After years in the cockpits and in-depth recognition of the attack plans, Tal Kalman was elected the first general to serve as head of the Strategy and Third Division, or in other words - the Iranian commander-in-chief • On the nuclear deal: "We say yes to a strong and long agreement.
"The Iranian people are paying a heavy price for the regime's interest in going to the nuclear."
Kalman, this week
Photo:
Eric Sultan
The past year has been very good in terms of security. The small number of terrorist attacks and casualties gave a relatively high sense of security, and the intense preoccupation with Corona (and the elections) also pushed to the margins other issues that in the days when they were repaired would make headlines.
But the security challenges are here, and they are here to stay. The new government, when it is formed, will not shy away from dealing with them, especially in Iran. Behind the scenes, preparations are already underway for this marathon of discussions, which are mostly concentrated in the IDF, and within it - in the new wing established last year to address Iran and strategic issues. The
head of this wing, Tal Kalman, is one of the General Staff And exclusive - accurately reflect the threats and the possible response, including the military, but also contain a warning: refraining from dealing with problems may pose a strategic threat to the State of Israel.
2020, Kalman says, has been a very good year in the fight against Iran.
"I do not want to call it a year of turning, but it has been a year of significant change."
It began with the assassination of Qassem Suleimani, and continued with "a sequence of things that for the most part I obviously cannot relate to, which caused the balance to be positive, and even very positive."
And yet, Iran is far from surrendering.
"Iran is not a specific operational challenge, but a challenge above the military. It is a challenge to our perception of national security. We have a tendency in this issue to have a certain cynicism in recent years, stemming from the thought of putting Iran in the discourse for other things, but I really think it is dealing with a country. It has the potential to become a regional power, headed by an extremist regime that has set itself a real goal of destroying the State of Israel.It is not tomorrow morning, they look 30, 40, 50 years ahead, and want in a gradual process to push the State of Israel, weaken it, and eventually erase her".
Dealing with Iran, he says, is made up of four components.
The first is the extremist regime, "as long as it controls Iran, Israel has a very big challenge."
The second is the nucleus.
The third is the military intensification "which is close to a powerful capability."
And the fourth is the Iranian pursuit of establishment and regional influence, "which in a long-term process exploits areas of lack of governance and builds capabilities in them."
The challenge that all of this poses to Israel is unprecedented.
"The standard elements of warning, decision-making and defense are irrelevant to a country with 80 million people that is 1,000 kilometers away from you. It is a long-term strategic competition that requires us to think differently than against a country that is on our border."
Explain.
"In front of a country that lies on the border, I build the force, prepare for war, sometimes act in the IDF to thwart, and I maintain a very large intelligence grip with the intention of deciding the war.
In Iran, this is not a matter of decision.
It's a competition.
Therefore the components that need to be addressed are not just military.
They are also military, but also diplomatic, economic, intellectual and more.
That's the size of the challenge. "
Can Iran be defeated?
" When you are in strategic competition with a country, you are not going to a place of decision.
What you are trying to achieve is superiority at any point in time, a superiority that will achieve significant deterrence that will both create confidence and deter the other side from acting against you. "
Still, there was hope in Jerusalem and Washington - that the regime would collapse under sanctions.
" Strategic competition is not thinking tomorrow morning. But long-term.
It requires the synchronization of all national efforts, some of which are not managed by the IDF but by other bodies. The State of Israel has somewhere to go in this matter. "
This is exactly the process that Kalman has been leading for the past year.
"Together with the Mossad, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Atomic Energy Commission and other bodies, an orderly process is underway, at the end of which a concept of how to properly deal with the Iranian challenge in the long run will be formulated and submitted to the political echelon, and we will not always be synchronized."
What have you learned?
"We realized that all the components of the problem needed to be addressed.
It is impossible to look only at the nucleus, or only at the intensification, or only at the region.
You have to deal with everything.
In recent years, we have been very focused on the nucleus, which is of course the beginning of the delegation because it will be a different confrontation between Iran that has a nucleus and an Iran without a nucleus. "The
Iranian regime is interested in the nucleus, he says, first and foremost as a guarantee of stability. "After entering a nuclear arms race, Iran may be joined by other countries that want to acquire nuclear capability."
who will?
"I estimate that a large part of the countries around us will strive for a nucleus. Certainly those that have economic capacity."
Saudi Arabia?
The Emirates?
Egypt?
Turkey?
"All of these countries are candidates, yes. They are bothered by Iran just like us."
Contrary to public perception, Kalman believes that Israel's strategy in the last 30 years has actually succeeded, and as evidence - Iran does not yet have a nuclear capability.
The way to continue to reject this desire of hers well into the future is to make her realize that the price she is paying is great.
"The Iranian people are paying a very heavy price for the regime's interest in going to the nuclear. But I really believe that this is not a problem of Israel, but of the entire international community."
Therefore, he believes that in nuclear talks, Israel should focus only on the nuclear issue, and not include additional issues in the content.
"When we talk about a nucleus, we are only talking about a nucleus, not regional issues or intensification. It is not right to put all these things into the same agreement."
Why?
"Because the nuclear is the number one threat, in which we must achieve the maximum. With everything else we will know how to proceed. It is not that we do not demand that the international community address them as well, but the priority is clear. First of all, the nuclear."
Alongside this, Kalman is deeply concerned about Iran's conventional military buildup, which is "an issue we are missing out on."
This is not about intensifying tanks and artillery, but mainly about long-range missiles and rockets, most of which are accurate, cruise missiles, UAVs, advanced air defense systems and more. "Iran is not just producing for itself.
It feeds its patrons with accurate capabilities, cruise missiles, air defense systems to deal with the capabilities of the Israeli Air Force.
What is produced in Iran does not remain in Iran.
It is immediately in Syria and Lebanon, and later perhaps in Gaza as well. "
"We have excellent intelligence"
Kalman believes that Israel can influence the nature of the agreement to be signed with Iran.
The way to do this is through dialogue with the new US administration, which has already begun.
In the middle of the month, there was an extensive dialogue between the parties led by the National Security Headquarters, of which Shakelman and his men were a part.
"The first step is to align with them on the intelligence picture. Iran's 2021 nuclear program is not the nuclear program it had when the previous agreement was signed in 2015."
And do they agree with us?
"I think in very high percentages they see the situation as we do."
And can you understand the concern in Israel, given the fact that these are the same people who were involved in formulating the previous agreement?
"It's true that in some cases these are the same people, but it's not the same administration. In the meantime, this administration is living up to its promise. He came to hear, and he did not run for agreement. So I have a few months to try and influence the administration's policy. "They will not let Iran be nuclear. Now the question is what is the way to act in the face of the situation."
What are the things that Israel should insist on?
"I can not go into details, but by and large we say yes to an agreement that will be longer and stronger."
Israel's main insistence is expected to be on the duration of the agreement.
"If there is a return to the original agreement, in 2025 some of the restrictions on R&D and advanced centrifuges and other things will expire, and in 2031 the agreement will expire and Iran will be without sanctions, in an improved economic situation, and with very few restrictions on the nuclear program.
This is the problem in the previous agreement, and for us it is an unacceptable situation. "
What do you say to those who say that Iran is closer to a bomb today than it was under the agreement?
" We understand that the actions taken by Iran are reversible, and signal to the international community 'hold us and return to the agreement'.
It's not that Iran has run away from us and it is rushing to the core.
Beyond that, if we were under the agreement, the Iranian issue was not on the agenda at all.
In Biden's conception of national security, the Middle East ranks fourth or fifth.
"The United States is looking at other areas, and is looking to invest less inputs in our area. The withdrawal from the agreement has left the Iranian issue on the agenda very clearly."
Kalman believes that the chances of Iran holding secret components in its unknown nuclear program are very small.
"We have excellent intelligence, and also collaborations, but because it has happened to us once before - our strategy should be that it can happen to us again. I can ensure that the best efforts and means are invested to monitor and be in the picture with a goal not surprised, but because I do not have a hundred "I'm in intelligence, and I do not know how to look to the future, and assuming that it is indeed an existential threat to the State of Israel that we cannot tolerate, we also need relevant military tools."
Let's talk about the military option.
"I've been in this event for about 25 years. There have been years I have been in the cockpits, and I know the plans from the cockpit level and the tactical level, to the systemic and strategic level I am at today. Throughout the last decades it has always been in gear, in the early years. It went down to some extent, but in the last year we have entered fourth-fifth gear. "
So please ask if Israel has the ability to militarily thwart Iran's nuclear program.
To attack and destroy completely, as in Iraq in 1981 and in Syria in 2007.
"The answer is yes. When we build such capabilities, we build them to execute. It's not that there are not many strategic dilemmas because the day after Iran can return to the plan, but the capability exists. Unequivocally."
A military threat, he believes, must be part of the strategic components.
This is also the message that Israel is conveying in its dialogues in the United States and Europe. "We do not want to activate it.
Maybe when I was young I wanted to, but today I understand that this should be the last solution.
We should try to reach a solution in other, diplomatic ways, and I think that has a chance, but this tool is also important.
The Iranian leadership is looking strategically, long-term, and it is conducted in a calculated and careful manner.
We have already said that for them the nucleus should be their insurance certificate, so if they understand that it could endanger them - they will think again. "
War in another territory
Although Israel is building blue-and-white capabilities to attack Iran, he says, the road there is through cooperation.
“Without being pompous, in the last two years there has been a very significant change in our collaboration with the partnership, led by the US.
We have a relationship with her that has reached an extraordinary level of intimacy.
There have been operational events in the past year in which things have happened that were not there before, from intelligence collaborations to operative collaborations.
It happens because the Americans understand our common interest in curbing the Iranian challenge in the Middle East. "
Many in the defense establishment believe that instead of fighting with the Iranians over our definitions, we should move the war to their territory.
" One of the conclusions in the process we are now is that we need to strengthen this component from the actions that we do. "
largely, he believes, normalization agreements with the Gulf states do just that." I think the Iranian leader, his strategy is based on the borders of the State of Israel, rose this morning and is very troubled, because he sees potential for consolidation Israeli on its borders.
This is a huge change. "
And military activity?
" Moving some of the activity to areas outside the State of Israel is part of the matter.
It is certainly the right tool, we will need to know how to develop it. "
Does that mean that if things explode on our border, Iran will not be able to sit quietly on its soil?
" We will have to develop such tools.
Unequivocal.
When you are in competition with an intelligent, strategic, long-term player, you must act to influence his intentions.
To do that, we need to act in other places and in other ways. "
To win this confrontation, he warns, a power building is needed." For the citizen, the security situation is good overall, and Iran is far away, but since it is a challenge to our national security perception, building requires A permanent force, which has run for many years and can not depend on such and such agreements. "
And what will you tell the finance minister who will come here a moment after the election and demand cuts?
" I will explain the overall picture, and say that investing in other important areas such as education and health and welfare requires security stability. , And to achieve it requires long-term budgetary stability for the defense establishment.
When you work in sprints, everything is much more expensive.
When you plan for the long term and spread it out over the years, you can do things in a more intelligent way, and also at lower costs. "
Israel in "Security Paradox"
is 52 years old, married and a father of three, living in a moshav in the South.
He volunteered for a pilot's course and completed a combat course, and did a long route during which he was the commander of the first "Storm" squadron (F-16A), commander of Ramon and Hatzerim bases, commander of an air squadron and chief of staff.
In 2018, he was appointed head of the strategic division in the planning division, and last year he was appointed head of the new division responsible for Iran and strategy.
He continues to fly regularly (on the "mighty" plane - the F-35), and is expected to run for command of the Air Force next year.
More than once he finds himself at night staying in the Kirya, mainly for the benefit of another unknown activity in the space, which rarely makes headlines.
Most of it is being carried out in Syrian territory, where Israel is struggling to prevent the establishment of Iran and the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah. Kalman believes that despite the Israeli attacks, Iran has not abandoned its dream of establishment, but has had great difficulty doing so since Suleimani's assassination.
There is a learning competition going on all the time between us and them. "Is
there a chance to make them give up?
" They are in a different place than they planned to be, and that made them significantly update their plans.
But this is not a one- or two-year campaign, not even four.
It's a long-term event. "
And what needs to happen for them to give up?
" Just like in the nucleus, the solution is not just military.
Attacks are only one part of the strategy, but there should also be a diplomatic component that is currently lacking.
Assad is very dependent on the Iranians economically as well, and we have thoughts on how to take Syria to a state of end to the civil war without Iran being in it.
It is a complex event that must be conducted between the powers. "
One of the main threats on his desk is the" exact "issue: missiles and rockets (and not only) that can hit a target with great accuracy up to a few meters, and therefore pose a strategic threat to Israel's centers of gravity. Iran has been intensely involved in this area in recent years, distributing capabilities to its protégés - especially Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen.
"There is a tendency, which is a mistake, to talk about accuracy and Hezbollah in one breath," he says.
We are talking here about a technological trend that has become relatively simple and accessible to all around us.
The State of Israel is a small country, and the ability to be precise about a small country is a threat that we have defined as a serious strategic threat, which is one under the nucleus.
What many do not understand is the aggregate: it is not just Hezbollah.
This is what has been built in Syria, and perhaps in the future also in the Palestinian arena, and in Iraq and Yemen, and of course in Iran itself.
It's a very challenging attachment. "
What you are saying is that if there is a war in the northern arena, your job assumption is to fly at us accurate weapons from every possible place in the region.
" True.
That is why we are no longer talking about a northern campaign, but a campaign in the northeastern arena. "
Therefore, he says, the consideration of whether to initiate a counterattack in Lebanon against Hezbollah's precision project is complex, because it could degenerate into a regional campaign." "
Israel needs to define red lines beyond which it operates?
" Defining red lines is very problematic. "
Why? After all, you have defined red lines in the nucleus.
" Red lines are inherently worn out. .
The State of Israel knows how to provide solutions to very complex challenges, and I estimate that with our technology and capabilities we will be able to provide a solution to this complex challenge as well.
But as stated, this is not just a matter of Hezbollah but a broad regional problem, which must be in our strategic discourse with the Americans and others, because no one in the world is dealing with it.
We are talking about nuclear, chemical weapons, but we are not dealing with exactly that, and we must put it into the discourse. "
Let's talk about the upcoming elections in the Palestinian arena.
" This is an event that we are following very closely.
The State of Israel has decided not to intervene in the PA elections, but we are certainly concerned about the possibility of Hamas strengthening in Judea and Samaria.
The message we conveyed to everyone we talk to, and also to itself, is that this is a very dangerous path, in which it is taking a risk. "
What is the Israeli interest?
" The strengthening of Hamas in Judea and Samaria is a serious blow to Israeli interest, as well as Israeli security. ".
And what is the Israeli interest in Gaza?
"We are pursuing an interim strategy in Gaza, in which we have not yet determined for ourselves what the long-term solution is for us. Hamas currently controls the Gaza Strip, and our interest is to be weakened, restrained, deterred and limited by its military buildup. .
This is not a strategic plan.
It's crisis management.
"This is currently the policy, a policy that has incidentally managed to prevent quite a few crises in the last year and a half."
But is it right for Israel to have Hamas control Gaza?
"These are discussions that we will have to hold with the political echelon. There may be a long-term situation in which Hamas controls Gaza, but this requires it to change, to recognize the State of Israel. Fatah underwent such a process many years ago.
The likelihood that Hamas will do the same is not very high. "
In conclusion, he says, Israel is in the" security paradox. "On the one hand it is very strong and enjoys strategic superiority, on the other hand the threats to it only intensified." We are committed to security, to daily peace , But it is our duty to look at the long term as well.
There is no doubt that 2020 will end with a very positive strategic balance for the State of Israel. "
And how will 2021 end?
" I think that if we succeed in completing some more normalization agreements we will have potential for another Middle East, and as always a lot will depend on dynamics with Iran.
If we succeed in harnessing the international community to a longer and stronger agreement, we will be in a very positive situation. "