The explosion of a missile resounds in Kiev and in a village in Sudan they do not know if there will be bread for tomorrow.
Without a week of war in Europe having been completed, its global effects are already taking shape.
The invasion of Ukraine reverberates throughout the world and in Africa it takes on the ugly face of famine.
As a more immediate threat, several countries fear a shortage of essential grains.
The dependence of Russia and Ukraine on wheat imports is immense in regional powers such as Egypt, where it reaches 85%.
It is notable in others such as Kenya or Nigeria.
Or in several states in the north of the continent.
But, above all, it deeply affects countries where food security is faltering.
Sudan, for example, imports 65% of its wheat from Russia.
Although the shortage of the precious cereal has not yet settled in international markets, its ghost has already triggered prices.
The increase amounts to 27% in the last month, most concentrated since the start of the Russian offensive last Thursday.
The two countries at war account for almost 30% of world exports.
And everything indicates that a mixture of suffocation sanctions in Russia and productive incapacity in Ukraine will cause a drastic drop in available wheat.
Other agricultural products (especially corn and sunflower oil) that Africa imports massively from Ukraine and Russia could suffer the same fate.
Some analysts who have thoroughly studied Russian-African relations predict bad times for the most vulnerable population.
"The war is going to deeply affect the lives of many poor Africans for whom bread is a fundamental part of their diet," says Steven Gruzd, of the South African Institute of International Affairs, where he coordinates a working group on the growing involvement of Russia on the continent.
From the African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), based in Washington DC, Joseph Siegle does not see major famines on the horizon, since these, he says, "are a problem of supply, but also of demand."
His forecast is that, as long as it continues, "other suppliers will supply wheat or alternatives to replace it" to African countries.
But even if acute malnutrition does not end up preying on entire populations, Siegle admits that the new war "can only aggravate an already pessimistic scenario, adding a layer of fragility."
Shortly before the Russian tanks crossed the Ukrainian borders, the ACSS published a report warning of a “tough year for food security in Africa”, continues Siegle.
Shortly before the Russian tanks crossed the Ukrainian borders, the ACSS published a report warning of a "hard year" for food security in Africa.
Gruzd does not rule out that a scenario of prolonged shortages could lead to protests, including popular uprisings.
“One of the main causes of the Arab Spring was discontent with how economic affairs were being managed in those countries,” he recalls.
Years later, in 2018, the fall of the tyrant Al Bashir in Sudan was baptized with a name that explicitly refers to the ups and downs in the price and supply of wheat: the bread revolution.
“
When people are hungry, they get angry
[when people are hungry, they get angry]”, summarizes Gruzd.
energy and inflation
In addition to the agri-food sector, the energy sector is postulated as the one with the greatest destabilizing impact.
While Europe holds its breath trusting that Russia will not close the tap on its gas pipelines, Africa combines – from a state perspective – fear with the hope of a great opportunity.
Among the importing countries, everything is bad news: transport costs on the rise and the consequent increase in inflation (for wheat and other cereals, prices are thus rising, driven by a double lever).
And meanwhile, the big exporting countries (of gas, like Algeria or Nigeria, but also of oil, like Nigeria itself, Libya or Angola) are rubbing their hands before a present with prices at historical records.
And they daydream with a view into a very rosy future.
If Russian gas stops flowing to the European Union,
But even in those countries that go fishing in troubled waters, few expect the profits to translate into an improvement in the general quality of life.
“As usual, it is the elites who are going to benefit;
the vast majority of the population will simply suffer the consequences of rising prices”, estimates Theodor Neethling, Professor of Political Science at the University of the Free State (South Africa).
It is convenient not to let go of the notion of
elite
(political, economic, military) when addressing the ties that Russia has been cultivating in Africa in recent years.
Russian-style
relations
that, in this new era, begin with the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The first Western sanctions on the expansionist policy of Vladimir Putin –already embarked on his quasi-messianic mission to return the Slavic giant to superpower status– sparked a renewed (until then marginal) interest in the African continent.
A new attention forged on the embers of the Cold War, when the USSR and the US did and undid as they pleased in Africa.
In two articles on the subject, Neethling and Siegle summarize the keys to Russia's rapprochement with Africa.
Opaque deals signed at the highest level, without public scrutiny, often exchanging weapons for minerals (uranium in Namibia, aluminum in Guinea, platinum in Zimbabwe...).
Vague promises and projects (for now) without specifying to build nuclear power plants.
Growing participation of paramilitary companies –with Wagner Group mercenaries at the helm– in insurgency or counter-insurgency activities, to suit the consumer.
Rough men, dressed in camouflage, but without an army, proliferate in Africa.
“You see them everywhere: Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea...”, says Gruzd.
"Russia has no qualms about gaining influence through, to put it mildly, untraditional means," adds Siegle.
Geostrategic deck
The historian specializing in Africa Irina Filatova, a professor at the prestigious High School of Economics (HSE) in Moscow, maintains that Russia, aware of its limitations (it has a lower GDP than Italy), has arranged a flexible assortment for Africa that is selling shrewdly.
In the African geostrategic deck, Filatova points out, the country “has been playing its good cards intelligently for years, which are not many.
It is already the main arms exporter on the continent.
And by using mercenaries, you don't have to involve the army for coordination, you just have to send
advisers
”.
Russia's growing political influence in Africa is reflected in images unimaginable a few years ago.
In recent months, videos and photos of Russian flags have been seen in demonstrations of public fervor in Mali or Burkina Faso.
There, two separate military coups gave off an unmistakable Russian aroma.
#BurkinaFaso: Pro-coup demonstrators flying a Russian flag through the streets of Ouagadougou this morning.
Pro-coup demonstrations in the capitol have taken a notably pro-#Russia position, raising questions of Russian involvement in this week's coup.
(1/2)
(via @Henry_Wilkins) pic.twitter.com/Nrv6kUgLyV
– POPULAR FRONT (@PopularFront_) January 25, 2022
More relevant to the geostrategic future of the region is the lukewarmness with which Africa has reacted to the invasion of Ukraine.
Few states (Kenya, South Africa or Ghana) have issued convictions without hesitation.
Most have opted for silence or equidistance.
“There is reluctance when it comes to criticizing Russia for a matter of national interest: African countries do not want to close their doors to having the partners they freely choose.
But also because of a deep-rooted anti-colonial and anti-American sentiment, which paves the way for many to buy into the story that the West is to blame for expanding NATO to the east,” Gruzd considers.
None of the experts consulted has any doubts about the effect on Africa of a Russia that has become a pariah for the West.
They affirm in unison that Moscow will turn its energies even more on the continent.
"Russia's return to Africa came after the 2014 sanctions, which are nothing compared to the ones being imposed now," says Gruzd.
“The European Union and the US would be wrong to put pressure on African countries to choose between themselves or Russia.
Much less to those less committed to democracy, who, not coincidentally, tend to be firm allies of Moscow, "says Siegle.
The ACSS research director encourages not to repeat the mistakes "of the 60s, 70s and 80s, when both sides fought to get the support of any dictator at any price, a strategy that cost Africa so much".
In this uncertain scenario, Filatova sees a new Cold War in Africa as inevitable, although not bipolar, "like the first", but with China and even India also acting as leading actors.
The Russian historian even launches a prediction: "It is not unlikely that China will occupy the economic hegemony and let Russia do in the military sphere, as long as it does not interfere in its interests."
In her opinion, the West would, in this scenario, withdraw little by little from the continent.
Quite a few questions hang over the upcoming Russia-Africa summit.
The first was held in Sochi in 2019. Putin returned to Moscow with a handful of juicy deals in his pocket.
The second is scheduled for November this year.
In principle, awaits St. Petersburg.
Although today, the simple question of whether it will take place is nothing more than mere speculation.
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