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Photo:
Michael Kappeler / dpa
Admittedly, German politics has other concerns than the future of the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan.
Dealing with the Covid pandemic is currently absorbing all the creative will of the Federal Government and the Bundestag, devouring all political capital and, above all, binding the entire attention of the political public.
It has largely gone unnoticed that the Federal Government has asked the Bundestag to extend the mandate of the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan one more time, this time until January 31, 2022. This is an abrupt U-turn, because until a few weeks ago it was assumed that that the longest, most expensive and politically controversial foreign deployment of the German armed forces would end on April 30, 2021, i.e. in a few weeks, i.e. on the same day on which the USA also wants to withdraw the last of its 2,500 soldiers from the Hindu Kush.
To the author
Markus Kaim
, born in 1968, is head of the "Security Policy" research group at the Science and Politics Foundation in Berlin as well as lecturer at the Institute for Political Science at the University of Zurich and guest lecturer at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin.
The task of the Bundeswehr contingent, namely "training, advising and supporting the Afghan national defense and security forces" remains exactly the same in the new mandate as the number of personnel with up to 1,300 soldiers.
Anyone who continues to pursue a course that has once been taken unchanged, one might think, seems to be on the road to success: the mission is producing the desired results, the Afghan security forces are well trained and loyal servants of the government in Kabul - in short: the mission is a full one Success.
Unfortunately, the exact opposite is the case and the federal government's policy is more of a sign of perplexity: According to the United Nations, the security situation in Afghanistan in the second half of 2020 was more critical than ever before.
The UN registered 10,439 »security incidents«, which corresponds to an increase of 18 percent compared to the same period in 2019.
A total of 389 attacks by the insurgent Taliban were reported, an increase of 21 percent compared to 2019. The targets of the attacks included members of the security forces, government officials and religious leaders who are known to be critical of the Taliban, but not soldiers of the NATO mission "Resolute Support".
Since the beginning of the year, violence in the crisis-ridden country has increased even further, regardless of the peace talks that began in Doha in September 2020.
In addition, the Taliban control large parts of the country.
NATO, and thus also the German Armed Forces, are far from successfully completing the mission of building up Afghan security forces who can independently and effectively provide security for the entire territory of Afghanistan.
The Afghan armed forces are only able to operate independently to a limited extent.
The Air Force and special forces in particular are almost entirely dependent on US support and funding.
These are also essential for logistics, training and strategic advice.
In short: NATO and thus also the Bundeswehr are far from a successful completion of the mission, namely to build up Afghan security forces who independently and effectively ensure security throughout Afghanistan.
After 20 years in Afghanistan, that's a modest record.
The German government also assumes that withdrawing the last remaining NATO troops would exacerbate the conflict between the government and the Taliban and possibly trigger a major civil war.
Under the current conditions, it not only poses a threat to the immediate stability of Afghanistan and the region, but also to the political and social progress made in recent years as a whole.
But it was precisely this withdrawal that the Trump administration agreed with the Taliban last year for April 30, 2021.
At least now it becomes clear that Germany is only confronted with bad options in Afghanistan.
Either the Bundeswehr will leave the country in a month and leave the Afghans to their own devices with an uncertain outcome. Or they will continue the mission in an environment in which, on the one hand, the desired success remains a long way off and, on the other hand, the Taliban will launch their attacks on NATO. Troops will resume, as they have already announced.
Neither of the two options is satisfactory; both are associated with considerable costs and risks.
But in the end there are four reasons for a quick withdrawal:
Firstly
, the US and NATO no longer have any leverage for a negotiated solution they are striving for: the commitment to withdraw last year was tied to conditions - a voluntary commitment by the insurgents that they would prevent terrorist groups from entering Afghan territory for the security of the US and threaten their allies;
the initiation of peace talks with the Afghan government, a reduction in violence, etc. It is currently a matter of dispute whether the Taliban have actually kept these commitments.
The leaders of the Taliban can be more certain than ever that time is on their side and that in the end all they have to do is wait until the last willingness to become involved has slackened in the western capitals.
But apart from the details, it remains crucial that the West has irrevocably and visibly set the course for the withdrawal for the conflicting parties.
The leaders of the Taliban can be more certain than ever that time is on their side and that in the end all they have to do is wait until the last willingness to become involved has slackened in the western capitals.
That could happen very quickly as soon as the insurgents target NATO troops again.
If NATO should break the agreement with the Taliban and stay longer in the country, it will endanger the western troops and remain in a war that it cannot win.
The fact that the mandate frankly "assumes a significantly increased risk situation for German soldiers in the event that they possibly remain in Afghanistan beyond April 30, 2021" suggests something bad.
Enlarge picturePhoto:
Michael Kappeler / dpa
Second
, Western governments hardly have any political partners in Afghanistan who are open to influence on their behalf.
The Taliban have already announced that they will adhere to the agreements reached until April 30, but that if NATO does not withdraw, these will then lapse.
They would not be available to extend this period.
But President Ghani's government is also resisting Western influence, believing that its 2019 election will give it continued international diplomatic recognition and unending financial support from the West.
The US envoy for the intra-Afghan talks, Zalmay Khalilzad, just felt this when he presented a new initiative for a possible peace settlement on behalf of Foreign Minister Blinken.
The Biden administration is calling for a "peace government" in which the Kabul government and the Taliban share power while a new constitution is being drawn up.
Finally there would be elections for a new government.
The government of President Ashraf Ghani immediately rejected this.
She insists that she will not agree to a transfer of power that will not be decided by a free and fair election - a principle that is praiseworthy in itself, but which contradicts the seriousness of the two presidential elections which Ghani emerged victorious from Exhibited irregularities.
But something else is decisive: with her behavior, she is making a face-saving exit impossible for NATO on April 30th.
It is hardly to be expected that this situation could change by January 2022.
Thirdly
, it is becoming more and more difficult to justify the presence of the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan with German security interests.
The indirect goal of strengthening the Afghan security forces has always been to combat Islamist terror groups in Afghanistan.
However, in order to deter terrorist organizations with the intent and ability to carry out attacks in western capitals, the Alliance does not need to continue to station troops in that country.
It would be enough for NATO to make it unmistakably clear to the Taliban that there would be consequences if they violated the agreement and allowed transnational terrorists to prepare attacks from their soil.
NATO should simply declare that it achieved its most important goals by weakening al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and urging the Taliban to hold peace talks - and then leaving the country.
This could be substantiated by the credible threat of special forces and air strikes.
Only a small military footprint in the region would be required.
NATO should simply declare that it achieved its most important goals by weakening al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and urging the Taliban to hold peace talks - and then leaving the country.
Since the Taliban are also interested in the continued flow of Western aid funds, they would also harm themselves with the support of al-Qaeda and the "Islamic State".
Fourthly
, it is problematic, to put it cautiously, that the intended mandate should also bind the Bundestag of the 20th legislative period until January 31, 2022, which will not be elected until September 26th.
In other countries, it is good practice for new parliaments and governments to have the opportunity to fundamentally review foreign policy goals and strategies and to make changes.
This should also be open to the political decision-makers who will direct the foreign policy fortunes of the Federal Republic from autumn onwards.
After 16 years in the reign of Chancellor Merkel, a balance sheet will soon be drawn up for her foreign and security policy.
She took up office in 2005 when the Bundeswehr was already stationed in Afghanistan.
This reduces the extent to which the Germans hold them responsible for the operation in Afghanistan.
It would be charming if she went down in the history books as the one who not only inherited and passed on the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan, but also ended it while protecting her face.
