The praise bestowed by the writer of these lines on this stage for Operation The Guardian of the Wall turned out to be more of a wish in retrospect.
The operation only strengthened the resilience of the terrorists, who have long been unmoved by the bombings and shells that the IDF usually boasts of their accuracy and effectiveness. The same for the ceasefire with Israel. Likewise, the downing of high-rises that has become routine does not create a sense of helplessness in him. What, then, motivates the IDF to recycle its failures time and time again?
What is the true "IDF spirit" of today?
The remarks of the outgoing chief of staff, Yitzhak Turgeman, about the IDF's failure to mobilize forces in Nahal Iron (Wadi Ara) in a future war, are probably the best expression of the moods that actually guide the army's actions. Those who disqualify in advance the mobilization of forces for a future war on a main thoroughfare for fear of disturbance by Arab neighbors, are those who have already given up the 300-meter separation between the Gaza protesters and the wall where the sniper who was killed by gunfire stood. The army that makes it difficult for its soldiers in Judea and Samaria to act against Arab rioters (and Jews who support them) - is the one who promoted the establishment of the mixed units, whose poor combat efficiency is known to anyone who checks the truth about them. It takes the organization just a little more professional concession to adopt the idea that in the long run a tank can only be operated by women. According to the IDF, the answer to the tankers' proven inability to operate a tank in prolonged combat is to set them on a "border guard" mission. As if someone could commit to this during a test, which can always occur suddenly.
The same weakness is evident in the cessation of training due to unauthorized intrusion into the training areas and the theft of weapons and equipment from the IDF. If the IDF suffers from a lack of pocket, which he says brings him to a lack of readiness on a test day, he will be honored and cut some, even small, of the rewards he has approved for himself from his own budget.
The military weakness leads to operational weakness, and returns to us in the form of the deterioration of national security and the creeping relinquishment of Jewish sovereignty in all parts of the country.
It is possible that the situation described here could have been different if the IDF had been conducted under much closer supervision by the legislature. However, this has not been the case for many years.
In the absence of parallel civilian bodies in the field of intelligence and assessment of the situation, whose role according to law is also to monitor and force the army to do what is required of it, it is not surprising that the organization got confused and forgot its mission. And get the IDF back on track?
I doubt.
For among its components there are those who see a blessing in all the negation presented here.
