After six months of halting nuclear talks, during which Iran has greatly expanded its nuclear program, it is signaling a return to negotiations in November. 2015.
As the left becomes desperate for a deal, something bad can happen.
The negotiation menu has been joined by an idea that its supporters call "less for less", and whoever understands calls "less for more" - less restrictions for more relief.
The leadership in Israel and the Republicans oppose a return to the 2015 agreement.
Even if it were possible to return to the agreement, in less than a decade Iran will build a permit for an industrial-scale enrichment program, and zero time to break into the bomb.
The advanced centrifuges, developed with consent, can be produced and hidden in secret sites, as much less centrifuges will be required to obtain the uranium required for the bomb, and the ability to "sneak" into it will be allowed.
The Iranians will have ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, and the development status of the weapons system will continue to be hidden.
Massive easing of sanctions will allow the regime to fund terrorism and other negative activities.
The original American goal - to keep Iran a year away from breaking into a bomb-scoring material - "long gone with the wind."
The progress from 2015 has reduced the time to at least three months, and Mali and his managers also recognize today that about five months is the maximum they will achieve.
Meanwhile, Tehran is enriching to 60 percent, producing metallic uranium, accumulating fissile material and preventing IAEA inspectors from accessing suspicious sites. Few nuclear restrictions, while preserving all pathways to the bomb.
Returning to the 2015 agreement is simply not possible.
Americans, Europeans and Israelis understand and admit the fact, and are forced to consider other options.
Most are incorrect, especially the so-called "less for less" deal, under which the administration would agree to a weaker deal, in order to negotiate a "longer, stronger and broader" agreement in the future.
"The deal is expected to provide Iran with further easing of sanctions, which will lead to a major economic recovery, immunity to peaceful Western pressure and additional resources to finance terrorism and regional aggression."
Iranian President Raisi, Photo: IP
The great danger in the plan
The deal will not be a preparation for a better deal, but the last deal.
In fact, it is not about "less for less", but about "less for more".
Tehran will agree to a few nuclear concessions, and will receive in return many economic concessions.
The new deal will give legitimacy to the violations, and Iran will retain most of the assets gained through the breach of the 2015 agreement and non-compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, long before it.
Tehran will continue to undermine the International Atomic Energy Agency and demand an end, or at least a freeze, of all past and present investigations, as it did in the original agreement.
Acceptance of the requirement will reduce the relevance of the Agency and jeopardize the basis of compliance with the Convention (NPT).
Even now, Iran refuses to answer agency questions and does not allow inspectors access to suspicious sites and materials.
What is needed for "unprecedented supervision and verification," which Obama was proud of when signing the agreement, if their results are not used?
Through nuclear blackmail (a threat not to return to negotiations), Iran has forced Mali and his managers, on at least three occasions, to order the IAEA director general to withdraw his intention to publish a serious report on Iranian violations, and to demand a special meeting of the board, and even a referral. To Moabit for the purpose of imposing new sanctions.
Threshold state
If a "less for more" deal is signed, the halting of the Iranian nuclear program will take top priority to a low level, on the mistaken assumption that the nuclear program "back in the box," according to U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan.
The reality is worrying, that the regime will find its way to the status of a "threshold state".
Many make a mistake in the definition, but "threshold state" is not measured by the time it has left to reach the bomb, but by building the independent ability to break out, at the time it chooses, without the ability of an outside body to stop it.
The deal is expected to give Iran further easing of sanctions, which will lead to a major economic recovery, immunity to peaceful Western pressure and additional resources to finance terrorism and regional aggression.
Iran is recovering from Trump's maximum pressure campaign, and many economic indicators (growth, oil sales, non-oil trade and inflation stabilization) show this.
The administration hopes Tehran will agree to negotiations on a "longer, stronger and broader deal," but after receiving significant concessions in exchange for a "shorter and weaker deal," this is an illusion. After persistent violations and assaults on American interests in the Gulf and the Middle East.Why would the regime agree to severe restrictions on nuclear programs and missiles, when it gets almost everything it wanted in the small deal?
To prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear threshold state, Washington must address all three elements essential to the program: fissile material, the development of the weapons system and means of carrying, while creating maximum economic pressure, backed by a credible military threat.
A "less for more" deal will fail to achieve these goals.
It is dangerous because it will send false signals to Iran that the West will agree to its demands and that Israel alone is weak.
Israel will be the one to pay the price of the wrong deal, as Iran continues to threaten its very existence.
Israel must build a credible military capability and other capabilities to deal with the Iranian problem, even though it will face global condemnation for attacking a country that is under international agreement - even if it is fatally flawed.
Israeli leaders have no choice but to speak with one voice and explain why a return to the 2015 agreement is not possible, and why a partial and small deal is even worse.
Any attempt by Israeli officials to even examine the small deal is extremely dangerous, even if the results are clear.
Such irresponsible behavior will send the wrong message to the Iranians, but especially ahead of Mali's expected visit to the country, ahead of the resumption of negotiations, it will send the wrong message to the Americans that there is something to talk about - and they will use it, no doubt.
Brigadier General (Res.) Prof. Yaakov Nagel
is a senior fellow in the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a visiting professor in the Faculty of Aeronautics and Space at the Technion.
Mark Dubovich
is the CEO of FDD.
An expert on the nuclear program and sanctions, and in 2019 he was marked by Iran.