Power or Human Rights: Does Biden's USA Have to Choose One?

A coup in Myanmar and the condemnation of Alexej Navalny in Russia - does the US, with its values, have a worse hand in the competition between the great powers?

• Joe Biden has been in office and dignity as US President since the end of January - and is facing important decisions.

• It is clear that the Democrat wants to orient himself more towards shared values ​​than his predecessor Trump.

  But is that at the expense of power interests?

• The US political experts Emma Ashford and Matthew Kroenig engaged in a substantial journalistic debate on this explosive question shortly after Biden took office.

• This article is available in German for the first time - it was first published on February 5, 2021 by the magazine "Foreign Policy".

Emma Ashford:

 Good morning, Matt.

We finally got some snow this weekend here in Washington DC!

And once again they were reminded: the only thing that can bring the capital of the world's most important superpower to a standstill is five to ten centimeters of powder snow.

Did you enjoy the winter wonderland?

Matthew Kroenig:

 Yes.

It snowed continuously for over 24 hours!

I haven't seen anything like it in DC for a long time.

I almost wonder whether the snowstorm originated in a Chinese laboratory.

EA:

 Well, the pandas at the zoo seemed very happy with it!

MK:

 Eliminating the rival's capital and making the national animal happy at the same time: a brilliant masterpiece from Beijing.

Joe Biden sets the first foreign policy course - values ​​and power interests in conflict?

EA:

 Fortunately, the onset of winter didn't stop Joe Biden from delivering his first major foreign policy speech as President when he visited the State Department on Thursday.

And I think he left us a pretty good basis for discussion: Myanmar, Russia and the tension between values ​​and interests in US foreign policy.

MK:

 It was a really good speech.

And we certainly have a lot to discuss.

Shall we start with Burma?

EA:

 Wait a minute, aren't we saying Myanmar these days?

MK:

 That depends on who you ask.

The US government calls it Burma because the name Myanmar is more closely associated with the military junta that ruled the country for many decades.

And these days, the country's military is rushing to power again and wants to overthrow the civilian government with a coup.

It is a setback to what a gradual transition to a democratic state could have been.

EA:

 Right.

Whatever we call it, it's been a bad week for the country.

Apart from that, Myanmar was already extremely problematic as a test subject for democratization.

There was indeed much hope after the military junta announced a so-called path to democracy in 2003, which eventually led to the Nobel Peace Prize-winning dissident Aung San Suu Kyi de facto taking over power.

But the transition has been marred by regression, particularly human rights violations against the Rohingya minority who actually supported the democratically elected government.

It is a reminder that democracy and human rights are not always compatible.

USA and Myanmar: Biden facing problems - Obama's bet didn't come off

MK:

 Despite the democratic elections, the organization Freedom House has

always classified

Myanmar - I am following the style guide from

Foreign Policy

- as unfree: because of the human rights violations and because the military kept control of 25 percent of the seats in parliament and the vice-presidency.

So the country falls back from unfree to still unfree.

EA:

 But there was some hope in Washington about opening up to democracy, wasn't there?

I think I remember that the US government lifted sanctions under the Power-Sharing Agreement.

Former President Barack Obama even visited the country during his tenure, which we would not normally associate with genocidal dictatorships.

Is that a failure of American democracy promotion?

Or is it a sign that the values ​​and interests of the USA are in tension?

MK:

 There was a debate in the Obama administration between those who wanted to hold generals and others accountable for ongoing human rights abuses and those who believed that opening up Washington would be a better engine for democratic reform.

Obama tended towards the latter, but the events of the week show that the bet didn't work out.

The other problem here is China.

Myanmar has grown closer and closer to Beijing in recent years.

EA:

 I knew you would talk about China.

Granted, a relapse into autocracy will likely bring Myanmar closer to China, but I don't see what that makes a difference.

Would the US measurably improve its defense capabilities in the region with Myanmar as a partner?

And if that were the case, why should we give priority to promoting democracy?

MK:

 I agree that the biggest geopolitical conflict of the 21st century will probably not be resolved in Myanmar.

But we would rather have the country on our side than on the opposing side.

And Myanmar is important to China.

President Xi Jinping sees it as a central hub in his network of the "New Silk Road" and as a corridor to Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.

And the United States must have some kind of policy towards Myanmar.

So which one should it be?

In his speech, Biden advocated democracy and human rights and called for the generals to relinquish power and restore civilian control.

But there is a rational argument for working pragmatically with those in power - whoever it is - to advance US interests, including the balance with China.

EA:

 Right.

This is what I was getting at.

There were many voices in Washington who said the coup in Myanmar was a test for the Biden government.

And while that's pretty exaggerated, I think there is some truth to it.

The Biden administration has promised to make democracy and human rights a top priority.

They are also trying to strike a balance with China.

It is a test of the direction in which the government is leaning - human rights or competition between the great powers - and a reminder that these two goals are in conflict with one another.

Frankly, I think both are wrong.

Myanmar is a small, poor country in Southeast Asia that borders China.

It has next to no impact on US interests, but the Americans seem to be convinced that a country that is not on our side in the competition of the great powers is inevitably against us.

USA have Russia in focus: Putin's power is fragile

MK:

 As I said, I do think Myanmar is important, even if it's not the top priority issue.

Washington will therefore have to carefully navigate this tension between its interests and values ​​there.

However, there is another place in the world where the interests and values ​​of the United States are closer together.

When Moscow arrested the Kremlin critic and opposition leader Alexei Navalny - who a member of the group admitted to having poisoned Russian agents in an attack a few months ago - protests broke out across the country.

Opposition groups took to the streets again this week when he was sentenced to nearly three years in prison.

Events show that Russians value freedom and human rights very well (contrary to the nonsensical theory that they culturally prefer a strong leader) and that President Vladimir Putin's power may be more fragile than previously thought.

EA:

 Oh Matt, where do I start?

You're right: many Russians want democracy, or at least more rights and less repression.

The idea that the Russians want a strong man is the same as the idea that Chinese culture is inconsistent with Western liberal concepts - all just orientalist nonsense.

But I think you're kidding yourself if you think that a democratic government in Russia would be a lot more America-friendly.

Just look at Navalny himself!

He endorsed the Russian invasion of Crimea and spread imperialist views on Russia's so-called Near Abroad.

It is the same as with Aung Sang Suu Kyi in Myanmar, who went from an icon of peace to the tacit tolerant of violence against an unpopular ethnic minority.

Democracy is not synonymous with Western human rights concerns, and it does not necessarily stand for foreign policy concessions.

MK:

 It's hard to imagine that a post-Putin administration could be more hostile to the United States.

Putin has defined Moscow's interests as essentially the opposite of Washington's.

Putin's immediate predecessors did not see US-Russian relations in such black and white.

For my part, I think it would be worth trying to see whether a post-Putin government in Russia - democratic or not - could not be less hostile to the United States.

EA: But

 it could also be more hostile.

We do not know it.

MK:

 What would a more hostile attitude look like?

Invade neighboring countries?

Make explicit military threats against NATO and the United States?

Intervene in US and other western elections to undermine our democracy?

Support dictators in the Middle East with military force?

Spending huge sums on the armed forces, including new generations of “exotic” nuclear weapons?

Because that is exactly Putin's policy.

EA:

 Touché.

American-Russian relations are terrible right now.

But what I mean to say: Putin's successor could continue this approach.

There is no guarantee that it will be better for us.

And then there is the Russia-China question ... Our employer, the Atlantic Council, published an anonymous strategy paper on China last week called "The Longer Telegram".

It argues that it would go down in history as the biggest geostrategic mistake made by successive US administrations that Russia has been allowed to drift completely into the - strategic - arms of China over the past decade.

Well, there has been a lot of joke about the article being some kind of George Kennan cosplay.

I don't really understand myself why it had to be published anonymously.

Regardless of what you think of the entire article, I think this specific piece of advice is correct.

Anyone concerned about China should build bridges to Russia.

MK:

 It was a provocative strategy paper that got a lot of attention.

The writer makes some good points, but he / she is simply wrong on this point.

As I

argued

in

Foreign Policy

, there is no point in trying to work with Putin against China.

Putin will not get involved.

And if he did, we couldn't trust him.

There is no danger that Russia and China will forge a close alliance in the foreseeable future.

And Russia doesn't have much to offer in the relationship.

I'd rather work with our existing democratic partners to beat Putin and Xi at the same time.

Biden's USA: Start a new policy with allies and partners?

EA:

 So you're still sticking to the idea of ​​an alliance of democracies that stand together against authoritarian states around the world?

It seems to me that the events of the past week - not to mention the discussion we just had - highlighted some problems with this model.

There were a couple of interesting articles on the same subject last week.

Bret Stephens of the

New York Times

argued that America should have a foreign policy that prioritizes dissidents.

I disagree with his view that US officials should prioritize the citizens of other countries over the needs and interests of those in their own country.

I disagree even more strongly with his thesis that helping dissidents would improve US foreign policy in the long term.

To be honest, I cannot explain how anyone can look back on the past 20 years and think that way.

But human rights are important, and I thought Peter Beinart's response to Stephens was really good.

He argues - I'll sum it up with my words - that the best way to advance U.S. foreign policy and promote human rights is actually to start in the areas where Washington has the greatest influence: violations made by the United States and its partners.

That is a compelling argument.

And it makes it possible to advance both US interests and values ​​hand in hand.

Biden's announcement that the United States will cease supporting the Saudi war in Yemen and stop selling offensive armaments to the Saudis was an important first step in that direction.

Biden also brought up this idea of ​​the “summit of democracies” again.

Yet, as Jim Goldgeier and Bruce Jentleson recently argued, there are simply so many practical problems in putting this idea into practice and so few tangible benefits.

MK:

 Analysts often make the trade-off between values ​​and interests much more complicated than necessary.

In my opinion, the matter is quite simple.

There are different categories of countries for US foreign policy: Washington can work most intensively with those countries that share US values ​​and interests, such as Great Britain and Japan.

It must stand firmly against countries that share neither values ​​nor interests, such as Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.

The more difficult cases are countries like the United Arab Emirates, Singapore, and maybe Myanmar as well.

They are not democratic, but they do not actively question the interests of the USA and there are concrete collaborations with them.

The United States should work pragmatically with these countries and find ways to induce them to improve their human rights situation.

Democratic ideals: The USA itself is now also in doubt

EA:

 Which countries would be eligible for a summit of democracies?

Only the closest allies?

The D 10?

Only countries with a polity score above 6?

Needless to say, according to several such measures of democracy, the United States itself is now a flawed or imperfect democracy.

I think Biden would be making a serious mistake if he pursued this summit.

MK:

 First of all, I think it's definitely beneficial to bring like-minded allies together to coordinate common approaches to common challenges.

Setting up the guest list is not easy.

I would advocate that the United States invite all formal allies in Europe and Asia, as well as all EU member states.

Now some will say that Hungary and Turkey are no longer considered democracies, and they are not wrong.

So these are some of the tough choices.

Golden Vulture and Jentleson, as well as others, said that since drawing up the guest list is too complicated, we shouldn't hold the meeting.

But I had the same problem at my wedding and we didn't cancel the whole event because of that!

EA:

 Ha!

But I bet your future mother-in-law didn't buy Russian weapons illegally.

MK:

 Well, she didn't stop buying French fashion during the Freedom Fries era, but other than that, she's pretty patriotic - I haven't seen an S-400 in her closet.

Joe Biden: Summit of Democracies?

The US could end up being a hypocrite

EA:

 I think you actually made an argument for my point: the difference between your wedding and a pinnacle of democracies is that your wedding had a clear purpose.

I still don't understand why we should need such a summit.

If the aim is to send a message of democracy to China or Russia, then inviting Hungary and Turkey to this summit would undermine that very purpose and, frankly, make the United States look rather hypocritical.

You could call it an own goal for the US - an unnecessary mistake that can be avoided.

MK:

 There is a risk, yes.

If Biden wants to avoid that, he can consolidate the meeting into a smaller group of democracies, for example the D 10. I'll say it again: The decision on which countries on the edge of the spectrum to invite is secondary to the larger strategic goal to coordinate leading democracies to deal with common threats, including those from revisionist autocracies.

EA:

 I can see some value in having a group of democracies come together to talk about common internal problems;

for example about how to deal with populism.

Be that as it may, the Biden administration will have to decide how to position itself vis-à-vis Myanmar and Navalny - whether it wants to promote democracy or the interests of the United States.

My guess?

I guess Biden signaled with his speech that the new administration will impose a bunch of new sanctions on both states to show that Washington disagrees without getting anything done with it.

But let me know if your in-laws want to sell Russian armaments.

My kids have been really insubordinate lately.

Some anti-personnel equipment could restore the balance ...

Emma Ashford

is a Senior Fellow of the New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Twitter: @EmmaMAshford

Matthew Kroenig

is Associate Director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at Atlantic Council and Lecturer in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

Twitter: @matthewkroenig

This article was first published in English on February 5, 2021 in the magazine “ForeignPolicy.com” - as part of a cooperation, a translation is now also

 available to

Merkur.de

readers 

.

+

Foreign Policy Logo

© ForeignPolicy.com