesty vis-à-vis the RN.
However, it is not the same for the parties which represent a force of inertia.
A recent poll indicates that in the event of a Macron / Le Pen second round the result would be extremely tight with a victory over Macron's thread at 52% against 48% for Marine Le Pen.
Can this be a game-changer in the first round?
Highly possible.
For now, the Macron vote in the first round is, especially for center-right voters, a useful vote.
These voters, often elderly with a strong political identity, vote for their own colors when they think they can win.
We see it in local elections.
When this is not the case, as the Europeans show, they do not hesitate to vote LREM to counter the RN.
If a dynamic right-wing candidacy emerges and appears to be able to represent a credible alternative, the useful vote effect may then reverse.
Xavier Bertrand or Valérie Pécresse would thus be seen as more consensual candidates against the RN.
If so, the first polls testing them can cost Emmanuel Macron dearly.
This is a bit like LREM's dilemma right now.
The President needs to keep enough left-wing voters in his pocket so that right-wing voters still find it useful to vote for him.