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Submarine crisis: can we speak of a cold war after the Aukus pact?

2021-09-22T12:42:06.077Z


INTERVIEW - The signing of the defense treaty to counter Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific has alarmed the UN secretary general, who fears the world will "fall back into a cold war". An analogy nuanced by Pierre Grosser, professor of international relations at Sciences Po.


On September 16, 2021, thunderclap on the international scene: the United States, Great Britain and Australia make public a new defense pact called “

Aukus

”. The objective, to stem Chinese expansionism in the Indo-Pacific. What to immediately rear up Beijing. According to the spokesperson for Chinese diplomacy, this new cooperation is an act "

extremely irresponsible

", which "

seriously undermines regional peace and stability, intensifies the arms race and compromises international efforts of nuclear non-proliferation

". Monday, it was the turn of the UN Secretary General to be alarmed: "

We must avoid at all costs falling back into a cold war that would be different from the previous one, and would probably be more difficult to manage, and more dangerous,

”warned Antonio Guterres.

Read alsoCrisis of the submarines: behind the scenes of the "

betrayal

" of the century

Pierre Grosser, seconded in history from Sciences Po in 1996, mainly teaches there the history of international relations and contemporary global issues.

LE FIGARO.

Does the new military axis between Americans, Australians and British mark a return to a logic of blocs in Asia-Pacific, similar to what the world experienced during the USSR?

Pierre GROSSER.-

It is true that the links between Russia and China have never been so good since the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950. Today, we cannot yet speak of a bloc, but the relationship is excellent.

On the one hand, Russia has the arms and the raw materials, while China is behind the United States in the race for economic primacy.

The diplomacy of the two states has longer arms than at the time, complicating Western calculations.

So is the analogy relevant?

In any case, it is nothing new, particularly from Beijing which, since the 1990s, has regularly accused the United States of having retained a “

cold war mentality

”.

On the western side, the appellation is also shaken up and down because it is our only reference to evoke such a situation: a global rivalry that does not quite degenerate into war.

We could find other terms, for example to speak of "

Sino-American rivalry

", but that would sound more hollow ...

Read alsoChina candidate for the Pacific free trade zone, nest of American allies

But what exactly do we mean by “

cold war

”?

Let us recall that this period extended over nearly 45 years - or even more than 70 years if we start from 1917 - and included multiple dimensions, ideological, strategic, cultural, not to mention the links with decolonizations.

Some of these realities have continued to evolve over the years, others have never completely disappeared.

Check out Cuba or North Korea, or watch regular weapons passes between Washington and Moscow on the NATO expansion.

You will see that the Cold War has not ended everywhere.

Why then did Antonio Guterres make the historical comparison by evoking a “

dangerous

risk

?

The use of such rhetoric is strategic.

For international actors such as Beijing or Moscow or even for the UN, brandish as a safeguard this period of sharp geopolitical tensions - with real wars from Central America to Asia via Africa, as well as the nuclear risk - is not trivial.

This makes it possible, instead of directly designating States as adversaries, to point out the return to the Cold War as a real enemy, at a time when the challenges are global, such as the environment or health.

In this instrumentalisation, China can rely, as in the 1960s, on part of the Western left and part of the European right to assert that the Cold War and its return are the product of a militarist United States and imperialists.

Relations between Washington and Moscow were almost non-existent at the height of the Cold War, while many American investment giants, such as Apple and Tesla, are present in China today.

Does this change the game?

Certainly, but the interdependence between the two superpowers can, for both of them, become a weapon.

For example, the battle for technical standards is less visible than military exercises, just as the internet world favors cyberattacks.

However, we hear more and more, on the American side, a discourse of de-nesting, to limit interdependencies, both on the Chinese and American side.

Beijing is going even faster.

We can therefore envisage an evolution like that of the 1930s, when, after the subprime crisis, large economic blocs were forged, with temptations of autarky.

The entire liberal system created from 1944 was to avoid this return to protectionist blocs, but this development has been feared since the 2008 crisis, now with ideological and strategic dimensions.

The Chinese government has notably accused this pact of "

compromising international nuclear non-proliferation efforts

".

Should we fear a resurgence of the nuclear race?

China cannot give lessons on this point, although it itself was rather proliferating, at least until its entry in 1992 into the Non-Proliferation Treaty. She even seemed to "

socialize

" by joining this type of treaty. However, the modernization and increase of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, although still far below that of Russia and the United States, upset the calculations of the United States, which is not used to managing several adversaries. nuclear - not to mention North Korea, which is very disturbing.

However, it should be remembered that the nuclear-powered submarine project for Canberra has nothing to do with nuclear weapons itself.

Like Japan and South Korea, Australia has not chosen this path - despite some temptations - because Washington has assured it of its

nuclear

"

umbrella

".

It was only in the Trump movement that the question arose of reducing commitments in Asia, leaving Tokyo and Seoul to move towards nuclear weapons.

How can France position itself, between the United States and China, and after having been betrayed by its long-time ally?

This is the whole problem.

As in the post-war period, France is worried about this rivalry between the two camps which forces it to make a choice.

We are talking about the “

Third Force

” again, as in the 1950s when two political parties, one communist the other Gaullist, had as their major objective the destruction of the regime, generating a merger of the other parties to support the Fourth Republic.

Read alsoSubmarine crisis: the United States is not moved by the tricolor anger, nor to have treated France badly

But our fear is above all to be relegated to the background by the Americans.

The "

blow in the back

" that Aukus represented for France goes against our permanent will since 1945 to influence the choices of the United States, leader of the Western camp and protector of last resort.

It reminds us of bad memories, when in 1944, the Allies made major strategic choices on France without consulting us.

In this regard, the next presidential elections will be essential.

Hopefully the candidates will go beyond the postures to let us know how France can adjust to this new world.

Source: lefigaro

All news articles on 2021-09-22

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