Business partner Putin, Schröder in 2018
Photo: DPA/ SPUTNIK/ KREMLIN
The danger of a war of aggression in Europe is real, but the German government does not yet seem to understand it.
Or how else to explain that she seems strangely paralyzed when dealing with Russia?
Germany, as the most important EU country, would now play a key role in this: Russia is threatening war against Ukraine. Chancellor Olaf Scholz speaks vaguely of “consequences” in this case, but does not name them. The reason is obvious: the traffic light coalition does not agree at all as to which punitive measures are possible. This is a catastrophe in this serious situation.
Moscow's behavior is warlike: satellite images and videos show Russian troops deploying near the Ukrainian border, units have been moved west from distant parts of the country. More than 100,000 men are stationed there, tanks, heavy artillery. Russia not only demands of the Americans and Europeans that Ukraine should never become a NATO member, but also a revision of the entire European security order of the past 25 years, because it allegedly feels encircled by NATO.
Russia demands the withdrawal of all NATO troops from the member countries in Eastern Europe and a guarantee that the neighboring Scandinavian states of Finland and Sweden will never join the alliance. Talks between the United States and Russia took place in Geneva last week, but after that the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov initially did not want to continue talking because the Americans and NATO did not want to fulfill Moscow's catalog of maximum demands.
Despite this alarming global political crisis, the German government is surprisingly cautious. Chancellor Scholz is notable for his taciturnity and formality. The government emphasizes that it will react together with the EU and NATO if Russia attacks. But she cannot even promise that she would stop the Nord Stream 2 Baltic Sea pipeline in this case. This pipeline has already been highly controversial politically, as it is intended to transport gas from Russia directly to Germany, bypassing Poland and Ukraine. The federal government apparently still thinks it is conceivable that gas will flow through them - even if Russia attacks Ukraine. So what is all the talk of consequences worth, then?
In German politics, all sorts of people aren't talking about what they want to do in the event of a Russian attack, but about what they don't want to do under any circumstances. This applies not only to politicians from the government camp, but also to the designated CDU leader Friedrich Merz: At the weekend he ruled out that Russia could be thrown out of the global payment system Swift - one of the most painful sanctions that was discussed at times: Russian banks and companies would be effectively excluded from international payment transactions. This builds trust rather than pressure in Russia: you can rely on Berlin's inaction.
Moscow can only feel encouraged in its actions, as weak and divided as Germany seems right now.
Prominent trivializers of the warlike approach can even be found within the governing coalition.
The biggest handicap for Germany's foreign policy at the moment is the chancellor party SPD.
Large parts of the party, as this crisis shows, are caught up in a nostalgia for dealing with Moscow that is actually more familiar from the Left Party.
There, the glorification of authoritarian regimes is the order of the day: the USA is bad, Russia is not so bad.
It is frightening how much denial of reality in relation to Russia can be heard from the Chancellor's party at the moment.
At the weekend, the SPD member of the Bundestag Ralf Stegner delivered a best-of of this mentality on Twitter: He lamented a "disturbing tone" in German comments on Russia and recognized "verbal saber-rattling".
It was commented on in the "Cold War tone" and "unilaterally promoted rearmament and spiraling sanctions where diplomacy and detente were urgently needed".
It is grotesque: For Stegner, the demands for a credible deterrent against Russia and support for Ukraine are "saber rattling".
He completely ignores the real saber-rattling of Moscow.
As a reminder, Russia is standing on the Ukrainian border with an entire army and is unilaterally threatening war.
Of course, Stegner's tweets also included the phrase "Ostpolitik": For many in the SPD, it's a kind of magic word for everything that has anything to do with Russia. But Willy Brandt's policy of "change through rapprochement" in the 1970s took place in the completely different historical situation of the Cold War; At that time it was about a policy of detente between two rigid blocs, not about an adversary who wanted to achieve a shift in borders and spheres of influence with the concrete threat of war. By the way, not about someone who openly carries out murder and poisoning attacks against political opponents in Western Europe. When someone in the SPD calls for "Ostpolitik" today, they are primarily warming the soul of the party and want to show a vague understanding of Russia.
Ralf Stegner is not a particularly important figure in the SPD.
But he is the symptom of this party.
And he is by far not the only SPD politician who shows a problematic connection to reality in this crisis.
Faction leader Rolf Mützenich gives one interview after the other in which he shows a lot of understanding for Russian feelings of a threat and very little understanding for the feelings of a threat felt by our Eastern European neighbors.
In December he called for an end to the "mutual threats" in the Ukraine crisis.
But when or what did Ukraine threaten Russia with?
Of course, the Russian point of view must also be appreciated – but not especially when Russia is holding a pistol to a neighboring country's temple.
SPD General Secretary Kevin Kühnert even declared that potential international conflicts should "not be talked about", which, given the facts, can only be described as a boycott of reality.
Kühnert claimed that this was how projects were to be buried "that have always been a thorn in one's side."
He meant Nord Stream 2, the pipeline that the green coalition partner has been rejecting for years.
One should not "mix up" the debates about Nord Stream 2 and Russian policy towards Ukraine, said Kühnert.
You could just as well say that you shouldn't confuse the needs of the German export industry with a war of aggression in Ukraine.
But since Europeans have good reasons not to go to war themselves, economic sanctions are the most powerful tool at their disposal.
It is difficult to understand why so many in the SPD want to exclude this pipeline project from possible sanctions, with which Germany has isolated itself within the Western alliance for years.
Does it have something to do with the fact that the history of the pipeline is closely linked to the SPD, above all to ex-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder?
He had agreed on the first Nord Stream pipeline with Vladimir Putin shortly before he was voted out of office, in order to immediately become chairman of the supervisory board at the operating company – he is now also chairman of the supervisory board of the Russian oil company Rosneft.
It is part of the problem that Schröder is treated like a normal former chancellor and elder statesman by many in his party and in Germany.
He is 100% a lobbyist paid for by Russia.
Manuela Schwesig, Prime Minister of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, is a particularly good example of how problematic the relationship between parts of the SPD and Russia is. She insisted on setting up a so-called environmental foundation with Russian money to complete Nord Stream 2 in order to circumvent American sanctions and even finish the pipeline with her own ship. Otherwise, right-wing populist parties in Europe are often financed with Russian money - and now it's going into the foundation of an SPD-led state government.
Fortunately, there are notable exceptions in the party. One of them is Michael Roth, the chairman of the foreign affairs committee in the Bundestag, who spoke out in the SPIEGEL in favor of using Nord Stream 2 as a means of pressure and demanded "defensiveness" against Russia. He, too, cannot do without the term »Ostpolitik«, but he defines it in a pleasantly different way than most in his party: According to Roth, a »new European Ostpolitik« should also take into account »the security interests of our Central Eastern European partners« – they come into the considerations of many Russia - Hardly understand: you like to talk about the "neighbor" Russia, as if Poland, Ukraine or the Baltic States didn't even exist.
During the election campaign, Chancellor Olaf Scholz claimed that anyone who orders leadership from him will get it. In view of the confusion and the voices of appeasement in his party, he should now express himself in clear words to Moscow. Scholz is not one of the outspoken Russia friends in his party, but he too keeps repeating the untruth that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is a “purely private-sector project”. The fact that he seriously denies the political dimension of the project is actually below Scholz' level.
Putin himself made it clear in the fall that the pipeline is a means of exerting pressure on him: he threatened to supply more gas to Western Europe only if Nord Stream 2 were opened. The neighboring countries in Eastern Europe have always seen the tube as a geopolitical project, as has the USA, even though the Biden government has done a great deal to avert further congressional sanctions against Germany. The German fussing about these days is therefore another blow for the allies: Representatives of the US government are making great efforts to publicly emphasize their unity with Germany. But the fact that the federal government still does not want to say whether Nord Stream 2 could become part of a sanctions package stuns many in Washington who are actually well-disposed towards Germany.
The only one who has positioned herself more clearly in the federal government is Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock.
The Greens have clearly opposed Russian hegemonic efforts in the past, as have large parts of the FDP.
The two smaller coalition partners have a more realistic stance on Russia than the SPD;
this gives reason to hope that the government might eventually adopt robust measures.
The fact that the Foreign Minister made a stopover in Ukraine before her meeting with Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was an important gesture.
Since the start of the new Russia crisis, however, the Federal Chancellery has claimed leadership in foreign policy, and it is literally slowing Baerbock down.
It would now be up to Chancellor Scholz to counter the nostalgic currents in his party for Russia and to clearly commit to possible punitive measures. Of course, these would also have to include Nord Stream 2. As long as Germany is so reluctant to clearly show Moscow the possible consequences, Europe will remain weak. When it comes to the future of Europe, its security system and Russia's future influence on the continent, you can be a little more active.
It's no longer just about Ukraine, which Russia sees as part of its historic territory. For Vladimir Putin, it's not just about averting danger, but also about restoring power and influence in Europe - with the only means he has: the military. It is true that his country's economic output is only twice as large as that of Switzerland - with seventeen times as many inhabitants.
But Russia's military has shown in recent years from Georgia to Syria and Crimea that it is capable of waging war effectively. It cannot be ruled out that Ukraine will be followed by other places of conflict: Russian representatives are already making indirect threats against other states - Mikhail Ulyanov, permanent representative of Russia to the international organizations in Vienna, claimed that the NATO membership of the Baltic states is destabilizing the immediate vicinity . Most recently, the non-NATO state Sweden sent additional troops to the Baltic Sea island of Gotland because Russia had stepped up its activities in the region.
The federal government must respond to this threat.
It should also reconsider its resistance to arms deliveries to Ukraine - it is incomprehensible that Germany refuses this support to this partner country in dire need.
Of course, in view of the new Russian threat, Germany and Europe must also decide on their own military deterrence.
Above all, the SPD should now undergo a reality check: In parts of the left, the word "warmonger" is still a popular vocabulary to discredit anyone who calls for an economic, military and political strategy in the face of Russia's destabilizing and warlike intentions.
Nothing Russia does in these circles is ever half as bad as what the US or Europe do to keep them safe.
But there can be no doubt these days who the real warmonger and war leader is.
The Federal Government and especially the SPD Chancellor's Party should not only urgently recognize this, they should also act accordingly.
