The Afghan territory is bordered by six other states: in the far northeast by China, in the north by Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, in the west by Iran, in the east and in the south by Pakistan.
Borders remain the site of all paradoxes, for the interests at play are generally too important for ideologies to prevail over more pragmatic considerations.
Afghanistan's borders are no exception to this rule.
The Taliban have started their offensives on provincial capitals and now control three in the north.
They now occupy more than half of the Afghan territory and a large part of the external borders.
For the six border countries, the time has come to establish different strategies with a view to a total conquest of power by the Islamist group.
Read also: Afghanistan: three new northern provincial capitals in the hands of the Taliban
Chinese realism
On either side of a common 76-kilometer border, two opposing visions of each other should logically oppose each other.
China persecutes Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang.
A short distance away, the Sunni Taliban fundamentalists find themselves at the gates of power in their country, after several military successes in recent months.
For a diplomat from a state that considers religions as superstitions to dialogue with the number two in an Islamist movement and in favor of the establishment of the Sharia, it is because a higher consideration has pushed them to do so.
Such a meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and the Taliban mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar did indeed take place on July 28.
For China, “realpolitik” is essential in this Afghan issue.
These talks are aimed at preserving the long-term economic interests of its power.
The Islamist group, in power in Afghanistan until the American intervention in 2001, is still in search of international legitimacy and has logically seized this outstretched hand.
In order to appear as a viable alternative and to level out its bloody and retrograde image, the spokesman of the Taliban thus assured China that "
Afghan soil would not be used against the security of any country whatsoever
" according to a statement made to AFP.
With these negotiations, the Afghan combatants wish to protect themselves from any foreign intervention.
To read also: Renaud Girard: "In Afghanistan, the cold realism of the Chinese"
Chinese diplomacy has recognized that the Taliban remain "
a crucial political and military force in Afghanistan
."
Wang Yi then called on the movement to
“play an important role in the process of peace, reconciliation and reconstruction in Afghanistan.
"
The double interest for China in securing the Sino-Afghan border is to avoid the spread of a terrorist center in Xinjiang, and to preserve its economic interests.
Within the framework of the New Silk Roads project, a trade-friendly Afghanistan would be a major asset for the Chinese influence strategy.
In Central Asia, Russia is watching
The Middle Kingdom is not alone in worrying about its Afghan border.
Three Central Asian countries share their borders with this unstable neighbor: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
In the north, these former entities of the Soviet bloc are still sponsored by Russia.
If the Taliban manage to establish their power definitively, "
the threat to Central Asia will not come directly from them but from groups which are affiliated to them, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, or the Jamaat Ansarullah
", analyzes Mélanie Sadozaï .
“
These groups are made up of many Central Asian nationals who have ambitions against their state of origin. For Central Asian leaders, these individuals are terrorists who can gain in power by benefiting from the support of a Taliban government, swell their ranks, accumulate equipment and cross borders to carry out attacks at home
, ”explains the specialist in the INALCO.
Russia has already reaffirmed its military support for regimes in the region. For Putin, the stake is simple: to prevent the emergence and infiltration of terrorist groups in his area of influence. On August 5, Russia kicked off joint military maneuvers with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan near the Tajik-Afghan border.
In addition to the security aspect, the other pitfall on which these countries of the northern border may come up is that of the suspension of economic exchanges.
These three nations export goods and electricity to Afghanistan.
If the Taliban take power, "
the governments of Central Asia will have to officially recognize this regime in order to continue these exchanges, which is impossible since the international community will not do it
", affirms Mélanie Sadozaï.
"
These countries will not want to alienate three quarters of the States of the planet, in particular Tajikistan which lives on international aid
", continues the specialist.
Iranian fears
Beyond the western Afghan border, the Shiite regime in Iran has never hidden its hostility to Sunni Taliban extremists.
But since the progress of recent months, the mullahs' regime has been trying to procrastinate.
The latter had already started talks in order to avoid open conflict with this adversary at all costs.
Iran's position does not deviate from that of other great powers like Russia or China.
Having always criticized the American presence in Afghanistan, Iran is now calling for the composition of an inclusive government that would take into account the Taliban forces.
For Bayram Balci, researcher at Sciences Po, the opposition between Iranian Shiites and Sunni Taliban should be put into perspective.
“
Today, the Iranians prefer to deal with the Taliban.
They are no longer “theology students”, it is a puritanist movement obsessed with going back to basics.
The situation is not the same as it was twenty years ago, the context and the people have changed.
I don't think the Taliban will make the mistake of supporting international terrorism again.
"
As its immediate neighbor, Iran increasingly fears a massive wave of refugees.
Iran already has more than 3 million Afghan refugees on its territory.
According to the authorities, several thousand Afghan exiles have already been installed in camps on the border between the two countries.
Tehran is also alarmed at the potential repercussions for the Shiite populations of the region if the Taliban came to an end, in particular the Hazara minority.
Pakistan: the big winner?
On the Durand Line, the name given to the 2,430 km border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, work to build long fences and barbed wire is almost complete.
On both sides, relations between the Afghan government and the Pakistani authorities have deteriorated considerably for several weeks.
"
Relations between Imran Khan and Ashraf Ghani have become very bad, because Kabul accuses Islamabad of promoting the Taliban push inside his country,
" said Jean-Luc Racine, a specialist in the region at the CNRS.
A return of the Taliban to the head of Afghanistan would offer important levers of influence for Pakistan. “
All countries that are interested in Afghanistan have an interest in getting closer to Islamabad. In the event of a Taliban victory, it is indisputable that Pakistan forged a close relationship with the Islamist movement from the start,
”explains the emeritus research director at CNRS.
Until 2001, Pakistan was one of the only countries to recognize the legitimacy of the Islamist regime in power in Afghanistan.
Today, Islamabad's strategic objective is simple for Jean-Luc Racine: “
He wants to prevent a regime favorable to India from gaining a foothold in Kabul because Pakistan fears being caught in a pincer movement.
It is at the heart of geopolitical reflection.
"
In this context, a Taliban victory would make Pakistan a key player for the countries of the region.
Russia and China have also understood the potential leverage that Islamabad represented.
However Jean-Luc Racine warns: “
with Islamabad, there is always this risk of hubris. We do not often measure what can be dangerous for the general situation. If there were to be a revival of Daesh in Afghanistan, for example, it would be a threat, including for Pakistan.
"