The chief of staff, Aviv Kochavi, did well when he chose to set aside time during his visit this week to the Egoz unit for a personal conversation with Lt. N., who shot and killed two commanders in the unit last week, Major Ofek Aharon and the late Major Itamar Elharar .
Naturally, the hug in such situations goes to families.
For those who are left in their grief, who have no cure.
The two bereaved families differ from each other in their response to the incident, but their mourner is the same.
Their struggle has only just begun;
They will require quite a bit of mental strength to deal later with the results of the investigation - and then with the conclusions of the investigation team - which will reveal the obvious: a chain of mistakes, some of them serious, are what led to the fatal outcome.
Lieutenant N. has already been questioned this week by the military police about his part in the incident.
This is a procedural procedure: the IDF investigates every case in which a soldier is killed in the army. If at the end of the investigations it turns out that there was negligence on his part, the military police investigation may take on a different face. The firing officer, who is also a victim of the accident.
Pushing it aside could have been disastrous.
Examine the fire opening instructions
The chief of staff acted correctly even when he hurried to appoint an investigative team headed by a general.
In the past, the IDF used to appoint such teams, led by generals, more frequently. David Ivri to investigate the helicopter disaster, Gabi Ashkenazi to investigate the Saluki fire disaster, and Gabi Ofir to investigate the flotilla disaster.
Dan Halutz appointed Giora Island to investigate the abduction of Gilad Shalit, and Doron Almog to investigate the abduction of Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev.
The current appointment of Maj. Gen. (Res.) Noam Tibon is intended to send a message that the event will be fully investigated.
Unlike the immediate operational investigation, which examines what happened and how it happened, the investigation team should look wider and deeper: at the unit (Walnut) and its parent units (commando division and 98th Division), and at the organizational, training and operational culture in these and other units.
There is no place for the rumors heard this week in the IDF that Tibon was appointed "comfortable" for the stars. It is true that the two are close, but it is natural that the chief of staff will appoint someone he trusts.
Tibon is a professional, decent and honest officer who knows how to raise a flag when he identifies problems or faults.
His immediate arrival in the field, hours after the incident, made it clear that he had not lost the basic instinct to see with his eyes and feel for himself, before versions were formed.
Tibon's challenge - and as a result of that of the IDF - is not simple. Egoz, like its sisters in the commando brigade, Magellan and Duvdevan, has in recent years become the IDF's operational spearhead.
They are the strongest and fastest punch the IDF has in almost every way: against Hezbollah in Lebanon, against Hamas in Gaza, against pro-Iranian terrorism on the Syrian border.
It is doubtful that there are other units that have been bounced so many times, that have done so much operational activity, that have lain such an amount of hours and days in the thicket.
This is their essence;
Therefore the demand for them among the recruits is second only to the elite units (and not by a large margin).
By and large, there are three things that make these units what they are.
The people, the means and the investment (mostly in training).
The people are the main story.
They are the best, and not as a recommendation.
This is true of the soldiers, and it is twice as true of the commanders.
It is no coincidence that the unit this week turned to some officers who were recently released, so that they could return to service and help stabilize the system.
Egoz and her sisters encourage creativity, initiative, daring in the commanders.
It's been in the unit's DNA since the days of Erez Zuckerman and Chico Tamir, who set up the unit to fight Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. With a lack of adherence to procedures, Walz is not alone in this matter;
Thus, it is necessary to ascertain whether the training at Nabi Musa included the basics: preparation of a camp security file upon the arrival of the forces;
Defining clear guarding practices in the camp and for any independent force outside the camp;
Defining clear fire opening instructions in space;
"Organization of the area" which includes a precise definition of where to keep, what the administrative points are and more;
Control of the battalion's infantry in all movements of the sub-units, and a clear division of the area into area cells (which correspond to the numbers of fire areas in the maps of the fire areas); and more.
The automatic temptation will now be to try to "align" the nut in particular, and the commando brigade in general.
It is not expected to pass without personal conclusions;
The accident in Nabi Musa is too difficult and unnecessary for her not to be responsible.
Whoever investigates - and will delve into the history of the theft of weapons in the unit, and who said what followed - may find that pressure was exerted due to the loss of night vision prior to the accident. To the fatal outcome.
The committee would do well to bravely consider the decision to change the opening fire regulations as well.
The original change was made during the time of the previous chief of staff, Gadi Izenkot, regarding weapons thieves operating inside the bases, but Kochavi also extended the change to weapons thefts in the training areas. The IDF strongly claims that the change did not result in the fatal result, For the future: The instructions to open fire are not intended to harm soldiers, they protect them.
Insist on a wrong narrative
Political and senior IDF officials (including officers in the chain of command above Egoz) vehemently claimed this week that Aharon and Al-Harrar are the first victims in the struggle for sovereignty in the Negev. .
The fight against the theft of weapons is one of the justified ones. Just like the fight against the violence that is raging on the roads and in the cities of the Negev. It is a national fight, of which the IDF is a part.
But the way to manage it is through thought, planning and intention - and not improvisation.
The intentions of the officers in the nut - the shooter and the dead - were good, testifying to all the right values and above all attacks and striving for contact, but the result shows that it was carried out in a failed manner.
Instead of insisting on a wrong narrative, those concerned will do well to mobilize for real correction - to prevent the next event.
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