Interview with Tian Feilong: "Loyalty Waste" is just a kind spur of "One Country, Two Systems" is changing the way of life

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Written by: Wu Ting Jiang Liu

2021-04-07 07:30

Last update date: 2021-04-07 07:30

A hurricane about Hong Kong's electoral system reform has finally settled.

During this period, Tian Feilong, an associate professor at the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Institute of Advanced Studies and Law School, and a director of the National Hong Kong and Macau Research Association, said "loyal waste" was like a headshot, causing an uproar.

Many Hong Kong people who are dissatisfied with the governance ability of the Hong Kong governance team clapped their hands and praised them, believing that this seemingly simple and rude truth speaks out their dissatisfaction and aspirations; some mainland, Hong Kong and Macao scholars are quite critical of this, thinking this statement It should not be said by the mainland that some people from the Hong Kong establishment have come forward to refute Tian's improper use of words.

"Hong Kong 01" focused on the current electoral system reform, the issue of the governance capabilities of the SAR government brought out by the "loyal waste", and how the "One Country, Two Systems" approach is integrated, proactive, and proactive. It interviewed Tian Feilong.

Hong Kong 01: The overall perception of Hong Kong’s electoral system reform plan is tight and tight, from the nomination threshold of the Election Committee to the review and confirmation, and then to the Election Committee’s removal of the district council, the addition of the fifth sector, and the 432 seats in the Legislative Council. The plan and the dual-seat, single-vote system for directly elected districts all reflect that Beijing is strengthening the safety factor of its governance in Hong Kong.

In light of last year's "Hong Kong National Security Law," how should we understand the central government's overall thinking and logic for bringing chaos in Hong Kong?

Tian Feilong:

In fact, this series of

settling

chaos is the central government’s "combined boxing" type of rational response to Hong Kong’s political climate change. It is aimed at the amendments in 2019, and 2019 as one of the direct consequences of the amendments. District Council elections.

Based on these two points, the Central Committee believes that the original electoral system has loopholes and is insufficient to prevent anti-China forces from seizing power in Hong Kong.

At the same time, in the turmoil of the amendments, the central authorities have also seen that Hong Kong’s ability to autonomy is very limited. Hong Kong parliamentarians and civil servants cannot shoulder the political responsibility of "patriots ruling Hong Kong." They lack responsibility, dare not fight, and dare not adhere to principled positions .

Therefore, stimulated by the chaos in Hong Kong, the central government has rethinked and actively repaired the "one country, two systems" system.

This rethinking is more concentratedly reflected in the discussion on upholding and improving the "one country, two systems" system at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee.

Since then, we have seen that the Hong Kong opposition has ignored the central government’s deep anxiety and signals of institutional action, and has continued to advance the political process of complete autonomy, without any meaningful dialogue and communication, proposing a trilogy of seizure of power and "ten steps for real speculation." , Continue to wantonly trample and break through the central authority and the bottom line of "one country, two systems."

They want to make full use of the power and space granted to them by the Basic Law, as well as the so-called external forces, step by step to subvert Hong Kong’s constitutional order from the inside, create a constitutional crisis, introduce external intervention, and create an anarchy that Hong Kong cannot govern. In the end, the reactionaries profited from the chaos in Hong Kong, and then created the ultimate goal of so-called complete autonomy, and completed the "revolution of the times" with complete "political speculation" and decisive actions.

This is an extremist political line that is anti-state, anti-rule, anti-prosperity and stability. It is dubbed "democracy" and adopts a strategy of seizing power similar to Nazi logic that combines street violence and electoral mechanisms.

In fact, this threat will continue to exist in 2020 and directly point to the Legislative Council elections originally scheduled for September 2020.

Such focused political background incidents and their direct threats to system security have stimulated the central government to change the highly self-disciplined power exercise habits of the original "One Country, Two Systems", and begin to combine the power of comprehensive governance with the national security and elections in "One Country, Two Systems". Connect securely.

The central government considers to take the initiative to actively assume the governance responsibilities in the fields of national security and election security. The final plan or the result of its selection is the "Minato National Security Law" and the current election system reform. These are the two most important measures. hand.

But this is not all the actions taken by the central government to establish and improve the "one country, two systems" system. Beijing will play a "combined boxing."

Next, we will dig deeper and clean up the social soil or cultural soil that created the anti-China and chaotic Hong Kong forces in Hong Kong society. Therefore, future reforms will inevitably point to Hong Kong’s education, civil servants, and social and cultural fields, including the supervision of the media, etc. .

And this time the Patriots ruling Hong Kong basically avoided another area, that is, the judicial field, which involves Hong Kong's judicial independence.

The judicial field is not a special exemption zone for patriots ruling Hong Kong, but it is different from the legislative and administrative fields. How to maintain the common law status of Hong Kong and the principle of judicial independence, and at the same time enable the Hong Kong judiciary to identify and effectively protect the sovereignty and security of the country And development interests need a new system balance.

Zhang Xiaoming, deputy director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of China, went to Hong Kong to listen to opinions on reforming Hong Kong’s electoral system (photograph)

Hong Kong's judicial reform must overcome the past blind spots of the "state", incorporate appropriate forms and wisdom into the core elements of "patriots ruling Hong Kong", and shape Hong Kong's common law as an integral part of the "one country, two systems" system.

Although there is a national security law in the port area, Hong Kong's judicial system still needs to face reforms, including the improvement of judicial efficiency, judicial openness and transparency, justice in sentencing justice, judicial protection of public order, national law knowledge and ethics of judicial personnel, And the judicial philosophy and adjudication jurisprudence that are truly based on "one country, two systems", and so on.

The Department of Justice has been exploring and strengthening the training and application of national law knowledge for its legal officials, but there is still a lack of relevant mechanisms in the judicial management of Hong Kong courts.

In addition, there is also the issue of foreign judges (I used to call Hong Kong’s "guiding justice"). With the British threatening to stop the cooperation mechanism of foreign judges, how the Hong Kong judiciary explores the way of autonomy and self-reliance cannot be avoided.

Judicial independence does not mean a high degree of dependence on foreign judges. The localization of the judiciary under the Basic Law is the proper meaning of Hong Kong's judicial independence and judicial autonomy.

This requires local legal talents in Hong Kong to assume the main responsibility for jurisdiction and judicial governance.

We can study how British colonies such as Singapore achieved judicial localization and how to strengthen their position as a financial center institutionally, and learn from useful experience.

This barrier must be passed before Hong Kong's judicial independence can truly return to itself, back to the normal state and normal track of national law.

I think these aspects will be extended in the future. They constitute the main issues and points of action for a complete set of "One Country, Two Systems" 2.0 version.

Hong Kong 01: All parties in Hong Kong are now very concerned. How long will this cycle be?

One view is that after the combination of the National Security Law and the reform of the electoral system is completed, it is urgent to cut the mess and carry out drastic reforms from all aspects; but there are also views that it is not appropriate to "force" too eagerly and take Hong Kong people into consideration. Feelings and acceptance.

Tian Feilong:

I think this system adjustment should have an appropriate cycle, including the implementation of the National Security Law in Hong Kong society. The education of the national security legal system is actually very superficial. It has not been deepened or truly rooted in the hearts of the people. The new election plan requires There is still a cycle of transformation in Hong Kong society for the implementation of patriotism to govern Hong Kong. There is still a cycle of transformation to transform the institutional norms into complete recognition and compliance. You should not rush for quick success and quick gains.

This is a combination of holistic theory and key theory. From the perspective of comprehensive governance, it is realized that the "one country, two systems" system has a series of important joints to be opened up and important elements must be institutionalized. At the same time, it is necessary to prioritize and prioritize Hong Kong. Social affordability and Hong Kong’s role as a platform hub.

In this way, we can select and combine reform intensity and adjust the order of reform topics.

Hong Kong 01: Analyzing the electoral reform plan this time, not only can we see the central government’s distrust of the pan-people, of course, this is also expected. At the same time, it is impossible for the business community, the establishment and the Hong Kong government to sit back and relax.

In the business sector, the proportions in the electoral committee and the legislative council are obviously diluted; in the establishment, the seat layout is also being restructured; in the Hong Kong government, the central government does not authorize them to determine the various sectors and quotas of the electoral committee as in the past. Divide, but shoot directly.

What do you think of the central government's "all-out attack" approach?

What is the true attitude of the Central People's Government towards the pan-people, the business community, the establishment and the Hong Kong government?

Tian Feilong:

According to my own understanding, this reform is Beijing's review of the past "One Country, Two Systems" system, which reflects that the political representation of the elements of one country and one country is too low. Therefore, it has been more closely connected with national affairs or in relevant state departments. People in the relevant industries who play professional roles are grouped into the election committee as sectors, so the original proportions of the local establishment, local pan-people and even the business community are relatively limited.

This is from the perspective of the integrity of "one country, two systems" and the introduction of the dimension of one country by the central government, so that Hong Kong's democratic elections can be truly implemented within the framework of "one country, two systems", with balanced participation and avoiding excessive localization.

In Hong Kong's past election political ecology, this was rarely considered and deliberately avoided.

The Hong Kong establishment was defeated in the 2019 Hong Kong District Council elections.

The picture shows Li Huiqiong, chairman of the Hong Kong Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (middle), and her candidate bowed and apologized to supporters at a press conference.

(Associated Press)

Hong Kong 01: The key for Hong Kong in the next few years is whether good governance and good governance can be achieved and whether deep-seated contradictions can be resolved. The key to this is whether the entire society can transition from democratic issues at the political level to a focus on governance.

The National Security Law of the Port Area and the reform of the electoral system are the powers of the central government. The central government can act boldly and confidently, but in terms of governance, the central government can do very little. The main thing is to rely on Hong Kong people to govern Hong Kong, but as you said before Many people are actually "loyal waste." How should the central government face such contradictions in promoting Hong Kong's governance?

What are the grippers?

Tian Feilong:

This is an inherent structural contradiction that has always existed in power building and governance capacity building since the return of Hong Kong.

Hong Kong itself is an elite society. The power of patriotism and love for Hong Kong we usually talk about in the definition of politics, due to the complex influences and consequences of history and politics, is representative of all strata of Hong Kong society, including that industry leadership is actually Limited, of course they are also working hard to grow, but only relying on traditional establishment or patriotic and patriotic forces can hardly drive Hong Kong’s huge governance system and governance requirements, so that they often result in loyal people. Lack of ability, lack of knowledge and professionalism in handling matters.

At the same time, we have also seen that those who think they are capable and those who can solve problems appear disloyal and forget the ethics of political responsibility with the conceit and utilitarianism of the elite.

Therefore, between loyalty and talent, it is as difficult to have both as fish and bear paws. This will result in Hong Kong if the central government leaves it alone and allows Hong Kong to operate in its own way. The result will eventually be the breeding of anti-China and chaotic Hong Kong forces over time. The faction was squeezed and even spawned a two-faced faction, and the disloyal opposition faction gradually seized the leadership of the Hong Kong Legislative Council and government governance positions.

This is the problem that the central reform is trying to solve, because letting Hong Kong go is inevitably a side effect of governance.

However, everything may be overcorrected, too much is too late, the use of patriots to govern Hong Kong is too strict, the scope of restriction is too narrow, and it will lead to the lack of actual leadership of the governance team in Hong Kong society and lack of convincing foundation and ability. The problem to be solved is difficult to solve within the political and professional scope, and it will cause greater public grievances.

Therefore, the way of governance in Hong Kong is loyalty and meritocracy.

So how to solve the dislocation of loyalty and talent, and how to solve the problem of the gap in the ability of the management team, I think we need to start from two aspects.

On the one hand, the establishment itself should strengthen the training and construction of political talents. It should realize that the new system does not only affirm their loyalty and give them more political stage to show, but puts forward higher requirements on their abilities. There must be a sense of crisis, a sense of competition, and a higher requirement for the ability to serve Hong Kong and the country.

On the other hand, I think it is obviously impossible for the non-establishment faction to be killed with a single stick, or to block all the roads and spaces for political participation, but to guide transformation and organic integration.

The central government also said that patriots governing Hong Kong do not have the same color, but to implement it is to accommodate moderate pan-people and centrists. Among them, there are many capable people in a professional society and an elite society like Hong Kong. What they need to make up is Become loyal opponents and loyal centrists. They have to show the country their loyalty to the system so that the country can trust them to enter the governance system and assume positions of power.

Once the "political demon" of the non-establishment faction is solved, just like the curse is broken, the mind will be calm and open, and the talents can be used as desired.

Therefore, the non-establishment factions should sincerely appreciate the "liberating" effect of the new system on them, freeing them from local radicalism and external intervention, and returning to Hong Kong’s solid constitutional order and autonomous land, and in a different mood and upright. The political "living law."

Even once the issue of loyalty is resolved, their competitiveness in the electoral and governance system may be more prominent. If the trust of the country can be maintained, their political development space will be greater than before.

So in fact, it is focused on two aspects.

The biggest problem of the establishment is the crisis of ability, so it is necessary to improve the ability, while the biggest problem of the non-establishment is the problem of loyalty. To become a loyal opposition, a loyal center, and after solving the bottom-line standard problem of patriots, let more people Talents from all walks of life in Hong Kong enter the governance system and adopt a mechanism of selecting and appointing talents to inspire them, tolerate them, and affirm them.

This is the original intention and complete target expectation of this electoral system reform. Only in this way can we build a stronger, more loyal and capable governance team to accurately respond to and solve Hong Kong's livelihood demands and Hong Kong. Deep-seated problem.

At the same time, although many issues within the political scope need to be resolved by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government itself, within the framework of "one country, two systems," the central government has full supervision over all powers granted.

Therefore, the establishment of a sound supervision and accountability mechanism for the SAR governance system by the central government is obviously also an indispensable link in the improvement and promotion of Hong Kong’s governance in the next step.

Someone has to rate their performance, someone has to listen to the opinions of the people in Hong Kong, and some officials with a lot of public grievances must accept the supervision and accountability of the central government, and some have to dismiss classes and step down.

Such a stronger accountability system should also be added.

Through consideration of such comprehensive system elements, this reform is not a simple confirmation of loyalty, but a real Hong Kong version of governance modernization reform directed at the political goals of meritocracy.

Professor Tian Feilong made a speech at the seminar on "One Country, Two Systems: Historical Experience and Governance Challenges" (information picture)

Hong Kong 01: So the term "loyal waste" is a powerful bang, which wakes up many people who pretend to be asleep.

Tian Feilong:

Actually, I originally did it out of goodwill. First, I did not name any individual in the "loyal waste", and made a scientific analysis of a phenomenon. The second was to encourage and encourage them. It is a timely reminder of the different and higher expectations of the people from the central government to the Hong Kong people under the new political game. It is a very well-meaning guide, which is then misunderstood by some people.

I think that the misunderstandings are obviously inadequate. They have a guilty conscience about their past performance and cannot fully and correctly understand the normative intentions and requirements of the new system.

Hong Kong 01: All parties are now discussing whether Hong Kong will move towards the Singapore model, but Hong Kong learns from Singapore and faces two fundamental problems. One is how to establish a long-term mechanism for the governance team to be accountable to the people, and the other is how to establish a talent selection system. .

Regarding these two points, Singapore has involved, Lee Kuan Yew has also discussed, but the current Beijing reform has not yet been involved.

In your opinion, how likely is it that a comprehensive reform of the talent selection system for governing Hong Kong will form healthy competition within the "patriots governing Hong Kong"?

What is the biggest resistance?

At this level, what considerations and arrangements does the central government have?

Tian Feilong:

The crisis of Hong Kong's political talents is that Hong Kong public officials have not been able to mold themselves into governance talents that are truly suitable for "one country, two systems." This is a long-term pain point in Hong Kong's highly autonomous system.

This time, with the help of the patriots ruling Hong Kong, the electoral system reform, I think this issue is officially put on the agenda.

On the one hand, like the governance in ancient China, a sound governance system must be governed by both people and laws. So in this regard, whether it is an establishment or a non-establishment, it may have its own political talent training mechanism. And echelon.

On the other hand, the central government can also make certain arrangements for the training and improvement of the competence and quality of Hong Kong's administrative officials and civil servants, including legislators.

For example, civil servants in Hong Kong can have regular rotation exchanges with civil servants in the Greater Bay Area. By assuming corresponding administrative positions in the Mainland, they can learn about two different political cultures, management models, and governance mechanisms.

In addition, for high-ranking civil servants in Hong Kong, such as the Secretary-General, etc., they can be transferred to relevant national ministries and commissions, and some international organizations to train them, so that they can grow at multiple levels. Don't just confine themselves to Hong Kong and make their governance capabilities in the long term. Rolled up and cannot grow.

Therefore, the SAR government and the central government must find ways to open up the joints so that talents can roll and flow.

When they return to Hong Kong after these richer experience exchanges and improved abilities, I believe that their thinking will no longer be a frog in the bottom of the well, a view in a hole.

Hong Kong 01: Looking back now, the first white paper on "One Country, Two Systems" in 2014 and Xi Jinping mentioned in Hong Kong in 2017 that "No boats after Suzhou" are actually very critical nodes, but Hong Kong people either did not understand them. Understand, or selectively ignore.

In your opinion, in order for the people of Hong Kong to better understand and understand the thinking of the central government, at what level can some changes be made?

For example, the National Hong Kong and Macau Research Association recently hosted a seminar on the "14th Five-Year Plan" Strategic Planning and Hong Kong Opportunities, and invited people from all walks of life in the Mainland and Hong Kong. This was rare in the past, but the specific effects need to be observed.

Tian Feilong: The rule of Hong Kong by

patriots means that a new requirement is imposed on those who govern Hong Kong. The gap in knowledge of national laws and national knowledge must be filled.

In this regard, Hong Kong’s own education system, including the civil service education system, can make up for a part, but the initiative of relevant state departments can also fill a considerable part.

The requirements and system of political learning are very important experiences for the Chinese Communist Party to make progress and success in governance. It constantly strengthens political learning, builds consensus, and builds capabilities. This kind of political learning mechanism should also be formed in Hong Kong’s governance team. .

For example, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government may also consider forming a theoretical center group to carry out periodic learning. Authorities are invited to give lectures to the directors of the department to explain and exchange some of the country's major policies, global strategies, and Hong Kong-related arrangements face to face.

Regarding what the country’s considerations are, what are Hong Kong’s decisions, what are Hong Kong’s own problems and needs, there can also be some on-site communication.

Therefore, the SAR government must have a continuous theoretical learning mechanism. This is very important, and it is very important for it to go up and down. Such a learning mechanism is very important.

Does not study, does not read, lacks public opinion communication, considers himself a professional elite, but is willing to have a narrow theoretical vision, administrative experience is involuntary, overly dependent on procedures and conventions, repeatedly oversight of the country, public conditions and the current situation, lack of sound judgment and decision-making power, not only This has caused serious lag in Hong Kong’s governance culture and system, and has caused the central government’s trend of "autonomous laziness" once it cannot be governed, which does not meet the standard requirements of "one country, two systems" for qualified governors.

The learning mechanism can bring beneficial increments to the renewal of Hong Kong's governance.

At the same time, the Hong Kong democrats are also adapting to reforms and are also undergoing transformation. I noticed that the Central Committee of the Hong Kong Democratic Party adopted the establishment of the "Mainland and Political Affairs Select Committee", hoping to increase political analysis and narrative work related to the Mainland and strengthen the political situation To study and judge the ability of the central government, scholars should be invited to teach, and there should be fewer detours and fewer mistakes.

I think this is very good. Seizing the opportunity of system transformation is also a political new birth for these traditional pan-democrats.

They can take the initiative to shape and transform into a loyal opposition through this kind of political learning, so if they are willing, I would actually be happy to give them a few lessons to help them understand the complete principles and policies of the central government’s "one country, two systems". A more complete national legal knowledge and national governance knowledge, including the country’s international strategy.

Because if you don't understand this aspect, under "one country, two systems", what kind of politics can you participate in in Hong Kong?

How can thinking and behavior keep up with this era?

Apart from local speculation and collusion with foreign countries, which drags down Hong Kong's democracy and development, what else can it have?

Of course, these aspects also require a series of policy innovations and corresponding assessment mechanisms, focusing on the building of the talent team and the improvement of governance capabilities, and self-portrait as a "powerful patriot."

The CCP has its own strengths and experience, and some reasonable elements can be applied to Hong Kong officials, and this is actually the experience that is universally applicable to truly build a strong governance team.

Theoretical learning, exchanges with the mainland, and stricter cadre assessment and competition mechanisms, organic integration of ideals and beliefs with governance capabilities, and continuous growth are the strengths of "One Country" and the requirements of "Two Systems" (Hong Kong).

Hong Kong 01: Next is about "One Country, Two Systems".

From the standpoint of the central government, it is actually the one who is most worried and the least wanting to cause problems with "One Country, Two Systems", and also most hopes that "One Country, Two Systems" will be stable and far-reaching. "Once we die, it will not be Hong Kong's failure, but the central government's failure.

But from the perspectives of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Britain and the United States, they think that the central government just wants to change "one country, two systems" into "one country, one system," and it wants to let "one country, two systems" die.

This is ironic, but it is also a reality.

How do you understand the significance of "One Country, Two Systems" for China and the CCP?

Why is there such a different and ironic situation in understanding?

Tian Feilong:

"One country, two systems" is definitely not dead, why?

China's modernization process is still going on. The transformation of "one country, two systems" into "one country, one system" does not conform to the overall interests of China's modernization, nor does it conform to the basic strategic plan for national rejuvenation and globalization formulated by the Communist Party of China.

Because the CCP regards the success of "One Country, Two Systems" as part of China's renaissance.

However, "One Country, Two Systems" must be the "living law" defined by China itself. Therefore, it is not actually discussing the issue of its death method, but discussing the issue of its new living method. That's why some people mentioned the second return of Hong Kong and "one country, two systems." "" version 2.0, the second half of "One Country, Two Systems".

I myself statutory the National Security Law and the new election as a new constitutional moment of "one country, two systems."

What kind of understanding are these theoretical formulations trying to shape?

It means that "one country, two systems" needs to change the way of life.

The original method of "one country, two systems" struggles to a certain extent, and all parties lose out or even lose more.

Do you see who has benefited from the turmoil of the amendments?

The legislative turmoil completely negated many of the original optimistic assumptions of "one country, two systems," including the authority of the rule of law in Hong Kong. No one has benefited from the legislative turmoil.

If so, it may be that Tsai Ing-wen has gained some and the United States has also gained some, but the gains in the United States were immediately offset by some losses under the National Security Act, and even the losses outweighed the gains.

As for the "one country, two systems" exchange method, it makes Hong Kong society seriously think about what is meant by one country?

What is two systems?

How can the two systems be integrated with one country and become a whole?

To be honest, the original living method of "one country, two systems" itself is half-dead, because the well water does not violate the river water is two skins, the original living method is just a way to maintain the status quo, it is not a truly organic life display of "one country, two systems" .

So a different way of working is that "one country, two systems" truly becomes a whole and an organism, so that no matter what kind of cooperative or conflicting relationship between China and the West, Hong Kong will always stand with the country, always advance and retreat with the country, and with the country. China is the same political community with a shared future.

And for the construction of such an organism and community, only the central government can assume responsibility. Hong Kong has neither the will nor the ability, or even the authority to integrate "one country, two systems."

But how can Hong Kong and the international community adapt to the more vigorous method of "one country, two systems" under the dominance of the state?

The key lies in how to treat the Communist Party of China, how to treat the Chinese model, and the basic fact that China continues to rise.

The understanding of "one country, two systems" in Hong Kong and the international community has always been rigid, just two skins, that is, "one country, two systems" is not really treated as a living thing.

So what the central government considers is how "one country, two systems" can overcome the crisis and live a wonderful whole, an organic blooming life.

The Western world, including the Hong Kong opposition, is considering how "one country, two systems" is half-dead for a long time, and then only retains the interconnection between Hong Kong's one system and the West, making Hong Kong a long-term "political dominated by anti-China chaos in Hong Kong and disloyal dualists." The "Happy Forest" acts as a "new Cold War pawn" and a base for subversion when needed by Western forces. This is morally and politically unjustified. It not only harms national sovereignty, security and development interests, but also suppresses and undermines the democracy of the Hong Kong people. Rights and development rights.

Therefore, speaking responsibly, it is the Central Government that truly understands the life principle of "One Country, Two Systems," and it is the Central Government that maintains and optimizes the life of its system.

The Hong Kong National Security Law and the New Election Law are both emergency legislation in a state of crisis and protective legislation to safeguard the security of the "one country, two systems" system.

On July 1, 2019, Hong Kong anti-revision demonstrators stormed the Legislative Council.

(Profile picture)

Hong Kong 01: This is indeed the case. A few years ago, we emphasized the passive, differentiated, and passive "One Country, Two Systems". It is urgent to switch to an active, integrated, and active "One Country, Two Systems."

The power to create special administrative regions and establish the special administrative region system lies with the central government. According to the logic of unifying powers and responsibilities, Hong Kong has come to this day, and the central government is indeed responsible for the test of "one country, two systems" today.

As we have always emphasized before, in the past, the "river water does not violate the well water" thought of governing Hong Kong itself has great problems. The development and prosperity of Hong Kong have repeatedly concealed deep-seated structural contradictions.

The return of Hong Kong’s sovereignty is not the end of the problem, but the beginning of a series of more critical issues such as how to effectively manage it. It is thought that everything will be fine after Hong Kong’s return, and great risks and hidden dangers have been planted from the beginning.

Tian Feilong: The

central government has carried out serious self-reflection and self-examination, which I think is reflected in the 2014 white paper "One Country, Two Systems in Hong Kong".

In 2014, the white paper wrote a lot. The most important new concept is the power of comprehensive governance. This is a reflective concept in itself. It shows that the central government has not managed what should be done before, and has not done what it should do. Therefore, there must be a system, Make-up lessons on policy.

Then, the turmoil of the amendments drove the central government to conduct deeper or more painful reflections.

In addition to the Hong Kong National Security Law and this electoral system reform, the central government also keenly recognizes that there is indeed a deep-seated economic and people's livelihood contradiction in Hong Kong society.

Hong Kong’s distribution issues, youth development issues, class equality issues, social justice issues, etc.

Therefore, after the governance system is established, the next step is obviously to solve the deep-seated problems of Hong Kong society, to make Hong Kong society more fair, to make people of every class more hopeful and energetic, and to extend the system dividends in "One Country, Two Systems" to cover All sectors.

Regarding these central authorities, in fact, they will continue to review and do it.

In this process, the central government should shoulder a full and proactive responsibility.

Moreover, the central government does not evade problems, is not afraid of contradictions, nor is it afraid of external sanctions and intervention. Instead, it has always proceeded from the fundamental interests of "one country, two systems" itself for the country and Hong Kong, to set things right, and to implement precise policies.

I believe that such a basic style of governance, or that Xi Jinping’s active role in "one country, two systems" in the era of Xi Jinping, will continue. This will contribute to Hong Kong’s social reconstruction, economic development, adjustment and improvement of people’s livelihood, and integration into the country’s development. The overall situation is a very favorable atmosphere and signal.

Hong Kong 01: In an interview with us, the former chairman of the Hong Kong Legislative Council Jasper Tsang said frankly that Beijing had a big myth about Hong Kong before 1997. He believed that Hong Kong’s governance system at that time was extremely good, so when drafting the Basic Law, it is best The set that worked in Hong Kong at that time was transferred to the Basic Law, and it was enough after the reunification.

In addition, they believe that Hong Kong’s democracy is extremely good, so there is no dispute that Hong Kong must follow the path of democratization after the return. The dispute is only about speed. Therefore, the central officials also pointed out that the Sino-British Joint Declaration did not mention the word universal suffrage, but The Basic Law states that the Chief Executive shall be elected by universal suffrage, and all the seats of the Legislative Council shall be elected by universal suffrage. Everyone has the same beliefs. Of course universal suffrage is good, and democracy is of course good.

Combining the myths and "lessons" before the reunification, how can Hong Kong better transition from its insistence on democracy to the improvement of governance efficiency in effectively solving economic and people's livelihood issues?

Tian Feilong: When

Hong Kong returned to China in 1997, the whole country was in a very unconfident situation. At the same time, the reform and opening up were more unilaterally dependent on Hong Kong and the West.

So at that time, most of our knowledge about capitalism, modernization, and globalization relied on Hong Kong to understand and digest.

At that time, the status of Hong Kong was extremely high. This also caused many people in Hong Kong to look down on the mainland, lack respect for the country, and even lack a deep understanding and recognition of one country in "One Country, Two Systems". This resulted in the connotation of "One Country, Two Systems". Many misunderstandings and misunderstandings.

Today, I think that the central government has already been highly confident, and its understanding of the development law of "one country, two systems", the way in which contradictions are handled, and its best effects are becoming more and more scientific and mature.

With the understanding of "one country, two systems" becoming clearer, they also know what to do and what not to do, and they also pay attention to overcoming the mistakes and policy biases made by simple utilitarianism in the past.

Looking back today, both the Hong Kong-British system and the universal suffrage democracy in Hong Kong have their limitations.

First, the British Hong Kong system itself has solidified a lot of the interests of the British suzerain country or British agents. If the British Hong Kong system and the British Hong Kong civil service system are copied as a whole, there will of course remain traces of the original British governance. Among them, the good aspects can certainly maintain Hong Kong's continued prosperity and stability, which is recognized by the West; the bad aspects will also evolve into confronting the country and undermining the "one country, two systems" factor.

Therefore, we must divide it into two and analyze the Hong Kong-British system dialectically.

The second is universal suffrage. Because Hong Kong’s universal suffrage is not an independent political body, it cannot be arbitrary and has no prerequisites. Instead, it must be based on the Basic Law and national security.

At the same time, universal suffrage is not a panacea. It can cure all diseases. Universal suffrage must be based on the rule of law and national security. At the same time, Hong Kong should be considered as a balanced participation in a capitalist society. The leadership and contribution of elites in an elite-led society should be considered together. .

Otherwise, Hong Kong will also move towards populism and over-welfare, and it will be infected with the political correctness and populization of the current European and American societies, which will counteract the vitality, prosperity and stability of Hong Kong.

Now it is indeed necessary to gradually use good governance to reflect on the original myths about universal suffrage democracy, and regard universal suffrage democracy as a link and element of a good political system, rather than as the only criterion for governance testing.

Regard direct elections as a reference factor for democracy, not the whole of democracy.

These reflections are commendable and come at the cost of chaos. They are a more mature and complete understanding of the modern governance system and the principles of democratic norms, and are basically reflected in the current thinking of the central government in governing Hong Kong, especially the electoral system reform this time. among.

Getting rid of Western myths and dependence, exploring the democratic and good governance of Hong Kong that truly fits "One Country, Two Systems", stimulating patriotic identification and new momentum for development, and rebuilding social justice for reconciliation and unity are the key to the second half of "One Country, Two Systems."

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