Loose discipline, flawed professional conduct: gaps in the nut unit

In the next 24 hours, the IDF will publish the findings of the disaster investigation in Egoz, in which the commanders of the Ofek Aharon and Itamar Elharar cruises were killed.

Amir Bohbot

06/02/2022

Sunday, 06 February 2022, 03:42 Updated: 19:50

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The IDF will publish tomorrow (Monday) the findings of the disaster investigation in the Egoz unit, during which two commanders of factions killed by a team commander were killed, which are expected to be published tomorrow. in the future.

This, after last Wednesday the commander of the Central Command, Maj. Gen. Yehuda Fox, and the commander of the inspection committee, Maj. "It wanted to consider additional points. It was decided to

postpone

the publication to Monday, and military officials claim that there may be another change in the date of publication.

And the professional of the unit, headed by an order to write a temporary camp defense file.

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The officers killed, Ofek Aharon and Itamar Elharar (Photo: Photo processing, IDF Spokesman)

Investigations revealed discrepancies in the temporary camp defense file. The various cruises that trained at the end of the training area of ​​the Navi Musa base and the range camp set up a number of tents at the beginning of the week, where we have the fighters and commanders. A temporary camp protection case should be adapted to the reality on the ground, the topographic conditions and more. After writing the case, there is a chain of actions for its approval and verification that it does take place. Sources who were in the process of investigating the chain of events said that a professional company listener (a soldier in the AB shift) was supposed to regulate the entry and exit of the compound, and give a "stick-light" to each of the officers who went out looking for night vision to prevent double-sided firing. Moreover, the sources stressed that if there were radios for the crew commander and separately for the commanders of the cruises and the PA, this could have prevented the disaster, if they had reported the events in real time.

The second stage is the reason that motivated the crew commander and the cruise commanders separately to go on a field tour to locate the night vision device stolen the day before.

The senior commanders made an effort to separate taking the initiative and the motivation to restore the night vision means, but on the other hand also criticized the way they acted and the low professional level that led to the disaster.

The investigation reveals that the night vision device was not stolen from the team commander nor from any of his soldiers, and was therefore not under pressure.

Attempts to claim action in the spirit of a nut unit were rejected outright.

The action of the team commander was also at the heart of the investigation, since according to senior commanders, if it had taken place in accordance with a basic professional level, such as walking in a squad, with contact, with commanders' approval and planned including detention and backup, things would have looked different on the ground.

A soldier was supposed to give a "stick-light" to each of the officers (Photo: IDF Spokesman)

The investigation reveals that in the seconds before the shooting, the team commander was very alert, with a bullet in his barrel, with a night vision device on his eyes, which greatly limited his vision and contributed to the high alertness.

The officer suddenly saw two figures (two cruise commanders) armed in front of him, opened fire and hit.

One of the cruise commanders managed to return fire but did not hit the crew commander.

According to sources who were exposed to the details of the investigation, the team commander was surprised by the scenario that unfolded before his eyes (two armed figures) and therefore claimed during the interrogation, "I felt an immediate danger to life and shot…".

Two cruise commanders followed the figure of the crew commander for hundreds of meters as he returned to the encampment from a tour of the area.

During the shooting, shouts were heard in Hebrew.

An uninjured sailing commander shouted: "Stop the IDF, stop the IDF," and the shooting was stopped.

The crew chief, a cruise commander and another veteran fighter who were in the area, rushed to provide assistance and then a serious problem of coordination and contact became apparent in order to report the incident and call medical teams quickly.

The chief of staff plans to send a clear message to the tactical echelon about the chain of events and the tragic results. But according to senior commanders he can not be satisfied with that. In addition to the investigation, Rabbi on his subordinates (Lt. Col. A. is decorated with the PLO for his work in Operation Cast Lead), in training and operational activities. The unit, it should be noted, received praise for activity in the Bambam (battle between the wars), but gaps were found in the discipline area.

Another point raised at the heart of the investigations was the attitude towards governance and the ability of the forces to secure themselves during training in the fire areas, which are subject to the constant challenge of valuable equipment, ammunition and ammunition thieves.

The investigation also revealed the instructions for opening fire in IDF fire areas. Gaps were also discovered at this point between IDF orders and what was happening on the ground.

In the seconds before the shooting, the commander of the team was very alert, with a bullet in his barrel (Photo: IDF Spokesman)

The chief of staff's main dilemma is not only the wording of the details and the criticism of the commanders in the elite unit, but the decision on where to draw a red line in the area of ​​responsibility for the incident and the punishment accordingly. The unit, which was established 25 years ago, and the purpose of the unit and the desire to preserve it as a quality force within the commando brigade.

Another very high-quality brigade in the 98th

Division under the command of Brigadier General Ofer Winter.

Among them is the team commander of the Walnut Unit.

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