(CNN) -
About $ 500 million worth of planes that flew for just a year.
A huge $ 85 million hotel that never opened and is in disrepair.
Camouflage uniforms for the Afghan army whose special pattern cost US $ 28 million more.
A health center listed as located in the Mediterranean Sea.
These cats are part of a catalog of complaints about "waste, fraud and abuse" in the framework of the reconstruction efforts of the United States in Afghanistan - a program that reached a cost of US $ 145,000 million in 20 years - made by the America's own inspector general in the war.
But the in-depth audits detailing these findings are no longer available to the public, for the most part at the request of the State Department, citing security concerns.
Afghanistan: "Domestic violence grows by forcing women to stay at home"
The total cost of the war, according to the Pentagon, was $ 825 billion, a low estimate: even President Joe Biden has cited an estimate that puts the amount at more than double: more than $ 2 trillion, a figure that takes into account long-term costs, such as veterans care. Interest on the debt is already in the hundreds of billions.
The $ 145 billion reconstruction program lacked oversight, prompting Congress to create the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in 2008. SIGAR published quarterly reports that received less attention than was due to the They addressed spending, according to critical voices, and sometimes the Pentagon denied them the information they needed, especially when it came to assessing security in the country.
A State Department spokesman told CNN that they had asked SIGAR to "temporarily" withdraw the reports, due to "security concerns in relation to our ongoing evacuation efforts."
They added that SIGAR had the authority to restore them "when it deems appropriate."
advertising
Below are 10 notable cases, devoid of identifying details, compiled by CNN over the years.
1) Electricity for Kabul
The Tarakhil Power Station was commissioned in 2007 as a standby generator for the capital, should the electricity supply from Uzbekistan be compromised.
It is a spacious and modern structure, powered by diesel-powered turbines manufactured by a global engineering giant.
But there was a catch: Afghanistan has little access to its own diesel and had to send the fuel to the plant using trucks, which made the process too expensive.
The facility cost US $ 335 million to build and the annual fuel cost was estimated at US $ 245 million.
SIGAR's most recent assessment said that at best only 2.2% of its capacity was used, as the Afghan government could not pay for fuel.
USAID declined to comment.
The Tarakhil Power Station in September 2011.
2) A fleet of cargo planes flew a year
Afghanistan's fledgling air force needed cargo planes.
In 2008, the Pentagon chose the G222, a plane designed in Italy to take off and land on difficult runways.
That first year, according to a speech by SIGAR chief John Sopko, quoting a USAF official, the planes were very busy.
But this would not last over time.
SIGAR only became aware of the planes when Sopko saw them parked at Kabul airport and asked what they were doing there.
Six years after the acquisition began, the 16 planes delivered to Afghanistan were sold for scrap for $ 40,257.
The cost of the project: US $ 549 million.
3) The Marine Headquarters in the desert that nobody wanted and nobody used
Sopko said in a speech that this nearly 20,000-square-meter control center in Helmand accurately demonstrated how when a project starts, it often cannot be stopped.
In 2010, the Marines were increasing the number of troops in Helmand, the most dangerous area in Afghanistan.
The construction of a command and control center at the main Camp Leatherneck base was ordered as part of that effort, although Sopko recalled that the base commander and two other Marine generals said it was not necessary because it would not be completed. fast enough.
Sopko said the idea of returning the appropriated funds to Congress was "so abhorrent to the contracting command, that it was built anyway. The facility was never used, Camp Leatherneck was turned over to the Afghans, who abandoned it."
It cost US $ 36 million, was never used, and it appears that the base was subsequently dismantled by the Afghans, who did not appear to use it either.
Defense Department spokesman Commander Robert Lodewick said in a statement that the SIGAR report contained "major errors," objected that it involved "misconduct" by some officers, and said the $ 36 million figure included ancillary costs like roads to headquarters.
US Marine Sgt. Charles Albrecht observes a construction crew working on a huge new base at Camp Letherneck in Helmand province in March 2009.
4) $ 28 million for inappropriate camouflage pattern
In 2007, new uniforms were commissioned for the Afghan army.
Afghan Defense Minister Wardak said he wanted a rare camouflage pattern used in dense forest areas, "Spec4ce Forest," from the Canadian company HyperStealth.
A total of 1.3 million outfits were ordered, costing between US $ 43 and US $ 80 each, compared to the US $ 25-30 originally estimated for replacement uniforms.
The uniforms were never tested or evaluated in the field, and only 2.1% of Afghanistan's territory is forested.
In her testimony, Sopko said it cost taxpayers an additional $ 28 million to purchase the uniforms with the special pattern, and SIGAR projected in 2017 that a different pattern choice could have saved a potential $ 72 million over the next decade. .
Defense Department spokesman Lodewick said the report "overestimated" the cost and "incorrectly discredited the value of the selected pattern type," adding that much of the fighting in Afghanistan took place in forested areas.
5) US $ 1.5 million a day in the fight against opium production
The United States spent US $ 1.5 million a day on anti-drug trafficking programs (from 2002 to 2018).
Opium production, according to the latest SIGAR report, increased in 2020 by 37% compared to the previous year.
It was the third highest production since records began in 1994.
In 2017, production was four times higher than in 2002. A spokesman for the State Department noted that "the Taliban have been the main factor contributing to the persistence of the poppy in recent years" and "that the Taliban have committed to banning narcotics. "
A tractor eradicates a poppy crop in Nangarhar province in January 2007.
6) $ 249 million on an incomplete road
An extensive bypass road around Afghanistan was funded by multiple grants and donors, totaling in the billions over the course of the war.
Towards the end of the project, US $ 249 million was awarded to contractors for the construction of a 233-kilometer stretch in the north, between the cities of Qeysar and Laman.
But only 15% of this road was built, according to a SIGAR audit.
Between March 2014 and September 2017, there was no construction on this stretch, and what had been built deteriorated, the report concluded.
USAID declined to comment.
7) The $ 85 million hotel that never opened
An extensive hotel and apartment complex was commissioned together with the US embassy in Kabul, for which the US government provided US $ 85 million in loans.
In 2016, SIGAR concluded that "the $ 85 million in loans is gone, the buildings were never completed and uninhabitable, and the US Embassy is now forced to provide security for the site at additional cost to taxpayers. Americans ".
The audit found that the contractor made unrealistic promises to guarantee the loans, and that the branch of the US government that oversaw the project never visited the site, and neither did the company they later hired to oversee the project.
A State Department spokesman said they were not managing the construction and that it was "a private effort."
8) The fund that spent more on itself than in Afghanistan
The Pentagon created the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO), expanded from Iraq to Afghanistan in 2009, for whose operations in Afghanistan Congress set aside $ 823 million.
More than half of the money actually spent by TFBSO - US $ 359 million out of a total of US $ 675 million - was "spent on indirect and support costs, not directly on projects in Afghanistan," SIGAR concluded in an audit.
They reviewed 89 of the contracts made by TFBSO, and found that "7 contracts worth $ 35.1 million were awarded to companies that employed former TFBSO staff members as senior executives."
Taliban must decide on opium cultivation 0:41
The audit also found that the fund spent about $ 6 million to support the cashmere wool industry, $ 43 million for a compressed natural gas station, and $ 150 million for high-end residences for its staff. .
Defense Department spokesman Lodewick said that SIGAR did not accuse anyone of fraud or embezzlement, instead he referred to the "weaknesses and deficiencies" of the audit and said that "28 of the 35 projects of TFBSO fully or partially met their objectives. "
9) The health center at sea
A 2015 report on USAID funding of health facilities in Afghanistan stated that more than a third of the 510 projects for which they had received coordinates did not exist in those locations.
Thirteen "were not located in Afghanistan, with one located in the Mediterranean Sea."
Thirty "were located in a different province than the one USAID reported."
And "189 did not show any physical structure within 120 meters of the reported coordinates. Slightly less than half of these locations did not show any physical structure within 800 meters of the reported coordinates."
The audit said that USAID and the Afghan Ministry of Public Health could only "monitor these facilities [if] they know where they are."
USAID declined to comment.
10) At least US $ 19 billion lost to "waste, fraud and abuse"
An October 2020 report presented a surprising total cost for the war.
Until that date, the United States Congress had allocated $ 134 billion since 2002 for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
SIGAR was able to review US $ 63,000 million, almost half.
They concluded that $ 19 billion, almost a third, was "lost through waste, fraud and abuse."
Defense Department spokesman Lodewick said that they and "several other departments and agencies of the United States Government have already stated that they have contested some of these reports as inaccurate and misleading" and that their conclusions "appeared to pass. overlook the difference between reconstruction efforts that may have been deliberately / negligently mismanaged and those efforts that, at the time of reporting, simply had not achieved strategic objectives. "