Anne Cheng, holder of the Chair of Intellectual History of China at the Collège de France, edited with Éric Vigne the collective volume entitled
Penser en Chine
, which appeared in Gallimard's “Folio-Essais” collection in 2021
.
FIGAROVOX. - Everything is first and foremost a story of ideas. This is what you explain with the proliferation in China, especially in academia, of the notion of tianxia ("China-world" or "Empire-world"). What does that mean ? Are we experiencing the "
Chinese moment in world history
"?
ANNE CHENG.
- When one considers the intellectual history of China, one has to take a long-term view, not - as one tends to believe commonly - because there would be an "eternal China", but because a number of concepts and notions, which relate in particular to political thought, are of ancient origin and have known a long development over the centuries. This is the case, for example, with the modern notion of “revolution” (in Chinese geming 革命) which dates back to that of the change of dynastic mandate in antiquity. Another example is that of tianxia 天下 which literally means "under the sky" and which appears frequently in pre-imperial sources to designate what we would call "the world", before acquiring a more political connotation with theestablishment of the first centralized empire in the 3rd century BC. Until its final fall at the dawn of the twentieth century, the Chinese empire referred to itself as tianxia. However, it is this notion of "China-world" that certain ideologues of Beijing would like to bring up to date by imagining a new world order rethought in Chinese terms and carried by the current rise in power of a China which would regain. thus the centrality proper to the “Middle Empire” which it had lost in the face of Western supremacy in the 19th century.is this notion of "China-world" that certain ideologues of Beijing would like to bring up to date by imagining a new world order rethought in Chinese terms and carried by the current rise in power of a China which would thus find its own centrality. to the “Middle Empire” which it had lost to Western supremacy in the 19th century.is this notion of "China-world" that certain ideologues of Beijing would like to bring up to date by imagining a new world order rethought in Chinese terms and carried by the current rise in power of a China which would thus find its own centrality. to the “Middle Empire” which it had lost to Western supremacy in the 19th century.
The Communist regime thus arrogates to itself the exclusive merit of having "liberated" China and, in doing so, of having restored it to its imperial status and thus of having thus re-established the continuity of the great Chinese civilization which dates back 5000 years
Anne Cheng
China is witnessing a proliferation of studies and stories relating to its national history. Are they being built against Europe, accused of being "evil", notably by being at the origin of Chinese difficulties in the 20th century (by missing the train of modernization, for example)?
I am not sure that China has ever been accused of being "evil", but we can understand from the foregoing that the imposition of Western modernity has taken place in China, as elsewhere, in violence and violence. suffering and at the cost of a strong feeling of alienation. But what we are currently witnessing is a paradox: the power in place finds it opportune and convenient to seize the theme of what it calls "the century of humiliations", those suffered at the hands of the Western colonial powers (including the Japan) between the mid-19th century (with the Opium Wars) and the mid-20th century (i.e. the victory of Mao's troops over those of Chiang Kai-shek in 1949). The communist regime thus arrogates to itself the exclusive merit of having "liberated" China and, in doing so,to have restored its imperial status to it and to have thus re-established the continuity of the great Chinese civilization 5000 years old - a sizeable paradox for an ideology which proclaims itself based on revolutionary rupture! But claiming to be an “eternal” essence and a Chinese “otherness” has the advantage of countering the universality of human rights with culturalist arguments.
The Confucius Institute is "
a Chinese government agency that has partnered with a growing number of universities and schools around the world
." These institutes are described as "
malicious
" by Marshall Sahlins. How are they points of support for promoting the political influence and soft power of the People's Republic beyond borders?
With the "rebirth" of Confucius since the 1980s, we happily continue in the paradox. Let us remember how Confucius has been the prime target of anti-traditionalist attacks throughout the last century, from the May 4, 1919 movement to the campaign against Confucius and Lin Biao at the height of the aptly named Cultural Revolution. , which finished destroying what could still remain of classical culture. And now the old Red Guards, after having spent their youth in "
breaking Confucius
", put him back, now that they are in power, on a pedestal both literally and figuratively to the point of making him the icon par excellence of Chinese national and civilizational identity. Confucius thus resumes the service to export the image of"Harmony", from "
luxury, calm and pleasure
"that China wants to project of itself into the world and which serves as a soft varnish to cover the reality of the very hard power of its strategy of economic and geopolitical power in all directions of the" new silk roads "...
Intellectuals have long been used to the very subtle art of indirect, allusive and metaphorical discourse which allows them to express their ideas without immediately drawing the wrath of censorship and repression.
Anne Cheng
David Ownby speaks of "the
borders of the possible in China
": does this mean that there is a certain freedom of expression, even limited?
David Ownby speaks, in his presentation of Qin Hui's intellectual journey, of “the
frontiers of the possible in China
”. Qin Hui, born in 1953 shortly after the establishment of the People's Republic by Mao Zedong in 1949, made his career at the prestigious Tsinghua University in Beijing. It is emblematic of many contemporary intellectuals who are products of communist China marked by Marxist-Leninist ideology, but also by the trauma of the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, then by the tragic outcome of the movement. student crushed in blood in Tian'anmen Square in June 1989. As intellectuals, many of them do not just play the advocates of the regime and some are even quite critical,while being perfectly aware of "
borders of the possible
”, that is to say of the red line (but invisible) of“
how far we can go too far
”.
They have long been trained in the very subtle art of indirect, allusive and metaphorical discourse which allows them to express their ideas without immediately drawing the wrath of censorship and repression.
The book delves into the question of the relationship between intellectuals and the state. How do knowledge production regimes and the position of intellectuals in society inform our understanding of China?
The case of a Qin Hui clearly shows that, even if it is still possible to "
think in China
", At least for a few and according to certain Straussian-type strategies", the influence exerted by intellectuals on society is very limited, not only because it is closely watched and controlled, but also because it is the result of multiple and complex negotiations, even of a sort of implicit pact between the intellectual world and the authorities. Today it is permissible to express opinions and publish them on all kinds of subjects, as long as they do not affect the hegemony of the Party-State. But the field of possibilities nowadays tends to shrink like a skin of sorrow as China wants to impose its unique and one-sided vision on the whole world, starting with all the points that try to resist it.
What does the renaissance of religion reveal in contemporary China?
The question is complex and impossible to deal with in a few lines. Admittedly, the reappearance in broad daylight of religious practices, after a long process of secularization which began more than a century ago and after the increasingly fierce repression exercised by the communist regime since its establishment, can be interpreted as a sign of some liberalization. But it is just as much the obvious sign of the failure of the communist ideology in its attempt to form "the new man" and to mobilize society and the youth around supposedly revolutionary ideals. This is probably what explains why the current power is constantly divided between the will to channel, even to exploit, certain religious currents and to suppress them.others who seem potentially subversive to him. As Ji Zhe explains so well in his description of the current status of Buddhism in China, religious forms and practices proliferate in multiple directions and must engage in complex negotiations with the authorities to exist and test the limits of the possible.
It makes you wonder if the Chinese giant would not end up falling because of the monsters that it would have itself generated.
Anne Cheng
You speak of a tension between the official discourse which limits the Chinese economy by advocating a "
socialist path
" and a temptation to open up with work of liberal orientation.
Is convergence possible?
I do not know whether to speak of convergence or divergence, the best being to refer to the article by Nathan Sperber on what he calls “
state capitalism
”.
". Admittedly, the apparent oxymoron represented by the famous formula of "socialist market economy" did not fail to create a tension between two terms which were thought to be contradictory, not to say incompatible, but to the chagrin of some and to everyone's surprise, said tension did not result in a burst, but on the contrary in a rather operational and efficient mode of operation. But today we are seeing an increase in internal tension in this system which, after having placed all the power of the Party-State in the development of ultra-capitalist type initiatives, is currently having to repress them with the same iron fist (we think of the recent and brutal disgrace of Jack Ma at the head of Alibaba and many others). VS'is to wonder if the Chinese giant would not end up falling because of the monsters which it would have itself generated?
What have been the effects of the global health crisis on the image that China has tried to forge?
Of course, China, which was the starting point of the pandemic in which we have been drowned for a year and a half, began by wanting to cover up the affair, then make people forget that it was the origin. It can now afford the luxury of ironising the often pathetic, even catastrophic, management of the health crisis by most states, even among the most prosperous, and thereby boasting about its own methods of authoritarian governance which have made it possible to curb (at least until now) the spread of Covid-19. The real irony in this story is, on the one hand, that the famous soft power so sought after by the Chinese authorities has spread around the world in the form of a virus and that, on the other hand,the rest of the world realized on this occasion of its almost total dependence on China, in particular as regards the means of protecting itself against the aforementioned virus ...
Thinking in China
, edited by Anne Cheng and Éric Vigne, Gallimard, coll. “Folio-Essais”, 2021, 560p., € 10.30. Gallimard