It does not take extraordinary sensitivity or experience to understand that Gaza is on the verge of explosion.
This stems from a series of issues and matters that slowly coalesce together, and may get things out of hand very soon.
The main concern, as always, is the internal situation in the Strip.
Five months after Operation Wall Guard, Gaza is stuck and frustrated.
The issue of Qatari funding has only been partially resolved (Hamas public servants are still waiting for salaries), and talks for a settlement in Cairo are being conducted lazily under the Israeli proviso that precedes any progress in resolving the issue of prisoners and missing persons first.
The rumors circulating in the middle of the week about a breakthrough in contacts for the return of the bodies of IDF martyrs Hadar Goldin and Oron Shaul, and of civilians Avra Mengistu and Hisham a-Sayed, should be taken with double bail. It seems that this is a psychological warfare Apply pressure on the families of the missing, and through them on the government.
An examination with several factors revealed that no real progress in the contacts was recorded.
Hamas insists on a glorious list of released, many of them heavy prisoners, a matter that Israel vehemently refuses.
It is estimated that Israel will agree to release only those released from the Shalit deal who have been re-arrested, but not much beyond that, and hence in the absence of new data in the equation - the chances of advancing a deal are slim to nil.
The contacts stuck in Cairo are joined, as in the past, by other issues.
East Jerusalem is warming again, and as always attracts interest that transcends its geographical boundaries.
The security situation in Judea and Samaria continues to be explosive, with almost daily clashes (especially in Jenin) that have continued since the prisoners escaped from Megiddo prison on New Year's Eve. To this can be added the constant explosive interest of security prisoners Against the background of the deterioration in the conditions of incarceration of some of the prisoners, and the threat of many of them to go on hunger strike.
The embarrassment of stars
Each of these is a permanent substance in the hands of Hamas, looking for reasons to preserve the struggle. Their unification at the same time is dangerous and requires gentle conduct, certainly when it comes to the background of the basic situation in Gaza - the desperate, the poor and the futureless.
This is not new, but the situation in Gaza is worse than before in every aspect - especially the psychological one. Hamas launched a campaign in May to fundamentally change the situation in the Gaza Strip. In the result test, he failed. His only achievement was consciousness: the connection of several fronts (and especially the Arabs of Israel), and the feeling among a broad public that he had the upper hand.
This issue came up on Tuesday in a discussion of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. Although the committee convened to discuss the defense budget, it also found itself dragged to the wall guard, after the chief of staff, Aviv Kochavi, was asked why the money was needed if the IDF did not win the wars. The questioner replied stars (MK Zvi Hauser new Hatikvah ", former cabinet secretary and chairman of the committee, who is familiar with the matter closely) the army defeated Hamas," but not 2-100 2-200. "
One can argue with the figure This one, which reflects a very narrow view of the campaign and its achievements. One may also wonder how in the whole committee - which is supposed to be the most glorious and important in the Knesset - "Today, when Gaza is on the verge of an explosion again.
This did not happen, and it is a pity, because a responsible committee should discuss these matters before a confrontation, and not after it.
And as things stand now, another conflict in Gaza is on the table, and it is necessary to find out what Israel is doing to prevent it, or alternatively - to be the one managing it, and if necessary also deciding it (as far as possible in limited systems).
Currently, Hamas is in charge.
He voluntarily releases the reins (for demonstrations, balloons, limited rocket fire) to his men and other organizations operating in the Strip, and voluntarily tightens it.
Israel does not initiate, but responds, sometimes under excessive pressure.
Evidence of this was given on Tuesday, in the closure of roads in the envelope that testified most of all to panic, and also in the chief of staff's departure from the ceremony in memory of Yitzhak Rabin, after receiving a note from his secretary about a "red color" alarm in the envelope.
Kochavi was attacked for this, unjustly.
From the moment he received the note he had to leave;
Had there been casualties in the incident, God forbid, he would have been attacked for why he continued to sit.
But the shell elements surrounding him - his aide, the head of his bureau - had to find out a little more details before calling him, in front of the whole country.
Had he counted to 10, the filmed, embarrassing and stressful event would have been avoided.
Start strong, in surprise - and step up
This nervousness on the Israeli side is unhealthy.
It is also unclear where it is supposed to lead.
If Israel wants to do everything possible to resolve Gaza's issues in the discourse, it must press on the gas in Cairo, and be willing to pay some of the resulting prices.
And if she considers it hopeless and the conflict in Gaza is inevitable, she should manage the conflict and not be led by it.
This is a strategic matter, which requires serious discussions and considered and orderly decision-making.
Israel must not be perceived as fleeing conflict, because it will be overturned not only in Gaza but also on the other fronts - most notably the internal front, which has only grown daily due to rising violence in the Arab sector and the authorities' helplessness to deal with it effectively.
In other words, Israel needs to consider initiating a move in Gaza.
Start strong, in surprise, then step up.
There is also a clear name and address for the first move: Yahya Sinwar.
It should have happened a long time ago, but now - after it has completely lost proportions - it seems to be ripe.
The one who constantly pushed for this was the outgoing head of the GSS, Nadav Argaman. Will disappear from the arena; the identity and character of his successor will determine whether Gaza under him will be more moderate or rather an officer.
Crimson decided not to be interviewed at the end of his service, an unusual matter in the Israeli public.
Thus, at least at the present stage, his position will remain the property of the professional bodies with whom he shares it.
Its essence can be summed up in the phrase: operational proactivity.
Initiate, do not get carried away, and do not be afraid to take risks.
The order to eliminate Sinwar, if given, will already be in the custody of the incoming GSS chief, Ronen Bar. Bar, like Crimson, also has the same attitude. opal.