09/18/2021 22:00
Clarín.com
Opinion
Updated 09/18/2021 10:00 PM
Perhaps behind the tremendous political and institutional crisis that Argentina is experiencing, a myth that began to be built since 2011 is also being destroyed: that of the superiority of Cristina Fernández
over the average of the leadership
.
That perception took almost the form of apology when in 2019 he surprised everyone with a challenge to political order and common sense. He nominated Alberto Fernández as a candidate. It was relegated to a presumed secondary role, being the undisputed leader and owner of the majority of the votes.
The maneuver was undoubtedly successful. It served for the Frente de Todos to oust Mauricio Macri from power. It was an imaginative tactical move that in no way consolidated his status as a
strategist or visionary that he was intended to be awarded
. The evidence is in sight. That device is seriously hacked after the resounding defeat at PASO. The truce imposed with the improvised recomposition of the Cabinet
appears precarious
. That construction of the system was very useful for an electoral fight. It does not serve to govern, much less even in adverse conditions.
Nor should it come as a surprise. There are two reasons that explain it. In her course in power since 2007 (where she never won a legislature), the current vice president also
marked her career with resounding failures
. One was the appointment of Amado Boudou as a companion in 2012. It left everyone speechless. No one is unaware of what happened next. Another was the anointing of Aníbal Fernández to contest the governorship of Buenos Aires against María Eugenia Vidal.
The decomposition in which the official coalition is plunged by the dispute between the vice president and Alberto uncovers the other issue. Alliances in Argentina have proven effective in gaining power.
Not to exercise its administration
. The example is now the Front of All. He knew how to be at the time Together for Change. Although their internal fights between 2015-19, compared with the present ones, have been almost those of altar boys in a temple.
Nobody knows - perhaps only she - what global things she mused when she decided to enthrone Alberto. He had two consciences: that he could not be at the head of any formula due to the rejection that his figure generates in a large majority; that he had to swell the army of faithful (La Cámpora and the ultras of different wood) to take advantage, as happened, in a polarized election. On the other hand, it concealed in a nebula the degree of autonomy that it was willing to grant the President for its management.
The distribution of the Cabinet, the occupation with leaders of the main State savings banks, its dominance in the areas linked to the Judicial Power (which triggered the first crisis with former Minister Marcela Losardo), the control of the Senate and the official bloc in Deputies Through his son, Máximo Kirchner, and the appropriation of Buenos Aires with Axel Kicillof were signs, from the beginning, that Alberto would govern as a besieged president.
In this long year and a half, Alberto and Cristina composed a simulation.
The vice president repeated more than once that the decisions rested with the President.
This, to ingratiate himself, always said that he used to consult her a lot.
The letter that Cristina made public
swept away all that story
.
It was an ultimatum for the Government to take the course it wants.
An unmistakable approach to a
palace coup.
How could the public admonition to Alberto be interpreted in any other way to honor his decision to have nominated him as a candidate?
How, in addition, the mention that it would not be respecting the will of the people?
It would be at that point where the crisis of the Frente de Todos
stopped being only internal to become an institutional matter.
As he well described in his letter, Cristina's displeasure did not stem from the electoral defeat.
It was the product of an accumulation
. He pointed out that during this year he had 19 work meetings in Olivos with the President. In all, as he said, he raised his dissent. This text is contradicted by some decisions that it allowed to transcend in the middle of the storm. All critical notes fell on economic policy. That is, about Martín Guzmán. But he called the economy minister to assure him that he had never asked for his resignation.
Another striking point of the epistle was the cruelty with the former presidential spokesman, Juan Pablo Biondi. I would talk about a lot of oddities. Is it normal for the most powerful leader in the country to use a public text to address a spokesperson in a moment of deep crisis? There are proportions that Cristina always misses in a state of fury. That would not be as disturbing as another sign: the lack of understanding also in secondary aspects that he has with the President.
The defeat produced an outbreak in the Government and the Frente de Todos. The gunpowder had been spread long before. Otherwise, not many things that happened in the public light and in the discretion of the offices would not be explained. The initial evaluation that Máximo Kirchner made in front of a faithful group was lapidary: "If the economy is bad and you add Alberto's political nonsense, there should be no surprise," he lamented. Cristina's son
never forgave those photos of the Olivosgate embarrassment
.
No one could certify if those words were a prologue to later events that undoubtedly tried to saw off the President. Nothing seemed casual, everything appeared orchestrated. The resignation of Eduardo De Pedro at the request of Cristina and his back to Alberto was the first step in destabilizing the Cabinet. The vice president and the minister were offended by the public and journalistic interpretation of the existence of a palace coup. The architect would have been Biondi, according to Cristina's brain process.
The explanation about that offense is curious. Understandable in that world that assumes itself progressive. How to accuse De Pedro as a coup leader who suffered a tragedy (the loss of his kidnapped parents) during the military dictatorship? Was the interpellation. It would be good if they explained what one thing has to do with the other. No disgrace, however tremendous, grants lifetime immunity for public and private conduct.
That operation of sawing the President had another chapter of theatrical outlines. Suddenly, Buenos Aires deputy Fernanda Vallejos "leaked" audios with insolent words towards the President and Guzmán. Vallejos excused himself. The maneuver continued with other offensive audios. They were not the product of an outbreak of anger. They would have responded to a programming:
the assemblage of the words and the coherence of the story denote this
. The vice president was totally silent on the vituperation of her ward.
The ruling coalition, like the apparatus of power, is now
damaged to its foundations.
Kichnerism was buckled with its boss, Cristina. Alberto stayed with his devalued friends and hunted for support and loyalties.
Sergio Massa walked with one foot on each shore
because his political volume does not give him the right to any option. "If I appear too close to Alberto, the K's crucify me," he explained. "If I leave it alone, the President would be in danger of falling," he closed. It has other weak sides. His Minister of Transportation, Alexis Guerrera, Cristina would not see well either, due to the apparent under-execution of the area's budget.
The President carried the resistance as far as he could. "Possibility was imposed," confessed one of its sides. An emergency Cabinet was rearmed which, for various reasons, makes its viability difficult. De Pedro, the Interior Minister who started the offensive against Alberto could not be displaced. How to live with a potential fragotero ?. The return of Aníbal as Minister of Security was thought with internalist logic: to neutralize the irruptions that Sergio Berni, his peer in Buenos Aires, usually has. That need, perhaps, prevented us from gauging this step in the face of society:
Aníbal is one of the leaders with the worst social weight.
He never returned from the debacle in the Province. It was hidden in the Fiscal Carboniferous Deposits (YCF).
The President exhibits as a reward for his presumed strength the continuity of Santiago Cafiero in the cabinet.
Now in the Chancellery.
That exhibition reveals two things: contempt for international relations;
the improvisation with which the renovated Cabinet was cooked.
Felipe Solá learned of his dismissal when he landed in Mexico.
He bellowed.
There he traveled on behalf of Alberto to the Summit of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).
Perhaps the only point of communion between Alberto and Cristina has been the nomination of Juan Manzur, governor of Tucumán, as Chief of Staff.
He was an Albertist of the first hour.
The vice president settled with him the pending accounts of the past.
Manzur doubted a lot, like all the leaders consulted, because in these conditions it is difficult for him to see a horizon.
The President managed to support Guzmán and Matías Kulfas, from Production.
There is no margin, in 60 days, for any downturn in the economy
.
The agreement with the IMF is also at stake.
Both stays are observed and questioned by Cristina and La Cámpora.
The defeat has broken the confidence of the two greatest protagonists of power.
It remains to be seen if the ministerial puzzle helps mend it.
Whether it happens or not, there is a dramatic question mark.
If a crisis of such magnitude was unleashed by the STEP, what will happen if the result is replicated in November?
That doubt nests recurrently in the heads of many.
Among them, Massa.