In a big, double row came out of the land arm this week.
Not because the commanders of the arm have changed, it is a matter of routine, that public interest in it is scarce.
A moment earlier, a new head of the Armed Forces took office, a much more important appointment, which also received a marginal mention. But in the incident in the land arm, something fell through. And the second - that "the motivation to serve in the combat units has improved, and in the last two years there has been a continuous increase in the motivation to serve in the combat units."
These remarks have caused quite a few eyebrows to rise, both inside and outside the IDF. The IDF has not maneuvered anywhere in recent years.
Not in the big, nor in the small.
Due to the dignity of those concerned (and to maintain the security of the information), we will not mention how many special operations the MM set up during the years of Kochavi as chief of staff.
Suffice it to say that the frustration among those involved has never been so great, and not just because of the structural changes led by the new head of the Mossad, Dedi Barnea, which are affecting the entire lineup.
Even when the IDF had opportunities to maneuver - for example, in Operation Wall Guard - it avoided it. "The test of war is not measured by what capabilities we use, maneuver or fire, but what results we achieve," the chief of staff stated.
"When only fire and attack are needed to achieve the results of the war, so be it done, and when the maneuver is required as in the overall war plans, it will penetrate the enemy territory vigorously to bring about a clear victory, in a short time and at the lowest possible cost to the home front."
Stars are right, of course, but life is not run in black and white. The wall guard did not carry out even the minimal ground deception that was part of Operation Lightning - the operation to destroy the "metro", Hamas' defensive tunnel system - which was supposed to capture hundreds of members of the organization inside the tunnels. If this plan had been carried out as planned and practiced, it would have caused Hamas a severe physical, moral and mental blow. But Kochavi decided (contrary to the opinion of most senior IDF officials) to refrain from doing so. Only a few Hamas members were killed, the purpose of the operation was missed, and the ground forces received further proof that they were not trusted for fear of becoming entangled and entangled.
We are therefore asked to wonder where the determination regarding the improvement of the maneuver comes from.
As far as is known, no weapons that change the face of the battle from end to end have come into use, no new patent deed has been discovered in training, and no more divisions have been secretly recruited. To all sectors will change in his wake - something that did not happen.
It seems, therefore, that this is a title that at the very least requires proof.
One does not have to go as far as Major General (Res.) Yitzhak Brick to know that the Army is squeaking, and is committed to deep revision.
His outgoing commander, Joel Strick, started with that, and it is likely that his successor, Tamir Yedi, will continue in the same direction, but there is still a long way to go.
The first step in restoring confidence in the Army is to recognize its true state.
The cards are close to the chest
The statement regarding motivation also requires clarification. Beginning with a short reliability test: Major General Moti Almoz, who served until the beginning of the year as head of the ACA, explicitly announced on every possible stage that the IDF had stopped measuring the motivation of conscripts. He also had a logical explanation for this: motivation measured by questionnaires given to the first order in the eleventh grade - is similar to that of those young people during their induction.
If the army really stopped to measure motivation, as instructed by the former head of the IDF Personnel Directorate, it is unclear what the Chief of Staff was based When he announced that "the motivation to serve in the combat units has improved." And if the IDF continues to conduct motivational surveys - why did it not report this to the public, why did it claim to have stopped doing so, and on what comparative basis does it rely?
Let us put aside this factual clarification for a moment, and approach the main point. The IDF has recently faced harsh criticism from soldiers on a variety of issues, most of which concern service conditions. From the level of food at bases, through the growing problem of transportation (especially of combat soldiers and those serving in closed and remote bases), That none of this is expressed in motivation, unless the IDF has become an adviser to me.
Sneaking, therefore, is the suspicion that not all data is visible to our eyes. For example, is it possible that the increase in motivation in the August cycle was directly due to Operation The Wall Guard, since it is known that wars and operations spur young people into combat service? And is it possible that most of the increase is not in hard-core combat (infantry, armor and engineering), but rather in light-combat (air defense and border defense system)?
I turned to the IDF Spokesman to get the actual data on which the Chief of Staff based his remarks.
It was explained to me that it is not customary to publish numbers, but only general trends.
This is strange, because the IDF used to know how to publish the data itself when they served its needs. Moreover, if the data is so good, why hide it? The IDF should be proud of it, and proud of itself for overcoming the motivation crisis.
Needless to say, I did not receive an explanation of the trends either.
But since the IDF's words are credible to me, the conclusion is clear: the IDF closed the gaps in motivation, and implicitly also the gap in the number of fighters.
And once this problem is solved, it is possible to go back and realize the additional shortcut in compulsory service.
A lesson in modesty
Moments after the land ceremony of the land arm ended, the IDF Spokesman tweeted: "The land is in full swing! Ground Forces improved and adapted to change passes battlefield, when multi-dimensional - more relevant than ever. "
(Res) which Bn-lolo, who among other things Kfir Brigade commander, rushed Lrtoot the IDF spokesman, wrote cynically and demonstratively:" Anyone who "He who did not say three things in Kochavi's IDF did not go out of his way - multidimensional, lethal and momentum."
Ben-Lulu was in his last position chief of staff of the Northern Command.
The commander-in-chief at the time was Aviv Kochavi.
In his remarks this week, Ben-Lulu expressed the opinion of many of his colleagues, regularly and in reserve.
The bottom line: it would have been better to settle for fewer statements and pompous words, and focus more on actions.
This is true for both maneuverability and motivation.
Both sound nice in speeches, but require proof.
The IDF was expected to take a modest lesson after the Wall Guard, which ended with promises of deterrence and silence for many years - shattered into the reality of incendiary balloons and demonstrations (as well as rockets and a fighter).
It must not be understood that the IDF should act only to prove something. Maneuvering, for example, is a dangerous business: it will have casualties, and God forbid abductees. Always come small and come out big.and this is not achieved in speeches.