Alexander Dugin, the thinker who inspires Putin

On February 4, with the conclusion of an agreement of great importance, the meeting between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping marked the beginning of a new international order.

The dissemination of the good news was immediately carried out by the Russian nationalist philosopher Alexander Dugin, who announced the following day the collapse of "global liberalism and Western hegemony", defeated by the emerging bloc of the "great Chinese space and the Eurasian project" , in the current “war of civilizations”.

The appearance of the agreement between Putin and Xi is pluralistic, since it invokes the principle of "multipolarity", the diversity of centers of power on a world scale against the "unipolarism" of the North American hegemony, but in reality the Sino-Russian alliance configures a new center of world power, emerged precisely to confront the outdated

U.S.

It embodies a new bipolarity, both by mutual support for the respective expansionist orientations (Taiwan, implicitly Ukraine) and by designing a strategic alliance between the Eurasian Economic Union, advocated by Putin, and the New Silk Road initiative, projected to global scale, from Xi.

The link between the two autocracies would result in nothing less, say Putin and Xi, than the establishment of democracy, yes, with the characteristics of each nation.

Apparently, the foundation of Putin's strategy would be the ideological arsenal that culminates in the endless twist of Alexander Dugin's work.

At the limit, both converge: Putin feeds on Dugin and then he gives argument to Putin's proposals.

The central concept for Dugin today is that of a multipolar world, in charge of confronting "the spiritual hegemony of the West", rejecting democracy, liberalism, parliamentarism, human rights, individualism.

But not every State can, from its sovereignty, face the challenge.

Here comes the trick: coalitions of states will be necessary and, with respect to the isolated country, “a pole must be located elsewhere”.

The strategic centers from which to build the multipolar world are the civilizations, located between them in dialogue or conflict (war).

The consideration of NATO as anti-Russian brings us to the concrete.

Based on its identity, Russia is the bearer of a civilization, capable of exercising its sovereignty and projecting itself over Eurasia (hence Putin's attraction to Salvini and Le Pen, European sovereignists).

The moral superiority over the West, the result of its religious traditions, closes the circle.

Alexander Dugin's doctrinal construction provides the envelope for Putin.

In his pioneering book,

Indebted to Lev Gumilev and tinged with a Turanic mysticism close to the Turkish Erdogan —Turanism was born in Turkey—, he designs the geopolitical framework of the greatness of Holy Russia, a skillful curtain of current imperialism.

And a sign of the "Asianity" that Stalin used against the Europeanism of Lenin.

Later he will trace the historical vision, starting from the Russia of Kiev (useful for the present), up to the expansion of the tsars, imbued with the traditional values ​​of that "Russian people, Orthodox people", which after the contradictory communist phase, can consummate with Putin.

He had been waiting for it since 1990, with accents of Carl Schmitt: the spiritual elite, after putting an end to the Red Beast, will remake the country “on the brink of the abyss”.

At that time, the central influence will be the neo-fascist Julius Evola,

which will later be replaced by the better furnished reaction of the French philosopher Alain de Benoist.

Always extreme right and radical nationalism, sovereignty.

Until ending in Heidegger.

Two men close to Gorbachev coined the foundations for Dugin.

The reformist Ambarzumov introduced the concept of “near abroad”, the independent environment at the dissolution of the USSR, over which Russia should retain guardianship.

More than ideas, in Transnistria for Moldova and in Abjacia for Georgia.

And above all

Yevgeny Primakov, whose statue stands today in front of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, creator of the concept of “multipolarity”.

It would serve as an antidote to unipolarity, the American monopoly of power on a world scale.

Putin will use it in his 2007 breakup speech, delivered at the Munich Security Conference, relying then on the economic emergence of countries outside the United States.

Now, on that platform, he elaborates his power project.

Such ideas, gathered in a

by Dugin, they are the clothing of an ideology of simpler lines.

Vladimir Putin, a KGB officer in Germany, sees the end of the USSR as a catastrophe, and will dedicate his political life, since his accession to power in 2000, to repairing it.

With caution and determination.

First, he reconquered Chechnya, without challenging the enemy, which is always the USA-NATO binomial.

Since the 2007 speech-manifesto, while proclaiming that only the UN can authorize the use of force between states, he has undertaken territorial recovery actions, first in Georgia, then the Ukrainian coast.

He exhibits his opposition, not only to power, but to Western values, and increasingly focuses on the historical greatness of Russia.

The review of Stalinism, possible since 1991, with the partial opening of the archives, will be annulled step by step,

It is not a matter of formally restoring the USSR, but of constituting Russia as the political, cultural and military center of the broken countries.

With a view to its aggregation.

Military interventions in Belarus and Kazakhstan prove their usefulness to local tyrants.

That is why it is Lukashenko who informs us about Putin's current objective: the Union of States, with Belarus and Ukraine, integrating their institutions into the Russian ones.

We know that for Putin the Russian condition of Ukraine is inalienable.

In a successive circle of guardianship, the countries of the Collective Security Treaty (CSTO), headed by Kazakhstan and Armenia, domesticated after experiencing in the Nagorno-Karabakh war the cost of its president's Europeanism, by losing Russian protection.

Putin explained it with the fable of the prevailing bear in the Siberian taiga,

The retreat on the supposed traditional values, in short, is nothing new in Russian history.

The flash of enlightened root reformism was logically suffocated, not only by the tsars, but by an aristocracy based on the work of serfs.

The enlightened critic Radishchev was successfully succeeded by the historian Karamzin, who inspired a vision of Russia where the misfortune of the people is compensated by their spiritual greatness.

Anti-Europeanism, which will come from

from Danilevski to Solzhenitsyn in stating that no Russian should trust the West.

In the operas of the populist Mussorgski, the archaism of the “old believers” —present in Dugin— is extolled in the face of the evil Latin Jesuits.

The new flash of 1990 was suffocated by the economic collapse.

Back to the past.

A reliable poll from 1994 gave 80% in favor of the resurrection of the USSR, the pride of being Russian and the return to one's own values ​​and traditions.

Against parliamentarism, 63% preferred a strong, personalized power.

They got it.

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